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INTRODUCCION 
 
El objetivo principal de esta tesis es analizar el realismo interno de Hilary Putnam en 
comparación con el realismo metafísico y el realismo natural. La razón por la que se 
establece dicha comparación es que Putnam adoptó brevemente cada uno de éstos tres 
enfoques, y en sus últimos escritos privilegió al realismo natural (inspirado por William 
James), rechazando el realismo metafísico y el realismo interno. El rechazo de Putnam 
hacia su propia doctrina del realismo interno comienza con las “Respuestas a algunas 
críticas” (Putnam, 1992) y llega hasta sus últimos artículos (especialmente su 2012a). 
En dichos artículos Putnam reprocha al realismo interno de reproducir el modelo 
epistemológico Cartesiano al cual precisamente se proponía reemplazar. De acuerdo a 
esta crítica, el realismo interno se basa en la idea de una “interface”1 (compuesta por 
esquemas conceptuales y sense-data) entre la mente y el mundo, reproduciendo así una 
dicotomía epistemológica tradicional.     
En la tesis argumento que esta crítica no reconoce ni le hace justicia a todas las 
consecuencias del realismo interno, como por ejemplo, el postulado que “la mente y el 
mundo conjuntamente producen a la mente y el mundo.” (Putnam 1981: xi) Esta 
metáfora (aunque fuera rechazada por Putnam en su período de realista natural), resume 
adecuadamente los propósitos dinámicos y holísticos del realismo interno: los esquemas 
conceptuales, más que moldes para interpretar una realidad independiente, son 
catalizadores por medio de los cuales el mundo se expresa y es experimentado.  Por lo 
tanto, si se conciben de esta forma, los esquemas conceptuales se asemejan a las 
“formas de estar abiertos al mundo” defendidas por el realismo natural. Tomando esto 
en consideración –y también considerando que el realismo interno posee elementos que 
                                                 
1
 Esta idea sostiene que “nuestros poderes cognitivos no pueden penetrar en la realidad de los objetos.” 
(Putnam, 1999: 10) 
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efectivamente responden a las antinomias del realismo metafísico-, el rechazo de 
Putnam al realismo interno en favor del realismo natural parece injustificado. Tal punto 
será enfatizado en la presente tesis. De manera que, la larga carrera filosófica de Putnam 
nos invita a preguntarnos por qué el realismo interno (que es una alternativa al realismo 
metafísico) debe ser abandonado en beneficio del realismo natural.   
El realismo interno de Putnam (un enfoque que fue adoptado por Putnam desde su 
ensayo “Realismo y Razón” en 1976, hasta su libro Realismo con Rostro Humano, 
1990), tenía como objetivo “aclarar los problemas que ciertas dicotomías producen en 
el pensamiento de filósofos y hombres del común.” (Putnam, 1981: ix) De acuerdo a lo 
que sostiene Putnam en este período, la filosofía se ve tradicionalmente confrontada a 
dos “temperamentos”: el realismo metafísico y el relativismo. El realismo interno surge 
entonces como una alternativa conciliadora entre ambos enfoques, favoreciendo algunas 
tesis del realismo metafísico (aunque rechazando la mayoría de éstas, particularmente la 
teoría de la verdad como correspondencia) y concediéndole también algunos puntos al 
relativista (pero negando rotundamente que un esquema conceptual sea tan apropiado 
como otro en relación con ciertos propósitos.)  
El interés central de Putnam durante su período “internalista” fue de responder a las 
antinomias creadas por el realismo metafísico, la doctrina que sostiene que “el mundo 
consiste de una totalidad fija de objetos independientes de la mente.” (Putnam, 1981: 
49) De acuerdo a la crítica que el realismo interno hace contra el realismo metafísico, 
esta última doctrina sostiene que “existe solamente una única y verdadera descripción 
de la ‘forma en que el mundo es’. La verdad implica una cierta relación de 
correspondencia entre las palabras o pensamientos y los objetos exteriores.” (Putnam, 
1981: 49) En oposición a esta idea, el realismo interno sostiene que la pregunta  “¿de 
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qué objetos se compone el mundo?” es una pregunta que sólo tiene sentido hacer al 
interior de una teoría o una descripción.” (Putnam, 1981: 49) 
Putnam pretendió que el enfoque epistémico de la verdad (identificándola con la 
idealización de la aseverabilidad garantizada) del realismo interno fuera una alternativa 
a la teoría tradicional de la verdad como correspondencia del realismo metafísico. De 
acuerdo al enfoque de Putnam, un enunciado será verdadero si su aseverabilidad está 
garantizada por condiciones objetivas, no porque represente una realidad independiente 
de la mente, como afirma el realismo metafísico. Como se evidenciará en esta tesis, el 
problema de la verdad es una de las mayores preocupaciones del realismo interno. Sin 
embargo, la idea de la verdad como epistémica no fue la única alternativa que Putnam 
postula contra el realismo metafísico, pues para comprender el realismo interno también 
resulta necesario analizar la relatividad conceptual y los esquemas conceptuales.      
En sus últimos escritos (2012a) Putnam concibió el fenómeno de la relatividad 
conceptual como un fenómeno exclusivamente científico que se reduce a la Mereología 
y le presta menos atención al fenómeno similar del pluralismo conceptual, el cual hace 
referencia a descripciones no equivalentes que pertenecen a ‘esquemas’ que no pueden 
ser sistemáticamente traducidos entre sí. Eventualmente (luego de la publicación del 
artículo de 1997 de Jeniffer Case), Putnam acepta que los esquemas conceptuales deben 
ser entendidos como lenguajes opcionales, lo cual permite reconocer el hecho que toda 
descripción permite diferentes convenciones y opciones, mientras que el pluralismo 
conceptual hace referencia a lenguajes naturales, los cuales no permiten una alternativa 
diferente a su uso.  
Putnam rechaza el realismo interno pues, como él llegó a verlo, se basa en el dualismo 
subjetivo/objetivo, lo cual es inaceptable en la filosofía de Putnam. Sin embargo, como 
argumento en la tesis, esta es una crítica que no penetra en la esencia del realismo 
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interno, pues, por el contrario, la idea internalista que la mente y el mundo 
conjuntamente producen a la mente y el mundo no descansa sobre la dicotomía 
subjetivo/objetivo ni sobre la dicotomía entre esquema y contenido, pues rechaza tal 
pensamiento dicotómico. El realismo interno insiste que no hay nada acerca de lo cual 
se pueda decir algo, o saberse algo, o creerse, a menos que sea lingüísticamente. De 
igual forma, para que el lenguaje tenga algún significado éste debe referirse a algo sobre 
lo cual se ha llegado a un acuerdo, una realidad diferente del lenguaje, pero que solo 
puede ser referida conceptualmente y en el marco del lenguaje.   
Una vez hayamos comprendido las ideas de la verdad como epistémica, la relatividad 
conceptual como pluralismo, y los esquemas conceptuales como lenguajes opcionales, 
la metáfora de Putnam que dice que la mente y el mundo producen conjuntamente a la 
mente y el mundo, tendrá más sentido.  
Sin embargo, el realismo interno fue un enfoque el cual Putnam no mantuvo por mucho 
tiempo. Al inicio de la década de 1990 (particularmente en su “Respuesta a Simon 
Blackburn”, en Putnam 1994b) comienza a encontrar algunas deficiencias en esta 
doctrina y comienza a acercarse al realismo natural, inspirado por el “empirismo 
radical” de William James.  
Según la crítica que Putnam hiciera al realismo interno en sus Conferencias Dewey 
(1999), el realista interno insiste en la idea que la realidad se percibe por medio de una 
“interface”,  reteniendo así una característica importante de la idea Cartesiana de la 
percepción:  
De acuerdo a lo que decía mi propuesta, el mundo determina si se está en una 
condición epistémica adecuada o si simplemente se cree estarlo, reteniendo así 
una idea importante del realismo del sentido común. Sin embargo, la 
concepción de dicha situación epistémica era, en última instancia, aquella de la 
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antigua tradición epistemológica. Dicha propuesta aún retenía la premisa básica 
de una interface entre la mente y lo que está fuera de ella. (Putnam, 1999: 18) 
Putnam insiste en que el realismo interno se expone a todos los problemas que se 
suponía debía resolver. Por ejemplo, tal como lo afirma Putnam, la esencia del realismo 
interno es la semántica verificacionista, inspirada por Michael Dummett. En la versión 
de Putnam de esta semántica, la verdad se identifica con la verificabilidad bajo 
condiciones epistémicas ideales. Sin embargo, Putnam señala  que existe un problema 
concerniente al acceso referencial a dichas condiciones ideales, pues de acuerdo al 
enfoque internalista, “el mundo determina si se está en una condición epistémica 
adecuada o si simplemente se cree estarlo.” (Putnam, 1999: 18)  
Eventualmente, Putnam critica que este tipo de verificacionismo, basado en la 
interacción de los esquemas conceptuales con los sense-data, permea negativamente 
todo el enfoque internalista:  
Según el enfoque del realismo interno, no son solo nuestras experiencias 
(concebidas como ‘sense-data’) las que son una interface entre mente y mundo; 
también los ‘esquemas conceptuales’ son concebidos como tal interface. Estas 
dos ‘interfaces’ están relacionadas en la medida en que yo creía que nuestras 
formas de conceptualización y juegos de lenguaje eran controlados por 
‘restricciones operacionales’ que en última instancia se reducían a sense-data. 
(Putnam 2012b: 26)  
De una manera bastante cercana al realismo interno, el realismo natural que adopta 
Putnam también es concebido como una alternativa al realismo metafísico y el 
relativismo. Tal enfoque es concebido como  
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una forma de reivindicar el hecho que las afirmaciones epistémicas responden 
a una realidad, sin necesariamente caer en una fantasía metafísica. [El realismo 
natural es] un punto conciliatorio entre la metafísica más reaccionaria y el 
relativismo más irresponsable. (Putnam, 1999: 4, 5)  
Es entonces bastante evidente que tanto el realismo interno como el realismo natural son 
concebidos como alternativas o “terceras vías” ante el realismo metafísico y el 
relativismo. Sin embargo, Putnam insiste en una característica del realismo natural que 
no hace parte del realismo interno, a saber, la existencia de una realidad independiente 
de su conceptualización: “A mi forma de ver, un realista natural, sostiene que los 
objetos de la percepción (normal y ‘verídica’) son cosas externas y, generalmente, 
aspectos de una realidad ‘externa’.” (Putnam, 1999: 10)  
El realismo natural es una alternativa a la “antinomia” realista que surge cuando se 
intenta dar una explicación de la relación entre el lenguaje y el mundo y al mismo 
tiempo se acepta la doctrina Cartesiana de la percepción:  
A pesar de estar de acuerdo en que se necesita urgentemente una “tercera vía” 
aparte del realismo moderno y el idealismo de Dummett, tal tercera vía debe 
insistir, como lo ha hecho McDowell constantemente, que existe una antinomia 
y no simplemente mezclar elementos del realismo moderno con elementos del 
enfoque idealista. Ninguna concepción que retenga algo parecido a la noción 
tradicional de los sense-data puede permitir una salida válida, pues 
inevitablemente, tal concepción, siempre nos confrontará con lo que parece ser 
un problema sin solución. (1999: 18)  
Putnam insiste entonces en que el realismo natural nos pone en contacto con la realidad 
y afirma que esta doctrina  nos permite estar “abiertos al mundo e interactuar con él, de 
manera que diferentes aspectos de éste nos sean revelados.” (Putnam 2012b: 27)  
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Con el objetivo de contextualizar al realismo interno y confrontarlo con el realismo 
metafísico y natural, haré uso de algunos argumentos que conllevan consecuencias 
similares y que, de cierta forma, han influenciado la filosofía de Putnam. Tales 
argumentos son los de William James, Wilfrid Sellars, y Donald Davidson, al igual que 
el argumento kantiano de John McDowell en Mente y Mundo, también conocido como  
Conceptualismo. Estos argumentos enfatizan la idea kantiana que las percepciones sin 
conceptos son ciegas
2
: cuando el lenguaje es concebido como una herramienta para 
interactuar con la realidad, en vez de concebírsele como la representación de una 
realidad independiente de la mente, la idea de la interconexión entre el lenguaje y la 
realidad se hace más clara. De acuerdo a tal idea, el lenguaje crea y procesa aquello que 
llamamos realidad; por lo tanto, las pretensiones del realismo metafísico de un lado, y la 
pretensión del empirismo de justificar la independencia de la realidad por medio de 
sensaciones, del otro lado, resultan injustificadas.  
Las opiniones de Putnam acerca del realismo y la relación entre la mente y el mundo 
han cambiado tanto e implican tanta sofisticación de su parte que, para comprenderlas, 
es necesario analizar el tema rigurosamente y considerar los diferentes argumentos que 
sobre el tema se han ofrecido. El hecho de considerar los argumentos de los filósofos 
mencionados no significa que éstos hayan tenido razón y que Putnam se haya 
equivocado, ni tampoco que éstos tuvieran una visión unificada con respecto al 
realismo. En lugar de esto, trataré de utilizar los argumentos de dichos filósofos para 
entablar una discusión con Putnam, tal como éste lo hiciera. Por lo tanto, el análisis del 
realismo interno también se verá acompañado de una discusión que busca presentar las 
ventajas de este enfoque.     
                                                 
2
 Sin embargo, se debe enfatizar en que el realismo interno no acepta el kantianismo tout court. De hecho, 
la doctrina kantiana dela intuición y las cosas en sí mismas, y la dicotomía entre espontaneidad y 
receptividad son rechazadas por Putnam. 
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Naturalmente, los textos a los que más atención se les dará son aquellos que, de un lado, 
exponen la doctrina y las consecuencias del realismo interno, como lo son Razón, 
Verdad, e Historia (1981), Las Mil Caras del Realismo (1987), y Realismo con Rostro 
Humano (1990); y del otro lado, los textos en que se rechaza tal enfoque y se desarrolla 
el realismo natural, como lo son la “Respuesta a  Simon Blackburn” (1994), La Trenza 
de Tres Cabos (Conferencias Dewey, 1999),  y “From Quantum Mechanics to Ethics 
and Back Again” (2012a)3.  
En el primer capítulo analizo la doctrina del realismo metafísico tal como Putnam la 
enfrentó. De manera que se intentará mostrar una doctrina coherente frente a la cual 
Putnam propuso su realismo interno. En el segundo capítulo discuto el “progreso” que 
hizo Putnam desde sus primeros intentos por responder las antinomias del realismo 
metafísico, incluyendo el artículo “Realismo y Razón” y el célebre argumento de los 
Cerebros en una Cubeta. El tercer capítulo es un análisis de uno de los puntos centrales 
del realismo interno, la verdad como aseverabilidad garantizada. En dicho capítulo 
defiendo la idea que esta concepción de la verdad no es del todo contraria a la 
concepción de la verdad como sentido común adoptada por Putnam en las Conferencias 
Dewey. El cuarto capítulo se ocupa de analizar la relación y el lugar de los esquemas 
conceptuales en el realismo interno. En éste capítulo defiendo la idea (propuesta por 
Jennifer Case, 2001) que los esquemas conceptuales deben ser entendidos como 
lenguajes opcionales. El quinto capítulo es una confrontación entre el realismo interno y 
el realismo natural. Espero mostrar en éste capítulo que, luego del análisis de ambos 
enfoques, la idea de una semejanza entre éstos no es del todo obsoleta.   
 
                                                 
3
 Tanto en su  2012a, y su 2012b, Putnam de nuevo cambia su posición frente a los qualia. Inspirado por 
dos recientes artículos de Ned Block (2007, 2012), Putnam ahora admite que los qualia son necesarios 
para comprender la conciencia, a diferencia de lo dicho en La Trenza de Tres Cabos. Por razones 
metodológicas no consideraré esta nueva posición y me centraré en lo dicho en las Conferencias Dewey.   
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Chapter 1 
THE PROBLEM OF REALISM 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Metaphysical Realism, described as “a claim about what entities exist and a claim 
about their independent nature” (Michael Devitt, 1984: 14), has been mostly 
understood as the thesis that (i) there are distinctive facts related to a certain domain, 
and (ii) that their existence and objectivity is mind-independent. As such, it has been 
historically opposed to all sorts of idealism, in the sense that metaphysical realism 
challenges the idea that all of reality is mental. Such sort of idealism finds expression in 
Bishop Berkeley’s doctrine that all ideas -and thus all reality- depend on God’s 
omniscient mind. However, the metaphysical realism which will concern us is the sort 
that opposes not Berkeley’s but Kant’s idealism. For Kant, what counts as an object of 
experience is mediated by the a priori categories of the mind. Thus, all of human 
knowledge is mediated and scanned through innate categories. However, such 
categories are limited and cannot penetrate into the ultimate reality of things in 
themselves; thus, human knowledge is limited to the field of phenomena, whereas the 
realm of noumena, the thing in itself, is unreachable for us humans.      
Metaphysical realism is a qualified rejection of such idealism, since it claims that what 
we call reality does not depend on any mental categories or any conceptual schemes. 
For the metaphysical realist there are large parts of reality which do not owe their 
existence to any mental states or human conventions. However, some realists -most 
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notably Thomas Nagel (1986) - claim that truth and objectivity outstrip evidence and 
justification, and thus the Kantian idea of noumena becomes central for them.  
Metaphysical realism also carries for some -notably Crispin Wright (1993, 1994) - an 
epistemological thesis which claims that this doctrine is also concerned with the 
knowledge of a mind-independent reality: 
Realism is a mixture of modesty and presumption. It modestly allows that 
humankind confronts an objective world, something almost entirely not of our 
making, possessing a host of occasional features which may pass altogether 
unnoticed by human consciousness and whose innermost nomological secrets 
may remain forever hidden from us. However, it presumes that we are, by and 
large and in favorable circumstances, capable of acquiring knowledge of the 
world and of understanding it. (Wright 1993: 1)  
Putnam’s internal realism can be better understood as a response to a qualified brand of 
metaphysical realism, namely, minimal realism. Such doctrine -held most notably by 
John Searle (1995) and William Alston (1996)- holds that there are some significant 
stretches of what we call reality that are brute facts, and therefore do not depend on any 
human conceptualization. Minimal realists accept that social reality depends mostly on 
human convention and language; however, as they argue, there are large chunks of 
mind-independent reality which allow for social reality’s existence. Putnam’s internal 
realism is taken as the most obvious opponent of minimal realism, in the sense that it is 
used negatively to describe such doctrine:  
We can think of metaphysical realism as defined by the denial of a semi-
Kantian position paradigmatically represented by the post-1980 Hilary Putnam: 
‘… what objects does the world consist of? Is a question that it only makes 
sense to ask within a theory or description….’ (Alston 2002: 98) 
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In what follows, I will briefly discuss this brand of realism and will not be concerned 
with epistemological questions about realism, since for Nagel, Searle and Alston, as 
well as for Boyd and Devitt, with whom I will also be concerned, epistemological 
claims about reality come only second to ontological and metaphysical claims
4
, and thus 
they present their realism mostly as an ontological thesis. However, after their 
assessment of metaphysical realism is done, I would turn to epistemological and 
semantic questions which, as Putnam’s internal realism shows, are necessary.          
 
1.2. Minimal Realism 
a. Thomas Nagel and the view from Nowhere 
In The View from Nowhere (1986), Thomas Nagel, characterizes thus the confrontation 
between realism and idealism: “The realism I am defending says the world may be 
inconceivable to our minds, and the idealism I am opposing says it could not be.” 
(Nagel, 1986: 91) Thus, realism, as opposed to idealism, claims that  
there may be aspects of reality beyond … [human objectivity’s] reach because 
they are altogether beyond our capacity to form conceptions of the world. What 
there is and what we, in virtue of our nature, can think about are different 
things, and the latter may be smaller than the former. (Nagel, 1986: 91)  
Thus, idealism seems a limiting view of reality, a sort of Protagorean view which limits 
the universe to the bounds of human understanding:  
The idea that the contents of the universe are limited by our capacity for 
thought is easily recognized as a philosophical view, which at first sight seems 
                                                 
4
 The reason they give for this is that in order to know that p, I must first acknowledge p’s existence. As 
we shall see in what follows, this statement is not doubt-free, for it is not specified how is it that one 
comes to know about the existence of p. 
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crazily self-important given what small and contingent pieces of the universe 
we are. It is a view that no one would hold except for philosophical reasons 
that seem to rule out the natural picture
5… What there is, or what is the case, 
does not coincide necessarily with what is a possible object of thought for us. 
Even if through some miracle we are capable in principle of conceiving of 
everything there is, that is not what makes it real. (Nagel, 1986: 92)  
It is clear that for Nagel, as well as for John Searle, as we shall see, external realism 
implies stepping out of language and our humanity to achieve a privileged View from 
Nowhere, a God’s Eye View which determines the reality and existence of objects 
which humans cannot conceive of (Nagel, 1986; Searle, 1995). 
Nagel admits, though, that external realism cannot be made sense of, at least not 
positively:  
My argument will be essentially negative. I believe that the statement of a 
realist position can be rejected as unintelligible only on grounds which would 
also require the abandonment of other, much less controversial claims. My 
position is that realism makes as much sense as many other unverifiable 
statements, even though all of them, and all thought, may present fundamental 
philosophical mysteries to which there is at present no solution. (Nagel, 1986: 
95)  
Thus, Nagel also shares Searle’s conviction that external realism (ER) must be taken as 
a background premise for communication; a premise which excludes any sort of 
positive proof. In this respect, Nagel and Searle share a conviction on ER which was 
arrived at by realizing the necessity of presuppositions for communication -rather than 
                                                 
5
 “That picture is that the universe and most of what goes on in it are completely independent of our 
thoughts, but that since our ancestors appeared on Earth we have gradually developed the capacity to 
think about, know about, and represent more and more aspects of reality.” (Nagel, 1986: 93) 
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arrived at after logical proof or rational justification. As it will be argued later, the 
internal realism of Hilary Putnam helps us realize that in order to achieve such 
conviction one must trod the path of human conventions first, and not the other way 
around. 
For Nagel, the belief in ER is related to the possibility that reality extends beyond the 
reach of human understanding:  
There are plenty of ordinary human beings who constitutionally lack the 
capacity to conceive of some of the things that others know about. People blind 
or deaf from birth cannot understand colors or sounds. People with a 
permanent mental age of nine cannot come to understand Maxwell’s equations 
or the general theory of relativity or Gödel’s theorem. These are all humans, 
but we could equally well imagine a species for whom these characteristics 
were normal, able to think and know about the world in certain respects, but 
not in all. Such people could have a language, and might be similar enough to 
us so that their language was translatable into part of ours. If there could be 
people like that coexisting with us, there could also be such people if we did 
not exist -that is, if there were no one capable of conceiving of these things that 
they cannot understand. Then their position in the world would be analogous to 
the one which I have claimed we are probably in. (Nagel, 1986: 95)  
All of this is granted and even unproblematic. Admitting that the universe might be 
more complex than what our limited understanding can conceive is not a metaphysical 
claim but simply a sign of intellectual modesty. However, that possibility doesn’t imply 
that we must accept an undetermined and unconceivable something (things in 
themselves) as a determined and conceivable thing. Spinoza, in the 17
th
 century, saw 
this very clearly when he said that Nature might consist of an infinite number of 
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attributes; however, our limited understanding only perceives the two attributes of 
thought and extension. What Spinoza saw as a logical and metaphysical impossibility, 
one can think of as a pragmatic commodity: why should we bother with a so-called 
“reality” which is inconceivable for us if every attempt that we do to “conceive” of such 
possibility we end up denying that very possibility? To think of an unconceivable 
something seems to be a self-refuting enterprise since the trail of the intentional serpent 
is over all.  
There seem to be two different referring entities in this problem: on the one hand, -and 
granting the realist’s point- we have “the unconceivable” as a referring possibility, in 
the sense that it refers negatively to the limits of our understanding. Such unconceivable 
entity is unproblematic, since it merely refers to the possibility that there might be 
things which are outside our current understanding. Accepting this possibility is a 
rational acceptance of our limited -though ever expanding- knowledge. The other 
referring entity (the “positive” entity) is the “reality” which, according to the realist, 
“exists” outside our conceiving capabilities, and which Searle and Nagel advocate. It is 
precisely this “referring entity” which I see as unconceivable, since -according to the 
realist- we refer to it not even from the perspective of any language - and yet, the realist 
is speaking of it!!-, but from a View from Nowhere which supposes that an “intentional 
neutrality” is possible outside of human language.  
 
b. William Alston  
William Alston championed (1996, 2002) a brand of modest or minimal Realism (mR) 
in which that doctrine is deprived of any epistemological claims. What is at stake for 
minimal realism is what there is, not how we come to know it. Alston’s realism is 
“minimal” since, as opposed to more ambitious claims, it “modestly” acknowledges that 
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there are some parts of reality which are what they are due to human conventions and 
language; such is the case, for example, of scientific theories. However, according to 
Alston, much of what we find out there enjoys an an sich status, namely, it is what it is 
regardless of our conceptions. Among the many things which are supposed to enjoy an 
in itself reality we find “familiar kinds of stuff and portions thereof- water, earth, sugar, 
manure, snow…” (Alston, 2002: 99) We must stop here and anticipate a little the 
argument which I will pursue throughout this chapter. When I come to present Searle’s 
realism I will discuss the cases for natural physical objects, such as mountains; 
however, it is interesting to reflect about Alston’s example of sugar. It is nevertheless 
strange how it is that sugar enjoys a reality in itself, since it obviously is a human 
product. However, I think Alston is claiming that the components of sugar are what they 
are regardless of our conceptual schemes and conventions. Regardless of how we speak 
and how we think, sugar will always be composed by carbon hydrates. However, it is 
not so clear why a carbon hydrate would enjoy an an sich reality and be what it is 
independently of any conventions if one admits, as Alston has already acknowledged, 
that scientific theories do not have such status and that they are what they are due to 
human conventions. If scientific theories depend on human convention, then what they 
count as a carbon hydrate depends on equal conventions. The realist is committed to a 
rather old fashioned metaphysical picture when he claims that reality consists 
necessarily of such and such objects and ultimate components. 
Alston believes that metaphysical realism, in order to stand on its own, needs to be 
qualified. Thus, he claims that it must be rid of the extra baggage which gets its 
formulation in trouble. For Alston, such extra baggage amounts to the correspondence 
theory of truth and the idea of a unique correct description of the world (something 
similar to the “Absolute Conception of the World”, defended by Bernard Williams in 
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his 1985). Alston believes that if he can show that realism does not imply these two last 
doctrines, then his minimal realism becomes a good candidate for being a true 
description of reality. So he proceeds negatively, by trying to find flaws in Putnam’s 
formulation of metaphysical realism.  
Alston notes that Putnam describes Metaphysical Realism as the conjunction of three 
theses which supposedly imply each other: 
M1. The world consists of a fixed totality of mind independent objects. 
M2. There is exactly one true and complete description of the way the world is. 
M3. Truth involves a correspondence relation between words or thoughts and 
external things. 
6
 
Alston’s argument will depend on Putnam’s claim that each of these theses implies the 
other; thus, if he can show that neither M2 or M3 follow from M1, then he would have 
shown that metaphysical realism survives a crucial challenge, thus getting closer to 
truth. 
As we have seen, Alston’s minimal realism is more modest than Putnam’s account of 
realism in M1, for it doesn’t claim that all of reality enjoys an an sich status, but only 
some parts of it. However, for argument’s sake, Alston acknowledges M1 as an 
appropriate and workable formulation of realism. 
Through Putnam’s favorite example of mereology7, Alston argues that metaphysical 
realism does not necessarily imply a unique correct description of reality, for it is 
compatible with such alternative accounts of reality as well. Thus, metaphysical realism 
would be compatible with an account which divides the world into objects in different 
                                                 
6
 See Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History, p. 49, and also Realism with a Human Face, p. 31. 
7
 Since a good deal will be said about it when we come directly to Putnam’s ideas on the topic, mereology 
will only be mentioned here in passing. 
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and incompatible ways: “consistency is preserved because the bases on which each of 
these [mereological] divisions is made is itself something that exists and is what it is 
independently of our choices between those divisions.” (Alston, 2002: 104) To support 
this thesis, and to show Putnam’s inconsistency, Alston brings an example from Putnam 
himself:  
How we go about answering the question ‘How many objects are there?’- The 
method of ‘counting’, or the notion of what constitutes an ‘object’- depend on 
our choice… but the answer does not thereby become a matter of convention. 
(Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, 32-33, quoted in Alston 2002: 110)  
However, Alston fails to see the importance of the implication between M1 and M2 
above. Putnam’s quote continues thus: “There are ‘external facts’, and we can say what 
they are. What we cannot say -because it makes no sense- is what the facts are 
independent of all conceptual choices.” (Putnam, 1987: 33) For Putnam, mereology 
makes sense, since it is not tied to a metaphysical ontological thesis. Putnam’s internal 
realism doesn’t go as far as denying the existence of external facts or objects; in fact, he 
acknowledges that there is something out there. However, the answer to what is out 
there is a matter that depends on our conceptual choices, as mereology shows. What is 
not conventional is the very answer that each choice gives us, for each conceptual 
scheme responds to its own contrivances and rules. Thus, in his example of mereology, 
in determining whether there are on the table three or seven objects, he says that  
If I choose Carnap’s language, I must say there are three objects because that 
is how many there are. If I choose the Polish logician’s language, I must say 
there are seven objects, because that is how many objects (in the Polish 
logician’s sense of ‘object’) there are. (Putnam, 1987: 33)  
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Again, for the internal realist there is no doubt that there is something “out there”; 
however, the answer to what there is is a matter of convention. This is pretty much the 
opposite of the metaphysical thesis which holds that the world consists of a fixed 
totality of mind-independent facts (M1). And such thesis is completely interrelated to 
(and implies) M2, the thesis which holds that there is a unique correct description of 
reality. The reason for such closed implication is that one cannot hold that reality 
consists of a fixed number of n objects without necessarily restricting one’s account of 
it. So the difference between an internalist account and a metaphysical one is that this 
last one restricts the possibilities of descriptions to a privileged language, be it physics, 
theology, or what he wills
8
. So, after all, M1 implies M2, restricting thus the 
metaphysical realist to a limited and univocal description of reality.  
This same argument holds for showing that the correspondence theory of truth (M3) is 
also implied by -and in direct relation with- M1. Alston argues that the basic thesis of 
metaphysical realism, M1, can stand on its own without carrying the criticisms against 
the correspondence theory of truth; thus, Putnam’s critique of metaphysical realism 
could be more easily discarded. However, if the realist holds M1, then it would become 
clear that any true statement must refer and correspond to the facts recognized by M1, 
not any others (since, then, such statements would be about something “unreal”, and 
thus untrue). But Alston doesn’t see matters this way. According to him, it is perfectly 
possible for the metaphysical realist to embrace M1 and still hold an internalist account 
of reality through mereology. However, I have just argued that this is not possible: since 
                                                 
8
 For Putnam, as we shall see in next chapters, internal realism must keep open the options of verification, 
lest it becomes a metaphysical doctrine: “I refuse to limit in advance what means of verification may 
become available to human beings. There is no restriction (in my concept of verification) to mathematical 
deduction plus scientific experimentation. If some people want to claim that even metaphysical statements 
are verifiable, and that there is, after all a method of ‘metaphysical verification’ by which we can 
determine that numbers ‘really exist’, well and good;… The difference between ‘verificationism’ in this 
sense and ´verificationism´ in the positivist sense is precisely the difference between the generous and 
open-minded attitude that William James called ‘pragmatism’ and science worship.” (Putnam, 1990: ix) 
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M1 holds that there is a restriction on what counts as an “object of reality”, there is a 
fixed totality of such objects. When I come to asses Michael Devitt’s version of Realism 
(3 sections below), we will meet again with the problem of the correspondence theory 
of truth and the realist’s denial that his own doctrine doesn’t need such theory. 
However, as we have just seen now, and as it will be argued later, Realism without 
correspondence is meaningless.    
The metaphysical realist, then, is not burden-free. By assuming that there is a fixed 
totality of real objects and facts he is committed to the twin theses that there is a unique 
description of such reality and that true statements correspond such reality. Alston’s 
criticism of Putnam fails to see this point, and believes that the realist can naively hold 
M1.  
However, as Alston himself acknowledged, his minimal realism is much more modest 
than M1, for it only holds that there are some parts of reality which enjoy an an sich 
reality. And it is precisely to this sort of minimal realism which we turn our attention 
now.      
c.  John Searle  
In The Construction of Social Reality (1995), John Searle identifies Realism as an 
ontological thesis instead of a necessarily epistemic thesis. For Searle, Realism states 
that 
(1.) The world (or alternatively, reality or the universe) exists independently of 
our representations of it.  
This is identified as external realism, which according to Searle is an ontological thesis, 
not an epistemological one, because it says that there exists a reality independent of our 
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representations, whereas it doesn’t say anything about how we come to know such 
reality; therefore, it is not an epistemic thesis or a thesis about truth:  
Realism is the view that there is a way that things are that is logically 
independent of all human representations. Realism does not say how things are, 
but only that there is a way that they are. And “things” in the previous 
sentences does not mean material objects or even objects. (Searle, 1995: 155)  
Searle expects to face the anti-realist epistemic claim which demands from the Realist 
an explanation of why things are one way rather than another (for example, why does 
the “absolute” language of physics “really” describes reality as opposed to 
commonsense language) by holding a non-epistemic view of Realism and thus avoiding 
making claims of how the world is in fact. According to Searle, the Realist is not saying 
that reality is one way rather than another; the Realist is simply saying (also blocking 
the Skeptic and Idealist, according to Searle) that there is a reality independent of 
representations:  
Realism does not say that the world had to turn out one way rather than 
another, but only that there is a way that it did turn out that is independent of 
our representations of it. Representations are one thing, the reality represented 
another, and this point is true even if it should turn out that the only actual 
reality is mental states. (Searle, 1995: 156)  
However, is it necessarily so? Let’s suppose a brain in vat has a representation of a 
chair. The supposed “reality” of this chair is nothing different from the representation of 
it, since the inputs for the representations of the BIV do not come from chairs out there, 
because there are no chairs, only mental states. It is, therefore, not necessarily true that 
representations are one thing and the reality represented another thing. As we shall see 
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in what follows, Searle takes “Reality” for granted9, committing himself to the 
empiricist Myth of the Given criticized by Quine (1953), Sellars (1997), and Davidson 
(1974).  
Taking Reality for granted also makes him suppose that idealism and anti-realism are 
easily blocked. He admits that even if it happened that material objects do not exist, still 
Realism would hold:  
For the antirealist it is impossible that there should be a mind-independent 
reality. For the realist, even if there were no material objects in fact, there 
would still be a representation-independent reality, for the nonexistence of 
material objects would just be one feature of that representation-independent 
reality. (Searle, 1995: 157)   
So Searle’s realist does not go as far as saying that material objects do exist and that 
they are better described from the absolute conception of physics
10
; Realism does not 
imply a View from Nowhere, Realism -as Kant correctly saw it, according to Searle- 
implies no view at all; the realist only says that there “is something” independent of 
representation.  
Searle’s Realism, though, seems to be such a broad theory of reality that it becomes 
unintelligible and finally -from a pragmatic perspective- philosophically uninteresting. 
For him, Realism “presupposes that there is a way things are that is independent of 
how we represent how things are.” (Searle, 1995: 156) However, in this apparently 
naïve presumption we find two contradictions which refer us to the metaphysical 
suppositions of the View from Nowhere (Nagel, 1986): if one holds that there is a way 
                                                 
9
 For Searle it is necessary to take External Realism for granted, since it ultimately becomes a condition 
for meaningful communication: “Unless we take ER for granted, we cannot understand utterances the 
way we normally do. Furthermore, we have to take ER for granted to engage in the sorts of discourse and 
thought that we have been engaging in.” Searle, 1995:182.  
10
 In this respect, Searle´s Realism would be different from Bernard Williams’ Realism as it is represented 
in his Absolute Conception. See Williams 1986.  
25 
 
things are (even if no humans or intentionality ever existed) one is already giving an 
intentional meaning to that sentence: certainly, there is one way, not two ways, or n 
ways for the “existence” of reality. And the second contradiction resides precisely on 
the expression “there is”, which implies existence: if no humans or conscience ever 
existed, could one think of a possible meaning for the word “existence”? What sense 
does it make to refer to something we don’t even know how to refer to? Such realism 
implies that if no conscience ever existed still the Mount Everest (Searle’s example) 
would “exist”. However, if no intentionality ever existed, could we refer to that 
unknown “chunk of reality” -which we commonly refer to as “Mount Everest”- as the 
“Mount Everest”? Could we even refer to it as a mountain or as a physical object? Of 
course, if we didn’t exist at all and there wasn’t any intentionality, “we” or anyone 
could not refer to anything. The “reality” which this Realism claims ends up being an 
undetermined something which we could not conceive or refer to.  
If Searle is right, and the Mount Everest would “exist” even if no humans or 
intentionality existed, then this claim would need, in order to make any sense, a minimal 
sort of “omniscient” intentionality which would serve to describe the Mount Everest as 
“the Mount Everest”, or at least as a physical object11. Indeed, the description of “the 
Mount Everest” implies a complicated web of beliefs which requires a background of 
intentionality which would be impossible to conceive of outside of human language and 
convention. For example, how can the Observer from Nowhere tell the limits between 
the “mountain” and the “valley” if he is not trained in human conventions? Description 
and reference imply our complicated form of life, and they are possible only through 
human interests and intentionality. Stripped of conventions, “reality” might look -from a 
God’s eye perspective- like an undetermined and unlimited “something”.    
                                                 
11
 And thus, an omniscient observer who would describe valleys and mountains, and so on. 
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Nevertheless, what is important in the realist argument is that there in fact are some 
parts of “reality” which are independent of how they are represented. However, my 
point is that one cannot have any cognition of “reality” or of “existence” if such 
cognition is outside of a cognitive system. Speaking of the “World out there” implies a 
complicated cognition system which is far from the neutral View from Nowhere which 
the realist claims to be possible. Such cognitive system implies language and 
convention, and these are ultimately what convey what we call “reality”. Speaking of a 
reality outside language and convention not only seems nonsensical but also 
contradictory, for every attempt we make to speak of it we end up using our language 
and conventions. 
Notice that so far I haven’t mentioned the role of justification and verification in 
Realism. For Putnam, such role is crucial when it comes to certain beliefs: “All I ask is 
that what is supposed to be ‘true’ be warrantable on the basis of experience and 
intelligence for creatures with a ‘rational and sensible nature.’” (Putnam, 1990: 41) 
When we come to the issue of warrant in Putnam’s internal realism, we might be in a 
better position to understand why the realist’s thesis is not warranted, for, as Putnam 
would say, we cannot ascertain its truth or falsity under any conditions, since such 
thesis outruns the very possibility of justification
12
.  
So far, I have not been concerned with justification for Realist beliefs, but simply with 
the statement of the Realist thesis, which I hold (following Putnam) to be unintelligible. 
In fact, Searle views these criticisms against Realism (which, through a syllogism, he 
discards as nonsensical) as the criticisms against the Kantian theory of things in 
themselves: the verificationists and internal realists (such as Putnam) claim that  
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 See Putnam’s preface to his Realism with a Human Face. 
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what external realism offers us is an unthinkable something, indescribable, 
inaccessible, unknowable, unspeakable, and ultimately nonsensical. The real 
problem with such a realism is not that it is false, but that it is ultimately 
unintelligible. (Searle, 1995: 174) 
For Searle, these sorts of criticism against Realism are better understood as a syllogism: 
“Premise: Any cognitive state occurs as a part of a set of cognitive states and within a 
cognitive system. 
From this premise it is supposed to follow that: 
Conclusion 1: It is impossible to get outside of all cognitive states and systems to 
survey the relationships between them and the reality that they are used to cognize. 
And from this in turn it is supposed to follow that: 
Conclusion 2: No cognition is ever of a reality that exists independently of cognition.” 
(Searle, 1995: 174) 
Searle accurately points out that conclusion 2 doesn’t necessarily follow from 
conclusion 1 or the premise. Indeed, from the fact that cognitions occur only within 
cognitive systems it doesn’t necessarily follow that no cognition is ever of a reality that 
exists independently of cognition. However, the relationship between the premise and 
conclusion 2 is not one of necessary deduction, but more of a relation of implication. If 
we accept that thought and representation are only possible within a certain framework, 
then one expects constraints on such framework, which imply that thought outside of 
that framework cannot be considered as such. Again, how can we think of and refer to 
“something” which is positively out of that framework? Can we even conceive it? The 
criticism of unintelligibility against the Ding an Sich makes sense and cannot be 
dismissed, as Searle hopes, as an insufficient logical deduction. External realism 
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requires something more than a syllogism to be refuted -or proved, for that matter-, it 
requires a logical and coherent thesis; and so far I have argued that such thesis is 
unintelligible and, from a pragmatic perspective, uninteresting.      
After pointing to the impossibility of a positive demonstration of external realism -in the 
sense that Kant demanded and Moore supposedly gave
13
-, Searle advocates the thesis 
that realism is a background presupposition for intelligible discourse. Whenever 
anybody engages in a meaningful speech act, that person is taking ER for granted, for, 
according to Searle, successful communication implies an “ontologically objective” 
reality which is independent of any representation: “The thesis that there is a reality 
independent of our representations identifies not how things are in fact, but rather 
identifies a space of possibilities.” (Searle, 1995: 182) For example, the utterance “Mt. 
Everest has snow and ice near the summit” holds independently of any representations, 
for, according to Searle, it makes reference to brute facts, which do not depend at all on 
representations. Such statements allow us to engage in meaningful communication, 
since we must take for granted a reality to which language refers to. 
Searle seems to be committed to what Davidson (1974) called the third dogma of 
empiricism, namely the scheme/content distinction. For Searle, the fact that there is 
such thing as a “mountain” which contains a thing called snow and ice is a brute fact, 
something which exists independently of language and representation. As Davidson 
criticized this dogma, empiricists believe that there is a ready-made world out there to 
which conceptual schemes fit in a one-to-one relation. Since later I will deal with the 
problem of conceptual schemes, by now I just want to point what Putnam said regarding 
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 Searle reminds us how any argument or attempt to prove the existence of the external world -as 
Moore’s famous “proof”- fails to realize that it is assuming what it needs to be proved: “The proposition 
that I have two hands entails the proposition that the external world exists. The existence of the external 
world is a truth condition of the proposition that I have two hands in the same way that the existence of at 
least one hand is a truth condition of that proposition.”  (180) Thus, a positive argument for ER must be 
given up.  
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this problem in The Many Faces of Realism, which, by the way, fits very well with 
Davidson’s criticism of the scheme/content dichotomy:  
To talk of ‘facts’ without specifying the language to be used is to talk of 
nothing; the word ‘fact’ no more has its use fixed by Reality Itself than does 
the word ‘exist’ or the word ‘object’. (Putnam, 1987: 36) 
This position of Searle’s also goes against the ontological relativity advocated by Quine, 
who insisted on seeing “all objects as theoretical... Even our most primordial objects, 
bodies, are already theoretical” (Quine, 1981: 20) Following Quine, one can criticize 
Searle’s realism by pointing that reference is indeterminate in the sense that utterances 
are not constrained by the world out there; language doesn’t fit the world in any way14; 
rather, language helps us cope with reality in a way which responds to our own 
interests. The utterance that “Mt. Everest has snow and ice near the summit” is not a 
brute fact, as Searle’s realism supposes. Such utterance belongs to a complicated form 
of life which rests on an equally complicated web of beliefs; and as opposed to the 
thesis of external realism, such utterance (or the supposed fact that it states) would not 
exist if that form of life is removed from the picture. The efforts of such philosophers as 
Sellars, Quine, and Davidson were much devoted to argue that there are no such things 
as brute facts since language and human convention penetrates so deep into what we 
call reality.  
d. Boyd and Devitt 
Richard Boyd and Michael Devitt, both former students of Putnam, have devoted much 
of their work to criticize Putnam’s version of anti-realism and develop a coherent 
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 This point, curiously enough, is also granted by Searle when he admits the impossibility of the 
correspondence theory of truth in his Construction of Social Reality. 
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account of metaphysical realism
15
. In what follows, I will concentrate on making sense 
of their claim that metaphysical realism implies mind-independence, and on the 
criticisms against Putnam which they raise concerning this issue. The problem of mind-
independence is central in the discussion of metaphysical realism because it boldly 
dismisses the input of language and intentionality in ontology, and also because it 
serves as a premise for one of the other central theses of metaphysical realism, namely, 
that there’s one true theory with one true ontology.  
Explaining Putnam’s characterization of metaphysical realism, Boyd says that for 
Putnam, the metaphysical realist holds that “related to OTT [there being one true 
theory, with one true ontology] is the doctrine that both the objects in the relevant 
ontology and their status as appropriate objects are mind-independent.” (Boyd 2012: 
40) This feature of metaphysical realism comes from Reason, Truth, and History, where 
Putnam declared that, according to metaphysical realism, “the world consists of some 
fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete 
description of ‘the way the world is’.” (Putnam 1981: 49)  
As Boyd notes, the metaphysical doctrine that holds objects as mind-independent, and 
that there is one true theory, is contested by Putnam’s treatment of “objects”: “‘Objects’ 
do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the world when we 
introduce one or another scheme of description.” (Putnam 1981: 52, quoted in Boyd 
2012: 40) In what follows I will try to make sense of the claims advanced by materialist 
metaphysical realists, such as Boyd, that natural objects (i.e. natural kinds) are mind-
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 See especially Boyd 2012 “What of Pragmatism with the World Here?”, in Baghramian (ed.) 2012 ; 
Boyd 1988 “How to be a Moral Realist”, in G. Sayre McCord (ed.) Moral Realism, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press; Boyd 1991 “Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds”, 
Philosophical Studies 61; Devitt 2012 “Hilary and Me: Tracking Down Putnam on the Realism Issue”, in 
Baghramian (ed.) 2012; 1983 “Realism and the Renegade Putnam”, Nous 17; Devitt 1991a “Aberrations 
of the Realism Debate”, Philosophical Studies 61; Devitt 1991b Realism and Truth, 2nd ed. Oxford, 
Blackwell.   
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independent and the claim, supported by Devitt, that the ontology afforded by modern 
science is also mind-independent.  
By developing what he calls a materialist, non-reductivist metaphysical realism, or 
materialist accommodationism (2012), Boyd argues that such doctrine, contrary to what 
Putnam thinks, doesn’t imply reductionism of intentional concepts to physicalism. For 
Boyd, there are two different sorts of phenomena whose claim of mind-independence is 
at issue: intentional and mental phenomena on the one side, and the ontological status of 
natural objects on the other. For the first sort, Boyd says that: 
On the one hand, there are phenomena which are prima facie mind-dependent 
because they straightforwardly involve minds: minds, for example, and mental 
states, but also human social structures and social artifacts, semantic 
phenomena and the like. Putnam appears to hold that, for the fully consistent 
materialist metaphysical realist, such phenomena -and the concepts and 
language that refers to them- must be reducible to the phenomena and concepts 
of physics. (Boyd, 2012: 44) 
Boyd, as much as he claims that his position is non-reductionist, nevertheless accepts 
that, ultimately, intentional concepts and reference are reducible to physics, fitting thus 
in the category of a materialist metaphysical realist, which Putnam opposes. In fact, his 
reductionism seems to be of a tout court character:  
All natural phenomena and all phenomena causally or otherwise 
determinatively related to natural phenomena are physical… In particular, all 
the intentional, mental and purposive phenomena referred to in the 
specification of the epistemic access and accommodation conditions are 
physical. (Boyd, 2012: 61)  
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As shall be seen in proper time, Putnam’s internal realism is an answer to such 
reductionism and pseudo-non-reductionism, such as Boyd’s. By claiming that 
intentional and mental phenomena can be reduced to physics, Boyd finds himself in the 
difficult situation, which all reductionists eventually face, of explaining how the very 
definition or concept of an intentional concept can be reduced to physical vocabulary. 
Even logical positivists such as Carnap and Reichenbach, eventually abandoned their 
ambitious reductionists programs when they realized that intentionality is not reducible 
or translatable into a supposedly privileged language such as physics
16
. Internal realism, 
as I will argue, steers clear from the dangers faced by reductionism, such as trying to 
give an account of intentionality in physicalist terms. For Putnam, as well as for the 
classic pragmatists like William James, the trail of the human serpent is over all, in the 
sense that they don’t shy away from the acknowledgement of intentional and mental 
concepts into the fabric of what we call reality.    
As for the second sort of mind-independence, the ontological status of natural objects, 
such as natural kinds, Boyd says:  
A central claim of many non-reductionist materialists is, roughly, that the 
naturalness of a natural object (a natural kind, relation, magnitude, thing, etc.) 
is discipline specific…The obvious way to understand this claim is to see it as 
maintaining that natural objects qua natural objects are, in some important 
sense, partly constituted by the relevant disciplinary practices. (Boyd, 2012: 
44) 
As opposed to the first sort of mind-dependence, Boyd accepts that this second sort 
cannot be easily rebutted by the reductionist: 
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 See Putnam “Logical Positivism and Intentionality” in his 1994a. 
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 Some object (say a natural kind) might be physicalistically definable, so that 
its inclusion in the “fixed totality of mind-independent objects” would be 
compatible with the first stricture against mind-dependence, but its 
membership in that category still might not be explicable in physicalistic terms. 
(Boyd, 2012: 45)  
For this reason, as Boyd tells us, his materialist accommodationism is not a reductionist 
doctrine, since it acknowledges the causal import of intentionality.  
In trying to make sense of the claim that natural objects are discipline specific, one must 
bear in mind that for Boyd natural kinds and reference are social constructions:  
natural kinds are features not of the world outside our practice, but of the ways 
in which that practice engages with the rest of the world… They are not free-
standing language-independent phenomena. (Boyd, 2012: 62) 
 If natural kinds and reference are considered as social constructions (and thus, 
language-dependent), then it would not be very farfetched to consider the ontological 
status (the “naturalness”) of natural objects as mind-dependent. However, and here 
comes trouble, Boyd is not happy to leave his materialist accomodationism as such, 
since he concludes that “the accommodationist conception is fully compatible with the 
view that reference and natural kinds are ‘mind-independent’ in whatever sense(s) are 
required for metaphysical realism.” (Boyd, 2012: 66) So, how are we to make sense of 
the second claim that the naturalness of natural objects is language-dependent, if on the 
other hand we have that natural kinds and reference are mind-independent? The answer 
that Boyd hints is that language-dependency is not the same as mind-dependency. This 
is probably the most appealing part of his materialist accommodationism since it 
emphasizes on the materialist side, namely, the claim that all mental and intentional 
phenomena are physical: “all the intentional, mental and purposive phenomena referred 
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to in the specification of the epistemic access and accommodation conditions are 
physical.” (Boyd, 2012: 61) As Boyd sees it, materialist accommodationism is non-
reductionist, since it acknowledges the causal import of intentional concepts in 
reference, making reference a language-dependent matter; but, for the materialist 
accomodationist, reference and intentionality are also mind-independent matters, since 
all mental phenomena, by being physical phenomena, are mind-independent. Thus, the 
motto for materialist accommodationism would be: no reference without language 
(language dependency); and no language without physics (mind-independency).  
Materialist accommodationism relies on the empiricist picture of language which I have 
already criticized, in the sense that it accounts for a physical phenomenon without 
accounting for meaning; in other words, it supposes that meanings can be ascribed 
physicalistically. Saying that reference is mind-independent accounts for a belief in a 
functionalist picture of mind –leaving no space for meanings and intentionality-, against 
which Putnam opposed his internal realism, and specifically to deal with such pictures 
of mind he developed his Brains in a Vat Argument, which I will examine in the next 
chapter.  
The problem of mind-independence is of equal importance for Michael Devitt, but from 
a perspective different from Boyd’s. For Devitt, the doctrine which he calls Realism 
differs from the doctrine which Putnam criticizes, Metaphysical Realism, in the sense 
that, for Devitt, Realism can stand on its own as a metaphysical thesis, without the 
import of semantics and without concerning itself with the problem of truth. Thus, 
Realism consists of two spheres, an existence and an independence sphere:  
Realism: Tokens of most commonsense, and scientific, physical types objectively exist 
independently of the mental (Devitt, 2012: 103)  
35 
 
As Devitt sees it, Realism is a metaphysical thesis concerned only with the objective 
existence of scientific ontology and with the mind-independence of such ontology; truth 
and justification are outside of the field of such metaphysics. Thus, by trying to put 
metaphysics first, Devitt thinks he can avoid the problem of truth, claiming that it 
doesn’t have anything to do with Realism, since this doctrine talks only about the 
existence of certain entities and their mind-independence. Most particularly, Devitt 
denies that the Realist is committed to a correspondence theory of truth, as Putnam 
claims he must be, arguing that when the anti-realist criticizes the correspondence 
theory of truth, Realism is untouched.  
If the doctrine of Realism could be detached from the problem of truth, then, as Devitt 
sees it, Realism would stand, because the relation between truth and realism has 
traditionally been expressed in terms of correspondence. For Devitt, the main criticisms 
against all sorts of realism have rested on the supposed truth of the first premise of the 
following argument: 
1) If the realist’s independent reality exists, then our thoughts/theories must 
mirror, picture, or represent, that reality.  
2) Our thoughts/theories cannot mirror, picture, or represent the realist’s 
independent reality. 
3) So, the realist’s independent reality doesn’t exist. (Devitt, 2012: 106) 
Though most of the debate has centered on 2) above, Devitt shifts his attention toward 
the veracity and evidence of 1), which, according to him, is false: “to question whether 
our theories aim at ‘picturing’ the world is not to question whether electrons ‘really’ 
exist.” (Stephen Leeds, “Theories of Reference and Truth”, quoted in Devitt, 2012: 107) 
Since Realism is a metaphysical doctrine which centers on the existence and mind-
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independence of a certain ontology, thus, for Devitt it follows that “a metaphysical 
doctrine like Realism cannot be attacked simply by arguing against certain semantic 
theories of truth or reference.” (Devitt, 2012: 107) Devitt is right in claiming that his 
Realism might be untouched by attacking only the correspondence theory of truth, but 
he is wrong to think that the problem of truth can be separated so easily from realism in 
general. 
Let’s analyze 1) more carefully. Devitt denies that 1) above is true because he denies 
that Realism is a matter of representation or correspondence, but rather, as his own 
definition shows, Realism is a doctrine of existence and independence. However, 
although it is true that the existence of a mind-independent reality is not necessarily a 
matter of representation or correspondence, it is definitely the case that talk of such 
reality must be a matter, if not of semantics, at least of justification. “Surely, Devitt 
would retort, Realism is not concerned only with talk of an independent reality, but with 
its implementation”: “It is not just that our experiences are as if there are cats, there 
are cats. It is not just that the observable world is as if there are atoms, there are 
atoms.” (Devitt, 2012: 104) However, such commonsense commits Devitt to a naïve 
pragmatism which he surely would reject: such naiveté implies a blind and unscientific 
belief in the discoveries of science without justifying them or testing them as true. 
Devitt, unknowingly, and most to his dismay, appears as a naïve pragmatist, in the 
sense that he doesn’t rely on a theory of truth for scientific theories, but only relies on 
their success: “What realists believe is that we can judge whether theories are true of 
reality, the nature of which does not depend on any theories or concepts.” (Devitt, 
2012: 110) Devitt’s pragmatic naiveté is rendered by the fact that he doesn’t account for 
the fact of how does the realist judge whether theories are true of the independent reality 
or not: if what the realist does is to judge whether theories are true of reality, then an 
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account of such judgment is required. The verificationist and the coherentist accounts 
are discarded by the realist because, since he accepts the independence of reality, then 
internal constraints as such implemented by verificationism and coherentism would say 
nothing about an independent reality. On the other hand, if theory X works, and we 
claim the independence of reality, as the realist does, then our only apparent choice is to 
admit that theory X represents or corresponds to that reality. Devitt, of course, would 
not be satisfied with this, insisting that the realist’s judgment of true theories says 
nothing about their correspondence to reality, but only to the success of science:  
Realism takes both the ontology of science and common sense, and the folk 
epistemological view that this ontology is objective and independent, pretty 
much for granted… It is not just that our experiences are as if there are cats, 
there are cats. It is not just that the observable world is as if there are atoms, 
there are atoms. (Devitt, 2012: 104) 
Devitt’s naïve pragmatism is reflected in the fact that even though the realist’s mind-
independent reality is not constituted by thoughts or theories, still he takes for granted 
the ontology of science and common sense as determining the entities that exist in such 
independent reality. But then, how does one ignore the theories which acknowledge and 
bring forth such ontology? Have all the items in that ontology always existed mind-
independently? Had Devitt lived in the 17th century, he would have counted in his 
realist ontology the existence of corpuscles and would have omitted the existence of 
atoms. This shows that all reference to the ontology of the supposed mind-independent 
reality implies reference to a theory, since that reality is through and through constituted 
by such a theory.  
Thus, it is very difficult to see how the doctrine of Realism could be established without 
reference to semantics, as Devitt expects. Such difficulty is shown by Devitt’s portrayal 
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of anti-realists (like Dummett and Putnam) as denying “that the existence and nature of 
the stars are in various ways independent of our minds.” (Devitt, 2012: 112) Devitt 
claims that Dummett and Putnam (making reference to Putnam 2007 and Dummett’s 
response) failed to understand what he meant by “independent” in his doctrine of 
Realism; and emphasizes that, as opposed to logical or causal independence, he means 
constitutive independence, in the sense that reality  
is not constituted by our knowledge, by our epistemic values, by our capacity 
to refer to it, by the synthesizing power of the mind, nor by our imposition of 
concepts, theories or languages; it is not limited by what we can believe or 
discover. (Devitt, 2012: 104)  
What does constitutive independence mean? As Putnam acknowledged in his response 
to Devitt 2012, it cannot mean a causal claim such as “to bring something into 
existence”, because Devitt himself acknowledges that the constructivist/anti-realist 
doesn’t go that far as claiming that; nor can it refer to a logical construction out of a 
primitive experience (à la Carnap), because, “If so, the “is not constituted by” claim 
would be acceptable to any antirealist who is not a phenomenalist, in particular to 
Michael Dummett, as Devitt well knows.” (Putnam 2012b: 123) In his response to 
Devitt, Putnam says that constitutive independence must be understood in relation to the 
claim which, according to Devitt, the constructivist/anti-realist, such as Putnam, 
accepts, namely, “that there wouldn’t have been dinosaurs or stars if there had not 
been people(or similar thinkers)” (Devitt, 2012: 111) As opposed to giving a positive 
argument, Devitt claims that constitutive independence is to be understood as the denial 
of what the constructivist/anti-realist says constitutes reality, namely thoughts and 
language. The problem, however, is that, as Putnam claims, the internal realist doesn’t 
hold that there wouldn’t have been dinosaurs or stars if there had not been people (or 
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similar thinkers). As opposed to this, the internal realist doesn’t deny the existence of 
dinosaurs or stars, but rather, claims that in order to meaningfully talk about such 
entities one must be justified to do so. In other words, the internal realist doesn’t 
necessarily deny that an independent reality exists only because our theories fail to 
mirror such reality; but instead, the internal realist holds that any talk of such reality 
must be justified on theoretical evidence and rational justification. For any token of 
“independent reality” there must be a theory which justifies us even to refer to such 
token, namely, for speaking about atoms there must be an atomic theory to justify such 
talk; if not, any talk of atoms outside atomic theory is sheer mysticism. If the realist’s 
independent reality exists, as he claims, then our thoughts and theories must justify such 
reality; but if it’s only justified and knowable through our thoughts and theories –as I’ve 
been arguing-, as well as in successful scientific experience, then one must ask if it is 
still worth it to call such reality “independent”.     
      
1.3. Partial conclusions of this chapter 
The brand of Realism shared by Searle, Nagel, Alston, Boyd, and Devitt falls prey to 
what has been criticized as a commitment to the Given, namely, the empiricist claim 
that reality can be known directly through sensitive information.  
These philosophers, though, don’t go as far as claiming that all of reality is ready-made 
and thus enjoys an an sich status. They acknowledge that some elements of reality are 
social conventions, and thus wouldn’t be said to exist without human language and 
interpretation. As representatives of metaphysical Realism, they defend the claim that 
reality transcends justification, and thus we might never achieve an accurate knowledge 
of it, since even our best theories might fail to grasp the very essence of reality; as 
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Nagel claims, “What there is, or what is the case, does not coincide necessarily with 
what is a possible object of thought for us.” (Nagel, 1986: 92) Reality, for metaphysical 
Realism, becomes a mysterious entity, something to be referred to from a View from 
Nowhere; in other words, something so unreachable, that it ultimately becomes 
philosophically uninteresting.   
On the other hand, for these philosophers (particularly Searle and Devitt), the notion of 
truth doesn’t imply the correspondence theory, since they do not claim that reality is one 
way rather than another
17
. So, they claim, their doctrine is ontological, rather than 
epistemological; Realism is more a matter of what there is, rather than of how to know 
it. 
In direct relation with the problem of truth, these realists claim that though metaphysical 
Realism cannot be positively stated as a thesis, it must be accepted, nevertheless, as a 
condition for successful communication: thus Nagel admits that  
realism makes as much sense as many other unverifiable statements, even 
though all of them, and all thought, may present fundamental philosophical 
mysteries to which there is at present no solution. (Nagel 1986: 95)   
In the same spirit, we saw that for Searle, as well as for Devitt, Realism must be taken 
for granted without any sort of justification: “Unless we take ER (external realism) for 
granted, we cannot understand utterances the way we normally do.” (Searle, 1995: 
182). As was shown in this chapter, all these realists demand from the anti-realist (as we 
also pointed out, Putnam is their preferred target) a clear statement of metaphysical 
realism to which he could, supposedly, criticize- instead of providing a justified and 
positive statement of their own doctrine. Unfortunately, in the proposals of Alston, 
                                                 
17
 In this respect, they do not share Bernard Williams’s idea that physical science is the Absolute 
Conception of the World. 
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Searle, Nagel, Boyd, and Devitt –all of them reputed advocates of realism- we couldn’t 
find a positive statement of the doctrine of metaphysical realism, one to which our 
standards of justification could adapt. Instead, the doctrine they offer is one in which 
“faith” seems to be the only argument for believing in their an sich reality.    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Chapter 2 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND SOME FEATURES OF INTERNAL 
REALISM 
 
2.1. Realist Beginnings  
In his article “What is ‘Realism’?” (197818) Putnam claims that “whatever else realists 
say, they typically say that they believe in a ‘correspondence theory of truth’.” (Putnam, 
1978: 18) In this early scientific-realist phase, Putnam sees the theory of truth as 
correspondence to reality as a necessary means to avoid considering the success of 
science a miracle. Thus, for early Putnam, the triad of truth as correspondence, 
reference, and the success of science became the central tenet of the scientific realism 
he embraced
19. This sort of “sophisticated realism” rests on the supposed convergence 
and success of science, and blames Idealism -the opponent of Realism, and which “in 
our time would be positivism or operationalism”- for being unable to account for such 
success and convergence, thus treating science as a miracle. However, this 
accountability of science depends on a qualification of reference and truth, which are 
not necessarily taken in a classical (metaphysical) sense.  
The scientific Realist holds that terms such as “electron” and “genes” refer to scientific 
“entities”; these “entities” are precisely what allows convergence and success in 
science, for reference to these terms “survives” translation practices and scientific 
                                                 
18
 The references to this article, originally from 1976, belong to Meaning and the Moral Sciences (1978), 
where it was reprinted.  
19
 Although in “What is ‘Realism’?” Putnam avoids identifying his own position with scientific realism, it 
is clear, as it will be shown, that his early realism is scientific, not metaphysical. See Hickey 2009: 51. 
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revolutions, thus discarding Kuhn’s claims of incommensurability20. However, such 
success of reference in the case of scientific “entities” seems only possible if we adopt a 
“principle of charity” or “benefit of the doubt”21 which states that  
it is an essential principle of semantic methodology that when speakers specify 
a referent for a term they use by a description and, because of mistaken factual 
beliefs that these speakers have, that description fails to refer, we should 
assume that they would accept reasonable reformulations of their description. 
(Putnam, 1978: 23)  
Early Putnam adopts a version of metaphysical Realism in his 1976 article “What is 
‘Realism’?” by accepting that there is a fixed relation between referring terms and 
referred things, between language and reality. If speakers are mistaken about their 
beliefs then their terms do not refer, since, apparently, it is only our mature terms which 
really refer. This is the Realist metaphysical assumption according to which there is a 
privileged language which represents Reality as it really is, and that other less 
privileged discourses are mistaken when they speak about reality. Take, for example, 
the concept of Democracy: according to this metaphysical assumption, the Greeks from 
the 4
th
 century B.C. would have been mistaken when using the term democracy for 
referring to their type of government, because the extension of that term as it is used by 
us differs from how the ancient Greeks used it. According to early Putnam’s 
metaphysical assumption, it is only our modern concept of democracy which really 
refers, while the Greeks’ concept fails to do so (since it excluded an important 
                                                 
20
 Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s claims against convergence on scientific theories (discussed in “What is 
‘Realism’?”, pgs. 22-25) state that scientific terms do not refer to the same entities in different conceptual 
schemes, therefore the impossibility of convergence in science yields incommensurability. For a more 
complete criticism of incommensurability by Putnam see his Reason, Truth, and History, chapter 5.  
21
 For an early statement of this benefit of doubt, see Putnam’s “Language and Reality” in his Mind, 
Language, and Reality; Philosophical Papers 2. This principle of charity becomes a central part of 
Putnam’s concept/conception distinction (chapter 5 of Reason, Truth, and History); which is also the 
main idea behind his concept of an ideal-limit of rationality.  
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percentage of the population, and “democracy”, as we use it today is a different concept, 
supposedly a “correct” one).  
However, the fact that our conception of “democracy” is different from the Greeks’ 
conception of “democracy” doesn’t account for saying that they were mistaken in using 
that concept, while we are correct. From a pragmatic perspective (not adopted yet by 
Putnam by the time he wrote “What is ‘Realism’?”), such talk of speakers from other 
cultures being “mistaken” by using their concepts to refer to something for which we 
also have a similar concept, has been abandoned, in part due to Quine’s indeterminacy 
of translation thesis (1960) and Davidson’s views on conceptual schemes (1974).  
Nevertheless, this metaphysical constraint on reference was partly abandoned by 
Putnam by the time of Reason, Truth, and History (1981), and from that point on, he 
adopts a more pragmatic “theory” of reference which depends on human interests rather 
than metaphysical assumptions about the accuracy of reference. 
The principle of charity is used to save scientific convergence through a fixed reference 
relation between language and reality, which seems to be a central tenet of metaphysical 
Realism. However, the “entities” which are referred to are not taken to exist 
“realistically”, as it will be pointed out in what follows, rather, their “existence” 
becomes intra-theoretic, which depends on a qualification of truth. If this is the case, 
early Putnam would be partially “innocent”22 from the metaphysical charge I just made 
in relation to reference.  
                                                 
22
 His “partial guilt” would consist in supposing that past speakers’ terms do not “refer,” and also 
advocating a fixed reference relation. From the point of view of the later “pragmatic Putnam,” such 
“partial guilt” would be metaphysically Realist enough.  
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Convergence on science is based upon reference practices
23
, and such practices are 
based on a Tarskian conception of truth. Tarski’s definition of truth relies on the 
technical term “satisfaction”, in the sense of a relation between words and things:  
‘Satisfies’ is the technical term Tarski uses for what I have been calling 
reference. For example, instead of saying ‘“Electron” refers to electrons’, he 
would say ‘The sequence of length one consisting of just x satisfies the formula 
“Electron (y)” if and only if x is an electron’… This certainly conforms to an 
essential part of the idea of a correspondence theory. (Putnam 1978: 30)  
Putnam concludes that Tarski’s definition of truth satisfies “the formal properties we 
want the notions of truth and reference to have” (Putnam, 1978: 31). Such constraints 
that our Realist conceptual schemes require have an explanatory value of the relation 
between words and things. The use of scientific terms such as electrons and DNA 
molecules is justified because the Tarskian definition of truth allows for their 
“existence”. 
The explanatory value of this qualified theory of truth as correspondence satisfies the 
notion of convergence adopted by early Putnam, namely, Richard Boyd’s scientific 
Realist thesis that  
1. Terms in a mature science typically refer. 
2. The laws of a theory belonging to a mature science are typically 
approximately true.     
These two sentences are accepted as parts of scientific knowledge, and are conjoined 
with the following notion of understanding truth realistically:  
                                                 
23
 Of course, not a physicalistic theory of reference, as Putnam says Hartry Field would demand (Putnam 
1978: 32)  
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(A) Venus might not have carbon dioxide in its atmosphere even though it 
follows from our theory that Venus has carbon dioxide in its atmosphere; 
and 
(B) A statement can be false even though it follows from our theory. (Putnam 
1978: 34) 
According to Putnam, (B) follows from any sentence of the general form (A), and (A) 
“is itself a ‘scientific’ (or even a commonsense) fact about the world (albeit a modal24 
fact about the world).” (Putnam 1978: 36) This leads Putnam to wonder: “how could 
anyone not understand truth and logical connectives realistically? How could anyone 
not be a realist?” (ibid.) The Realist must, therefore, take science at face value 
(“Realism, so to speak, is ‘science’s philosophy of science’”); science becomes, for the 
Realist, a standard of truth and justification. But again, as the Tarskian definition of 
truth has shown, “the concept of truth is not philosophically neutral.” (Putnam, 1978: 
37) Given the acceptance of Boyd’s convergence, and accepting (B) “as a part of 
science”, Putnam concludes that Realism, thus understood, depends on “a way of 
understanding truth, not just a way of defining the word ‘true’.” (Putnam, 1978: 37))  
Instead of adopting a metaphysical definition of correspondence, early Putnam’s 
Tarskian definition of truth allows him to describe the “real world” “in terms of our 
own conceptual system (Well? Should we use someone else’s conceptual system?)” 
(Putnam, 1978: 32) 
                                                 
24
 Since my interest here (and also for matters of space and time) is not to argue the details of Putnam’s 
early scientific Realism, but rather to outline it in order to assess whether it is a metaphysical doctrine or 
not, I shall not go into the details of modal demonstrations. For the “modal” reasons of why (A) is such a 
fact about the world see Putnam 1978: 35.  
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Metaphysical Realism –which, by the time of “What is ‘Realism’?” Putnam had not 
totally differentiated from scientific Realism- is not necessarily linked to classical and 
physicalistic definitions of truth and reference; thus,  
abandoning realism- that is, abandoning the belief in any describable world of 
unobservable things, and accepting in its place the belief that all the 
‘unobservable things’ spoken of in any generation’s scientific theories, 
including our own, are mere theoretical conveniences, destined to be replaced 
and supplanted by quite different and unrelated theoretical constructions in the 
future- would not be a total scrapping of the predicates true and refers in their 
formal aspects. (Putnam, 1978: 29)  
Thus, the concepts of existence and truth become intra-theoretic, something very close - 
though not quite the same- to what Putnam would later claim in his internal realism. 
As we shall see later, in his internal realist phase (which can be traced to his 1976’s 
“Realism and Reason”) Putnam abandons the constraints on reference as a condition for 
truth. Instead, he adopts the view that truth is linked with justification, therefore it 
cannot depend on a relation of metaphysical dependence between language and reality, 
where the “reality” and “fixedness” of the world limit and constraint all “correct” and 
“accurate” discourse. The point to emphasize is that, due -in part- to his scientific and 
analytic background, in an early phase Putnam adopted a doctrine very close to that of 
metaphysical Realism in the sense that he advocated a theory of correspondence where 
truth depends on reference. As was pointed out, the “entities” referred to are not 
necessarily taken as the ultimate constituents of Reality
25
, rather, they are seen as intra-
theoretic conveniences. We can conclude, then, that in “What is ‘Realism’?” Putnam 
                                                 
25
 Although the criticism raised above in relation to the principle of charity might yield a different 
interpretation. 
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swings in a middle ground, between scientific Realism (with a slight bend towards 
internal realism) and full blown metaphysical Realism.  
 
2.2. Realism, Reason, and Semantics 
In “Realism and Reason” (1978), Putnam further develops the consequences of a 
correspondence theory of truth without the metaphysical constraints of a realist (thus, 
fixed) reference relation. According to this early stage of internal realism, metaphysical 
realism, as opposed to internal realism, is not an empirical theory of language but “a 
model of the relation of any correct theory to all or part of THE WORLD.” (Putnam, 
1978: 123) Thus, metaphysical realism holds that understanding a term consists in 
knowing what piece of the world it refers to. This metaphysical picture is linked with a 
unique reference theory between words and objects to the point that the only possibility 
of truth is a unique correspondence theory between language and world. The main 
problem with metaphysical realism thus stated is that it also holds the reality of Kantian 
noumena, the thing in itself, thus supporting the thesis that truth is radically non-
epistemic. Such acceptance supposes the inaccessibility to such world in itself, thus we 
come to know it by mere appearances; truth is inaccessible to even our best theories. 
Putnam argues that if such picture is accepted “then talk of all these theories as 
descriptions of ‘the world’ is empty.” (Putnam, 1978: 133) This reminds us of the 
external (minimal) realism advocated by Searle and Alston, a realism which holds that 
reality is inaccessible to human knowledge and that it exists in itself, independent of any 
conceptualization.  
A further problem with this statement of metaphysical realism is that, by itself, it blocks 
the very possibility of successful reference, a possibility it advocates by embracing the 
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correspondence theory of truth. By holding that truth is radically non-epistemic, 
metaphysical realism blocks the possibility of telling whether a reference relation 
between word and object is correct or incorrect, because not even our best theories have 
access to the world as it is in itself. Metaphysical realism, just as relativism, is a self-
contradictory thesis.   
Instead of this metaphysical picture, in “Realism and Reason”, and as an early step in 
the development of his internal realism, Putnam proposes a sort of “verificationist 
semantics”, not much unlike Michael Dummett’s “non-realist semantics” (Dummett, 
1978). According to this version of semantics, “the realist notions of truth and 
reference come in not in explaining what goes on ‘in the heads’ of speakers, but in 
explaining the success of language-using.” (Putnam, 1978: 129) In this early rendering 
of internal realism, Putnam already embraces conceptual relativity and mereology 
(which will be discussed later in their more mature renderings); thus, these two features, 
which have remained constant in Putnam’s philosophy since an early stage, are 
counterexamples of what at first glance would look like Putnam’s always changing 
philosophy. However, I want to focus here on the verificationist semantics adopted by 
Putnam in this early rendering of internal realism. 
According to verificationist semantics, understanding a sentence is knowing what 
constitutes a proof (verification) of it, as opposed to the metaphysical realist’s claim that 
to understand a sentence one must know its truth-conditions: “Dummett and I agree that 
you can’t treat understanding a sentence (in general) as knowing its truth conditions; 
because it then becomes unintelligible what that knowledge in turn consists in.” 
(Putnam, 1978: 129) Instead, verificationist semantics claims that understanding a 
sentence is done within a theory, within a language. According to Dummett’s 
verificationism (which is of a Wittgensteinian sort, as opposed to a positivistic sort) a 
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speaker is said to understand a sentence when she presents a manifestation of such 
understanding, for example, asserting the sentence “there is a cow” when in presence of 
a cow. The main feature of this anti-realist semantics is that the extensional notions of 
truth and reference play no part whatsoever in it, since they are replaced by intensional 
notions, such as assertibility. Then, as opposed to the realist claim, non-realist semantics 
claim that understanding a sentence has nothing to do with understanding truth 
conditions. Thus, this semantics allows avoiding the problems which come up with the 
realist claim that truth is bivalent: since understanding of a sentence depends on canons 
of verification, there seems to be no point on deciding whether unverifiable (in 
principle) sentences are true or false. In other words, Dummett’s verificationism treats 
truth not as an objective relation between mind and world, but instead as a semantic 
verification procedure where truth is constrained by our abilities to verify.   
However, since the internal realist has claimed that there isn’t a unique reference 
relation, then, how does he know that  
‘cow’ refers to cows in the sense of referring to one determinate set of things, 
as opposed to referring to a determinate set of things in each admissible 
interpretation? (Putnam, 1978: 135)  
Putnam’s answer is that within the theory “‘Cow’ refers to cows” is a logical truth. It is 
only a theoretical truth, not a metaphysical unrevisable truth about an unchanging 
world; thus, adopting a theory is adopting a version of the World
26
. Versions are 
revisable, and since they do not assume the question whether there is a theory-
independent fact of the matter as to what a term in a given theory corresponds to, then 
one can have that “‘Cow’ refers to cows” is a contextually a priori truth. 
                                                 
26
 See Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (1978), and Putnam’s “The Way the World is”, in his 
1990.  
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Thus, as early as 1976, Putnam had already figured out the seeds of his internal realism 
and had noticed the inconsistencies of metaphysical realism. Since that point on, his 
philosophy starts to resemble more and more to what he himself called a 
demythologized Kantianism, a coherent and strong version of social knowledge:  
Kant’s image was of knowledge as a ‘representation’ - a kind of play. The 
author is me. But the author also appears as a character in the play (like a 
Pirandello play). The author in the play is not the ‘real’ author - it is the 
‘empirical me’. The ‘real’ author is the ‘transcendental me’. I would modify 
Kant’s image in two ways. The authors (in the plural- my image of knowledge 
is social) don’t write just one story: they write many versions. And the authors 
in the stories are the real authors. This would be ‘crazy’ if these stories were 
fictions. A fictitious character can’t also be a real author. But these are true 
stories. (Putnam, 1978: 138)   
 
2.3. Models and Reality 
Putnam’s early critique of metaphysical realism is further developed in his “Models and 
Reality” ([1977] 1983), where he deploys a model-theoretic argument against the realist 
claims that model theory can be used to show that there is a unique reference relation 
which can thereby establish the truth of a theory. Since “Models and Reality” is a highly 
technical essay whose consequences and form of argumentation were later abandoned 
by Putnam, here I will be concerned only with its conclusions against metaphysical 
realism, and will not go into all its important technicalities
27
.  
 
                                                 
27
 For a very complete analysis of the technicalities of Putnam´s model-theoretic arguments, besides his 
own “Models and Reality”, and the second chapter of Reason, Truth, and History, see Taylor, 2006, 
chapter 3. 
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a. Indeterminacy of Reference and Completeness 
The philosophical lesson Putnam draws from the “Löwenheim-Skolem paradox”, which 
he discusses in “Models and Reality”, is that there are simply too many ways in which 
our mental symbols can be mapped onto the world; thus, in such “paradox” one finds 
the seeds for internal realism. The philosophical side of the “Löwenheim-Skolem 
paradox” points that the realist must agree that: 
1. What our symbols refer to is massively indeterminate. 
2. Even an ideal theory might be false.  
As we have seen, 2. is accepted by metaphysical realism, and it was precisely this 
feature of realism which Putnam attacked in “Realism and Reason”, to the effect that 
metaphysical realism -due, in part, to its commitment to things in themselves- becomes 
an untenable position from its very statement. However, in “Models and Reality”, 
Putnam arrives to 2. through 1., which is fiercely opposed by metaphysical realism. 
Indeterminacy (at least in its ontological aspect) is one of the tenets of the supposed 
“relativism” which metaphysical realism sets to oppose and it is precisely to this 
ontological indeterminacy which Putnam points out through the Skolem argument. The 
reason that indeterminacy of reference (1. above) brings as a consequence that even an 
ideal theory might be false (2. above) is because the first claim undermines realism’s 
commitment to the idea that truth can be established through a unique and adequate 
reference relation, such as the correspondence theory of truth. Thus, not even a 
formalization of total science (a finished and ideal limit of enquiry, according to Peirce) 
would render ideal theories true –‘true’ in the sense that the realist demands. Then, we 
have that the sense of ‘true’ which we obtain through the Skolem argument (the only 
apparently verifiable sense) is a very different sense of ‘true’ as the realist demands. 
The realist idea of truth refers to its epistemic independence, in the sense that truth is 
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verification transcendent; whereas the sense of ‘true’ which we have through the 
Skolem argument is a sense which is theory and language dependent. 
Barry Taylor in his Models, Truth, and Realism (2006) identifies this argument as the 
Argument from Completeness, which is (as opposed to its cousin arguments from 
Cardinality and Permutation (Taylor, 2006, chapter 3)) the main model-theoretic 
argument against the tenets of realism. The Argument from Completeness rests on 
Gödel’s COMPLETENESS THEOREM: any consistent first-order theory has a model 
(and a normal model) (Taylor, 2006: 51). The Argument from Completeness claims that 
-as opposed to the realist claim of truth’s epistemic independence- every theory can be 
constructed in a model in which all of its theses are true:  
Consider an ideal theory T*, crafted by generations of super scientists. Being 
ideal, T* accords at least as well as any competitor with the methodological 
constraints on theories […]; further, it meets all ‘operational constraints. Then 
by the Completeness Theorem, T* has a model M*. So, though realism holds 
that T*, for all its ideality, may be false, we have established that all of its 
theses are true, in one clear sense of ‘true’; for all of them are true-on-M*. 
(Taylor, 2006: 51)  
Bearing in mind that one of the central tenets of realism is truth’s supposed epistemic 
independence -thus even an ideal theory might be false-, the Argument from 
Completeness stands as a strong criticism of metaphysical realism, since it attacks that 
very notion. As Taylor puts it:  
The Argument from Completeness confronts us with a model M* which 
renders true all the theses of the ideal theory T*, and, hence, with a sense of 
‘true’ -true-on-M*- according to which all the theses of T* are guaranteed to be 
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true, apparently conflicting with realism’s commitment to objectivity of truth, 
specifically to its epistemic independence. (Taylor, 2006: 59)  
The Argument from Completeness shows us that there is no room for an ideal theory to 
be false in the sense that the realist requires. Through model-theoretic arguments, ideal 
theories are proven to be ‘true’ in a very different fashion from realist standards, which, 
a fortiori, shows that no ideal theory can be proved to be false under the same 
standards. That is how we arrive to the claim that even an ideal theory might be false (2. 
above) from the claim that what our symbols refer to is massively indeterminate (1. 
above): metaphysical realism claims that there must be a unique truth-making state of 
the world and that (sometimes -if we discard things in themselves-) ideal science can 
lead us to such states (the Absolute description of reality from a View from Nowhere). 
Now, the Model-Theoretic Argument shows that such unique and accurate truth-making 
state of the world is an illusion, since there is no established norm in any language or 
metalanguage which renders a specific interpretation as the “intended” interpretation 
(indeterminacy of reference). When presented with indeterminacy, the realist must 
explain what constraints a model has to satisfy for it to be the “intended” interpretation 
of a set, to the effect that the model stands in a determinate and true reference relation 
with the objects of the set:  
the argument that Skolem gave, and that shows that ‘the intuitive notion of a 
set’ (if there is such a thing) is not ‘captured’ by any formal system, shows that 
even a formalization of total science (if one could construct such a thing), or 
even a formalization of all our beliefs (whether they count as ‘science’ or not), 
could not rule out denumerable interpretations, and, a fortiori, such a 
formalization could not rule out unintended interpretations of this notion. 
(Putnam, 1983: 3)  
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What is at stake here is the realistic belief that there can be a unique reference relation 
between words and world, namely, a Platonic belief in the unexplained and unnatural 
“grasping” of forms. Through the model-theoretic argument Putnam shows that there 
are models of sets in which “‘Cat’ refers to cats” is true in the same sense in which 
“‘Cat’ refers to cherries” is also true. There is nothing in the formal system itself which 
fixes with metaphysical glue the extension of the word “cat” to a particular set of 
objects.  
Thus, the Model-Theoretic Argument shows us that the truth or falsity of theories 
depend on a certain model and conceptual scheme (Argument from Completeness), and 
not on the realist’s fictions of truth’s epistemic independence and ultimate reality. The 
collapse of the realist’s claim that there is a unique reference relation renders impossible 
his belief that one can pick an “intended” and correct interpretation of a theory; thus, the 
realist is mistaken to adopt model theory as a feasible program to argue in favor of the 
correct relation between language and extralinguistic structures.     
b. Non-realist semantics, again 
Models don’t take into account a key element in the understanding of language, namely, 
interpretation:  
If we are told ‘axiomatic set theory does not capture the intuitive notion of a 
set’, then it is natural to think that something else -our ‘understanding’- does 
capture it. But what can our ‘understanding’ come to, at least for a 
naturalistically minded philosopher, which is more than the way we use our 
language? And the Skolem argument can be extended […] to show that the 
total use of the language (operational plus theoretical constraints) does not ‘fix’ 
a unique ‘intended interpretation’ any more than axiomatic set theory by itself 
does. (Putnam, 1983: 4)  
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There must be something outside the formal system which allows for interpretation, and 
which is not necessarily the use of language, thus, something outside the use of the 
language which comes in. However, in this “non-realist semantics/intuitionist” phase, 
Putnam links interpretation with the very idea of the use of language, thus it is 
necessary to show that the use of language necessarily amounts to methods of 
verification plus interpretation. In other words, there is nothing in the way between 
interpretation and verification which separates them from the use of language.  
Following Dummett (which was also his strategy in “Realism and Reason”), Putnam 
adopts the strategy of non-realist semantics and intuitionism, where  
knowing the meaning of a sentence or predicate consists in associating the 
sentence or predicate with a procedure which enables one to recognize when 
one has a proof that the sentence is constructively true […] or that the predicate 
applies to a certain entity […]. The most striking thing about this standpoint is 
that the classical notion of truth is nowhere used… (Putnam, 1983: 20)  
One advantage of this non-realist semantics over realist semantics is that the problem of 
a unique reference relation (and thus the problem of a unique “intended” interpretation) 
doesn’t arise: “reference is given through sense, and sense is given through verification 
procedures and not through truth-conditions.” (Putnam, 1983: 21)  
Non-realist semantics abandons the idea of understanding as knowing the truth-
conditions of a sentence, for such alternative implies already (and mysteriously) 
knowing the intended interpretations of a metalanguage, and so on. Instead, non-realist 
semantics views “the understanding of the language as consisting in the fact that 
speakers possess (collectively if not individually) an evolving network of verification 
procedures.” (Putnam, 1983: 22) Such network amounts precisely to the notion of use 
of the language, which comprises also the notion of interpretation. The problem of a 
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unique intended interpretation doesn’t arise under this picture since the use of a 
language fixes the interpretation, language use becomes the interpretation itself:  
To adopt a theory of meaning according to which a language whose whole use 
is specified still lacks something -namely its ‘interpretation’- is to accept a 
problem which can only have crazy solutions. To speak as if this were my 
problem, ‘I know how to use my language, but, now, how shall I single out an 
interpretation?’ is to speak nonsense. Either the use already fixes the 
‘interpretation’ or nothing can. (Putnam, 1983: 24)  
Through model-theoretic arguments Putnam showed that the social aspect of language 
cannot be overlooked when it comes to meanings. This conclusion is in line to the 
semantic externalism developed in his “The Meaning of Meaning” (1975), which 
claimed that “meanings ain’t in the head.”28 The model-theoretic argument developed in 
“Models and Reality” takes further this semantic externalism by showing that it doesn’t 
make sense to talk about interpretation and meaning outside of their relation with the 
use of a language, since they all are intertwined.  
 
2.4. Brains in a Vat 
The Brains in a Vat (BIV) Argument was put forward by Putnam in his Reason, Truth, 
and History (1981) as a criticism to the realist claim that mental images and signs 
necessarily refer to mind-independent objects. Together, the BIV Argument and the 
Model-theoretic Argument, form Putnam’s early attack on metaphysical realism and its 
confidence in the referential relation between mind and world.  
                                                 
28
 The idea of semantic externalism, developed in that article is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Through the skeptical supposition that we all could be brains in a vat -thus, all of what 
we call reality might be merely inputs from a computer connected to our brains-, 
Putnam seeks to show that there is a fundamental problem about realist (“magical”) 
theories of reference. The core of the argument is this: in order to show the 
inconsistencies of the realist’s theory of reference, Putnam –for the sake of argument- 
accepts a “causal constraint” on reference, to the effect that “a term refers to an object 
only if there is an appropriate causal connection between that term and the object.” 
(Hickey, 2009: 80) When a BIV utters the words “there is a tree in front of me”, all the 
language “inputs” come from the computer to which the BIV is connected to, not from 
actual trees out there. Therefore, the BIV is not in a proper causal relation with the 
world, to the effect that none of its words refer to it; they refer to the “mental images” 
which are being fed by the computer. For the sake of the argument, Putnam asks us to 
imagine a situation where all human beings are BIV, thus, the evil scientist, or the 
machine, makes us have the illusion that we are actually speaking to and hearing each 
other, when in fact, all we perceive and think of are the inputs from the machine. 
Is this skeptical scenario possible? The answer, for Putnam, is ‘No’:  
[T]he supposition that we are actually brains in a vat, although it violates no 
physical law, and is perfectly consistent with everything we have experienced, 
cannot possibly be true. It cannot possibly be true, because it is, in a certain 
way, self-refuting... The answer is going to be (basically) this: although the 
people in that possible world can think and ‘say’ any words we can think and 
say, they cannot (I claim) refer to what we can refer to. In particular, they 
cannot think or say they are brains in a vat (even by thinking ‘we are brains in 
a vat’). (Putnam, 1981: 7, 8)  
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To argue for this option, Putnam brings the example of Turing’s Test, where a computer 
is said to be conscious only after a person fails to determine who is who in a 
conversation with a computer and with another person
 29
. For Putnam, a variant of 
Turing’s test (Turing Test for Reference) can be used to determine the existence of 
shared reference, and thus determine if our partner uses the same words to refer as we 
do. The scenario for this test of reference is similar to that of the BIV, since in it 
machines produce meaningful sentences in any given natural language and interact (via 
linguistic responses) with speakers of such natural language. Naturally, for Putnam this 
test is not a proof that the discourse of such machines refers in the same way that human 
discourse refers (the same is true of the sentences of the BIV, and the ants who “draw” 
the face of Winston Churchill). From this comes the important conclusion that “words 
(and whole texts and discourses) do not have a necessary connection to their referents.” 
(Putnam, 1981: 10) The reason for this is that, whereas our discourse about the world 
implies some non-verbal interaction with it, the BIV’s and machine’s discourses do not 
bear any sort of such interaction. Putnam defines such interaction as “language 
entry/exit rules”:  
There are ‘language entry rules’ which take us from experiences of apples to 
such utterances as ‘I see an apple’, and ‘language exit rules’ which take us 
from decisions expressed in linguistic form (‘I am going to buy some apples’) 
to actions other than speaking. Lacking either language entry rules or language 
exit rules, there is no reason to regard the conversation of the machine […] as 
more than syntactic play. (Putnam, 1981: 11)  
                                                 
29
 “The conversations are not to be carried on face to face, of course, since the interlocutor is not to know 
the visual appearance of either of his two conversational partners. Nor is voice to be used, since the 
mechanical voice might simply sound different from a human voice. Imagine, rather, that the 
conversations are all carried on via electric typewriter.” (Putnam 1981: 9) 
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As it is clear, the main thrust of the BIV argument is that mental images and words do 
not bear a necessary referring relation with the world. However, as Putnam points out, 
some philosophers (“most famously Brentano”) claim that the mind refers by means of 
concepts instead of mental images. Nevertheless, “when we introspect we do not 
perceive ‘concepts’ flowing through our minds as such. Stop the stream of thought when 
or where we will, what we catch are words, images, sensations, feelings.” (Putnam, 
1981: 17) The supposed “intentional” concepts of the phenomenologist are not to be 
found inside the mind, but rather in a social context of communication:  
[T]o attribute a ‘concept’ or a ‘thought’ to someone is quite different from 
attributing any mental ‘presentation’, any introspectible entity or event, to him. 
Concepts are not mental presentations that intrinsically refer to external objects 
for the very decisive reason that they are not mental presentations at all. 
Concepts are signs used in a certain way… [A]nd signs do not themselves 
intrinsically refer. (Putnam, 1981: 18)  
As Putnam sees it, there must be, in order to there being understanding of a language, a 
“causal” relation between words and objects which is constructed by the way of 
concepts, and not through the presence of a mental image. Thus, according to the last 
quotation, concepts are abilities, rather than merely mental images, as the realist (and 
phenomenologist) claims they are; thus, they do not necessarily refer to a determined 
object.  
When I hear the words “point to a tree”, or if I’m showed an image of a man pointing to 
a tree, I cannot understand such utterances and images unless I have constructed and 
achieved the ability to point to trees when asked to point to trees:  
A man may have all the images you please, and still be completely at a loss 
when one says to him ‘point to a tree’, even if a lot of trees are present. He may 
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even have the image of what he is supposed to do, and still not know what he is 
supposed to do. For the image, if not accompanied by the ability to act in a 
certain way, is just a picture, and acting in accordance with a picture is itself an 
ability that one may or may not have. (Putnam, 1981: 19)  
In order for there being reference, meaning, and understanding, there must be a causal 
interaction between mind and reality; such causal interaction refers to the linguistic 
abilities afforded through concepts. Thus, concepts are not mental images or 
occurrences, but abilities to use language in a certain way, a meaningful way.     
The BIV Argument seems like a very adequate response to Searle’s and Alston’s 
minimal Realism (mR) which was presented earlier. According to mR, there are 
significant parts of reality which are mind-independent, such as mountains, trees, sugar, 
and so on. mR holds that, for example, Mount Everest is Mount Everest even if no 
humans ever existed, and thus no words would ever be uttered to refer to it. In the 
sections above, I presented arguments against such claim, to the effect that, ultimately, 
mR refers to an undetermined “something”, which is, from a pragmatic perspective, 
philosophically uninteresting. Now, I would like to claim that the BIV Argument points 
in a similar direction.  
mR operates with a commitment to what Davidson called the “third dogma of 
empiricism”, namely, the scheme/content distinction (Davidson, 1974). Before 
Davidson, Wilfrid Sellars had already pointed to this empiricist fallacy by referring to it 
as “The Myth of the Given” (Sellars, 1997). The argument from Sellars/Davidson 
claims that Empiricism operates with a ready-made theory of sense-data, to the effect 
that it supposes that reality consists of objects which are ready to be organized naively 
and objectively by the mind; as Locke saw it, the mind was a tabula rasa, upon which 
ideas are impinged. According to Davidson, there is not a fundamental divide between 
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the contents of perception and conceptual scheme, since language itself conveys the 
“reality” of such content, thus, reality is as it is only through language. For Davidson, 
the idea of a language which organizes experience doesn’t make sense; rather, language 
faces experience (Davidson, 1974).  
On the same vein, Sellars argued that the empiricist justifies a particular belief through 
the possession of a general concept: he justifies “p believes that x is red” through p’s 
acquaintance with redness; however:  
[I]n characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving 
an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical 
space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. (Sellars, 
1997: 76)  
For Sellars, just as the BIV Argument also claims, understanding a concept refers to the 
ability of using language in a certain way, not in possessing a mental image or sense-
data. So, p’s belief that “x is red” must be understood in relation with p’s ability to use 
language in a certain way (namely, a way which justifies his belief), instead of 
understanding it in the language of sense impressions. The Sellarsian idea of the 
“logical space of reasons” characterizes knowledge as a social phenomenon, instead of a 
solipsistic enterprise, as the empiricist and realist would have it.  
Now, mR operates with the idea that mental images and words refer no matter what. 
The ontology proposed by mR supposes the independent existence of things in 
themselves; however, they can be perceived, known, and referred to
30
. Thus, Mount 
Everest -as an object which enjoys an ontologically an sich reality- “causes” a person to 
magically refer to it every time that the words “Mount Everest” are uttered by that 
                                                 
30
 If mR is to be consistent, it must hold a dual theory of the thing in itself: Mount Everest is supposed to 
be ontologically a thing in itself (it exists and is what it is independently of human cognition); whereas 
epistemically it necessarily doesn’t carry an sich features, thus the possibility to be known.   
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person (or when a person is shown an image of it). As the BIV Argument showed, this 
doctrine “is not only bad natural science, it is also bad phenomenology and conceptual 
confusion.” (Putnam, 1981: 21) It is so, because it commits the blunder of adopting a 
magical theory of reference, pretending that a person would correctly refer to Mount 
Everest without possessing the concept of it
31
. But even if the person possessed the 
proper concepts to refer to mountains, and referred to the, so far unknown by him, 
Mount Everest, as “that mountain”, by pointing to it, even then, that person would  not 
be referring to Mount Everest as the realist claims. Mount Everest is Mount Everest 
after the conventional process of naming it so, and thus establishing its name as a 
concept. Similarly, if I’m walking in the streets of Berkeley, California, and point to a 
random person and refer to it as “that man”, I am not referring to the famous 
philosopher John Searle, for it is possible that my conceptual scheme lacks the concept 
of “philosopher”, and so on; and, even if I had such concepts, it is still possible that I 
don’t recognize his face; thus, when I refer to Searle as “that man”, it cannot be 
meaningfully said -according to the BIV Argument- that I am referring to John Searle
32
.  
It can be objected that this argument carries the spell of Kuhnian incommensurability; 
after all, I am interpreting Putnam as saying that one can only meaningfully refer to 
something after one has acquired its concept, and thus the ability to refer to it. Thus, the 
objection of incommensurability would run like this: “If one can only meaningfully 
refer to conceptually-known entities, then, one cannot say that pre-atomic-theory 
scientists in the 19
th
 century were meaningfully referring to atoms when they observed 
atoms, since they didn’t have such concept; thus, one is tempted to say that such 
scientists lived in a different world than atomic scientists do.” This criticism of 
                                                 
31
 And thus, without necessarily possessing the concepts of “mountain”, “valley”, “division”, “proper 
name”, and so on.  
32
 I acknowledge, however, that this claim extends the BIV Argument to essentialist discussions -such as 
the concept of a person- which are not the point here. 
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incommensurability vanishes by pointing that, certainly, pre-atomic-theory scientists 
could not have referred to atoms, since such concept wasn’t implemented yet -as if 
Adam Smith could meaningfully have referred to the International Monetary Fund! 
However, one cannot accept that this implies that they lived in different worlds and that 
a rational dialogue between different scientific paradigms is impossible. Simply, their 
words and theories didn’t share the same concepts and conceptions that ours do. The 
fact that someone’s words do not meaningfully refer exactly as ours do doesn’t mean 
that eventually she cannot achieve the ability to use our concepts meaningfully and 
establish successful communication. Reference, pace the realist -and as opposed to 
merely pointing to something or having a mental image-, if anything at all, is a social 
practice.   
 
2.4. Partial conclusions of this chapter 
Putnam’s early efforts to oppose metaphysical realism, though not totally devoid of 
metaphysical presuppositions, stressed that the notion of truth, though is not exhausted 
by the notion of justification, still, cannot be independent from it. Thus, his Model-
theoretic Argument strives to show that under realist standards there is a gap between 
what is true and what is ideally warranted by our best theories, an alternative a non-
realist cannot accept. In “Models and Reality”, Putnam deploys the Skolem argument to 
show that model theory is not an appropriate tool for the realist to argue in favor of the 
correspondence relation between language and extralinguistic structures. As the 
Argument from Completeness showed, the truth of a theory may be constructed 
depending on a model, to the effect that the sense of “truth” thus acquired makes no 
reference whatsoever to anything outside the model itself; thus undermining the realist 
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claim that truth is non-epistemic. The Skolem argument also points to the indeterminacy 
of reference, attacking the realist claim that one can pick out an “intended” 
interpretation for a theory. If such picking is rendered impossible by means of model-
theoretic arguments, then model theory becomes a very doubtful candidate for showing 
that the objectivity of truth and the world can be demonstrated through formal models.        
On the other hand, the BIV Argument is embedded in the tradition of Quine, Sellars, 
and Davidson, a tradition which unmasked the “dogmas” that made empiricism a 
metaphysical doctrine, and thus paved the way for a more pragmatist approach. What is 
most valuable in these arguments against metaphysical realism is the attack on the idea 
of the Given, namely, the claim that language organizes reality. As was pointed out, the 
empiricist (and realist) takes reality to consist of ready-made objects which are 
presented to the mind, ready to be correctly perceived. For philosophers such as Quine, 
Sellars, Davidson, and Putnam, this claim doesn’t acknowledge an important feature of 
language, namely, that of coping with experience. Instead, the empiricist and realist are 
concerned with the representational aspect of language, thus, for them it makes sense to 
talk about sense-data and mind-independent reality. Summing up, the BIV Argument 
relies on the critique of magical theories of reference to show the impossibility to refer 
to anything without deploying a conceptual use of language.  
The BIV Argument responds to the metaphysical realist’s claims by pointing that reality 
is what it is only after one has acquired the ability to use language through concepts; 
only then, one’s words are meaningful. If concepts are not deployed, as Metaphysical 
Realism’s ontology supposes, one ends up not only with an uninteresting “something”, 
but also with an undetermined and meaningless “that”.               
By the time Putnam wrote The Many Faces of Realism (1987), he had realized a certain 
inadequacy to rely on model-theoretic arguments to argue against metaphysical realism, 
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since such arguments relied on a theory of meaning and language which retained 
functionalist presuppositions. As opposed to this strategy, from The Many Faces of 
Realism on, Putnam pays more attention to conceptual relativity and pragmatism rather 
than model-theoretic arguments and metaphysical theories of the mind, such as 
functionalism.  
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Chapter 3 
TRUTH AS IDEALIZED WARRANTED ASSERTIBILITY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Reflecting on his philosophical development and his former attachment to Realism, 
Putnam acknowledges that a radical change came with his reconsideration of the 
problem of the correspondence theory of truth:  
The issue which first made uncomfortable with my hard-line realist position 
was one with which every philosopher is familiar: the notion that our words 
‘correspond’ to determinate objects (where the notion of an ‘object’ is thought 
to have a determinate reference which is independent of conceptual scheme) 
had long seemed problematical, although I did not see any alternative to 
accepting it. (Putnam, 1983: viii)  
The problem is linked to the determination of reference, how to fix the correspondence 
between words and objects: “how can a determinate correspondence between words or 
mental representations and external objects ever be singled out? How is the 
correspondence supposed to be fixed?” (Putnam, 1983: viii)  As we have seen, the 
model-theoretic argument advanced in “Models and Reality” showed that there is no 
way to single out a definite and unique correspondence between words and objects- at 
least not in the way the realist demands. But model theory confronts only a partial 
aspect of the concept of truth, namely truth in a specific metalanguage; besides, the 
Tarski-inspired model-theoretic argument affords only a formal definition of truth, and 
not an informal elucidation of this notion. Given this limitation, and given the fact that 
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we are concerned with the assesment of internal realism in comparison to metaphysical 
and natural realism, it is necessary to consider that which is probably the most valuable 
insight of internal realism: truth as idealized warranted assertibility. In this chapter I 
explore this pivotal element of Putnam’s internal realism and contrast such approach 
with the common-sense notion of truth adopted by Putnam since his Dewey Lectures. 
The main goal of this chapter is to show that internal realism (at least in its conception 
of truth) is not contrary to a common-sense view of truth in which truth is not identified 
with justification.  
 
3.2. Coherence as rational acceptability 
A starting point to understand truth as idealized warranted assertibility is to consider the 
idea that the rational acceptability of a set of statements depends on a “sort” of 
coherence with certain experiences:  
‘Truth’, in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability- 
some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our 
experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our belief 
system. (Putnam, 1981: 49-50)  
This “sort” of coherence is expressed in two levels: consistency between beliefs in a web 
of beliefs and consistency of experiential inputs with such web of beliefs. Without this 
second level of consistency, internal realism could very easily be blamed of idealism 
and solipsism. The consistency of experiential inputs with beliefs points to a relation not 
of causality but of interdependence: the inputs are not the neutral matter of sense-data, 
nor are beliefs isolated concepts. The appeal of internal realism is that it avoids the 
dichotomies between mind and world and belief and fact, and instead it proposes that 
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experiential inputs are, at least to some extent, shaped by our concepts. Thus, internal 
realism denies that 
there are any inputs which are not themselves to some extent shaped by our 
concepts, by the vocabulary we use to report and describe them, or any inputs 
which admit of only one description, independent of all conceptual choices. 
(Putnam, 1981: 54) 
Conceptions of coherence –as opposed to the concept of coherence itself-, are 
contingencies created by culture and they reflect our values: 
 Our conceptions of coherence are deeply interwoven with our psychology. 
They depend upon our biology and culture; they are by no means ‘value free’. 
But they are our conceptions, and they are conceptions of something real. 
(Putnam, 1981: 55) 
It is important to remark, then, that what depends on our culture are our conceptions of 
coherence, not the concept of coherence as a whole. Culture can shape what we accept 
for a belief to be consistent with other beliefs, in other words, culture determines the 
contents of beliefs. For exemple, one can accept that culture determines the consistency 
that beliefs must have with each other in a 21
st
 century scientific image: they must admit 
and incorporate the paradigmatic facts and theories of modern science. However, the 
internalist conception of coherence doesn’t admit the idea that the very concept of 
consistency is a cultural product, rather, all rational acceptability of beliefs is mediated 
by consistency. This point is illustrated by Putnam by his advocay of a limit-concept of 
an ideal truth, a Grenzbegriff. In the last page of Reason, Truth and History (1981), 
Putnam defends the idea that cultures and traditions produce different conceptions of 
rationality (our own conception created by the Greek tradition and modern science), 
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however, “the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality posits a 
Grenzbegriff, a limit-concept of the ideal truth.” (Putnam, 1981: 216)   
This limit-concept, as we shall briefly see, is not to be identified with Peirce’s  ideal-
limit of science, the utopic situation in which all true sentences would eventually 
converge. For the internalist, there are objective features concerning truth and 
justification, for example, even though truth is related to justification, there might be 
truths which transcend justification. A similar point applies to rationality, according to 
the internalist: even though what we consider rational might change (our conceptions of 
rationality), it is still a fact that consistency is a condition for rational belief.           
Coherence, as opposed to correspondence, is a matter as much of consistency as of 
interdependence, since the acceptability of a statement depends on other statements, 
experiences and states of affairs. As this shows, the idea of truth as warranted 
assertibility points to the metaphor that the mind and the world jointly make-up the 
mind and the world, since truth is conceived as unified coherence between mind and 
world (as opposed to the metaphysical notion of truth as the correspondence of theories 
to a transcendent reality).   
Putnam’s conception of coherence as consistency and interdependence of statements is 
in line with coherentist theories developped in the 20
th
 century, most notably by some of 
the members of the Vienna Circle and the Oxford Neo-Hegelians
33
. Otto Neurath 
defended coherentism by claiming that  
statements are compared with statements, not with ‘experiences’, not with a 
‘world’, nor with anything else. Each new statement is confronted with the 
totality of existing statements that have already been harmonized with each 
other. (‘Soziologie im Physikalismus’, quoted in Kunne, 2003: 381) 
                                                 
33
 See chapter 7 of Kunne 2003. 
71 
 
Neurath’s condition for the coherence of a set of beliefs is consistency: a new statement 
can be added to a set of staments only if the set remains consistent after the new 
statement is added. However, this conception of coherence as consistency between 
statements is open to the criticism (advanced by Bertrand Russell and Moritz Schlick, 
see Kunne 2003) that a set of statements might be consistent and yet be false. In 
response to this, coherentists, such as Neurath, maintained that the only type of 
statements which have truth claims are judgements and beliefs, thus, “if we have 
excogitated something, we cannot simply decide to believe it.” (Kunne, 2003: 382) 
Coherentists, such as the Oxford Neo-Hegelians (Bradley, Joachim), denied that 
conherence is limited only to consistency, and advocated the idea that a set of beliefs, in 
order to be coherent, must also be comprehensive and come to terms with perceptual 
judgements. A set of beliefs x is more comprehensive than a set of beliefs y only if x 
answers not only all questions answered in y but also at least one further question which 
remains unanswered in y (Kunne, 2003: 383) This idea of comprehensiveness is also 
conditioned by the tribunal of perceptual judgements which the set of beliefs must come 
to terms with; thus, “a set of beliefs is maximally coherent if it is consistent and second 
to none as regards comprehensiveness, perceptual control, and tight justificatory 
unification.” (Kunne, 2003: 385)  
This brief review of coherentism shows that Putnam’s idea of warranted assertibility as 
coherence is conceived in the tradition of 20
th
 century coherentism, since it advocates 
consistency between statements, as well as consistency between statements and 
perceptual judgements. As a consequence, Putnam’s coherentism withstands the same 
criticisms faced by Neurath and the Oxford Neo-Hegelians, but, as has been argued, it 
relies upon the consistency between mind and world to answer such criticisms.   
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3.3. Truth as justification under ideal epistemic conditions 
But truth, according to the internalist picture, cannot be identified with rational 
acceptability (justification) tout court, since truth is a necessary property of a 
statement
34
 which cannot be lost, whereas rational acceptability is relative:  
The statement ‘The earth is flat’ was, very likely, rationnally acceptable 3,000  
years ago, but it is not rationnally acceptable today. Yet it would be wrong to 
say that ‘the earth is flat’ was true 3,000 years ago; for that would mean that 
the earth has changed its shape. (Putnam, 1981: 55)     
Therefore, an important feature of internal realism is the emphasis on the close relation 
between truth and justification: truth is independent of justification here and now, but 
not independent of all justification. Rather, for the internalist, truth is an idealization of 
rational acceptability: we conceive an statement as being true when it can be asserted 
under ideal epistemic conditions.  
As has just been pointed, by identifying truth with justification under ideal epistemic 
conditions, Putnam was wrongly understood as equating such conditions with Peirce’s 
ideal limit of science, the utopic situation in which science could justify every true 
statement. However, Putnam’s linking of truth to justification under ideal epistemic 
conditions is very far from Peirce’s metaphysical yearning: an epistemic condition is 
ideal if it is appropriate to a context and is coherent with a particular statement. For 
example (and following Putnam’s example), the statement “There is a chair in my 
study” is true (rationally acceptable) only if the conditions in which it is stated are 
appropriate for such statement, namely, if there is good light in the room and if my 
vision is not impaired. In other words, “there are better and worse epistemic conditions 
                                                 
34
 Internalism accepts a bivalent logic according to which statements have the property of being true or 
false. Bivalence is a fact of our conceptual schemes, just as independence from our cultural peers’ opinion 
is a fact about the notion of warrant.  
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with respect to particular statements.” (Putnam, 1990: viii) The epistemic conditions 
advocated by internalism make reference to experiential inputs as well as the language 
in which such conditions are stated.  
Therefore, to a certain extent, truth understood as justification under ideal epistemic 
conditions is language-dependent: when I am justifying an statement about physical 
objects, the rational and sensible process to follow is to assert my justification using 
material object language, and the same applies for every instance of truth as 
justification:  
[O]ne cannot say what are good or better or worse epistemic conditions in 
quantum mechanics without using the language of quantum mechanics; one 
cannot say what are good or better or worse epistemic situations in moral 
discourse without using moral language; one cannot say what are good or 
better or worse epistemic situations in common sense material object discourse 
without using commonsense material object discourse. (Putnam, 1990: viii) 
This is a very important point of Putnam’s conception of truth as warranted assertibility 
since it stands in stark contrast to the metaphysical doctrine of truth as correspondence. 
As we have seen, the idea of truth as correspondence confronts chunks of Reality with 
statements, affirming that the statement is a true reflection of the Reality in question. 
This position, as was showed in the first and second chapters, breeds the anxiety of 
determining how language hooks on to the world, the dichotomy of mind and world. As 
opposed to this metaphysical stand, Putnam’s idea that truth as justification is language-
dependent doesn’t confront Facts of Reality with statements, instead, it proposes the 
idea that such “facts” are incomprehensible if described in a language not appropriate to 
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their context. Such context, and such coherence of discourse and reality is determined 
by our “rational and sensible nature.”35  
An important difference, then, between the metaphysical doctrine of truth as 
correspondence to reality and Putnam’s truth as justification under ideal conditions, is 
that, as opposed to the doctrine of correspondence, when we identify truth as warranted 
assertibility we don’t dichotomize between fact and convention. Acording to this view, 
there are no finished and transcendent facts on the one hand and a set of statements on 
the other hand waiting to be confronted. Instead, Putnam challenges us to conceive such 
facts as unintelligible without a coherent statement to describe them. 
Therefore, the “sort of coherence” which Putnam compares to truth and rational 
acceptability is an interplay between concepts and experiences. But this interplay is not 
dualism all over again. Instead, internal realism claims that it doesn’t make sense to 
speak of pure facts (stripped of conceptualisation) on the one hand, and of concepts 
which don’t relate to an objective reality, on the other.  
 
3.4. Epistemic conditions are world-involving 
Against the criticism that internal realism might be an idealistic doctrine (due to the 
acknowledgement that elements of mind create an important part of what we call 
reality), Putnam insisted in his internalist period that the notion of ideal epistemic 
conditions is a world-involving notion. We have already seen that Putnam 
acknowledged that rational acceptability as coherence implies consistency between 
beliefs and consistency between beliefs and experiential inputs. In what follows I show 
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 Putnam here cites Kant’s words (Putnam, 1990: ix). 
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further how this consistency between beliefs and experiential inputs is developped in 
Putnam’s internalism.  
For the internal realist, there are two senses in which the world (external reality) is said 
to determine epistemic conditions:  
1) Even though truth is identified with justification, there are cases when truth is 
evidence-transcendent: “the totality of actual human sense experiences does not 
determine the totality of truths, even in the long run.” (Putnam, 2000: 18) This 
first sense of “world-involving” is a clear retort against the objection that, since 
it is speakers themselves who determine whether a statement is true in 
sufficiently good epistemic conditions, internal realism can easily fall prey of 
solipsism: for the internal realist, truth trascends experience and justification; 
therefore, there might be truths which are unverifiable in principle, and thus we 
cannot conceive of any epistemic conditions to justify them. This is, of course, a 
negative sense of world-involvement concerning epistemic conditions, but it 
shows how knowledge of reality is conditioned by the world.     
2) The second sense of “world-involving” regarding epistemic conditions is clear 
from Putnam’s insistence on the “rational and sensible nature” of speakers when 
it comes to ascertain the truth or falsity of any statement: it is not only 
empirically that a speaker can verify a statement under ideal epistemic 
conditions, justification is also a rational matter, a matter of coherence and fit, 
as we have seen in the last sections. When we verify and try to justify statements 
such as “There’s a chair in my study”, or “There was a dinosaur in North 
America less than a million years ago” (both examples come from Putnam 
1990), we are not giving a report of what our sense-data perceive, nor are we 
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supposing that such are the statements of a Brain in a vat
36
; but rather, we are 
expressing beliefs which fit our experience and are rational for us. 
Epistemic conditions are world-involving in the measure that, in order to justify a 
statement or belief, one needs to rely in a complex web of beliefs which is articulated by 
reasons and concepts. When the internalist affirms that the mind and the world jointly 
make the mind and the world, he is contrasting the mind with a world of beliefs and 
experiences, not only sense-experiences.   
This internalist doctrine echoes Wilfrid Sellars’ criticism of empiricist epistemology, 
known as The Myth of the Given, which was briefly mentioned in the previous chapter. 
To better understand Putnam’s position and contextualize it, it might help to analyze it 
in the light of a very similar doctrine advanced by Sellars and, more recently, by John 
McDowell. 
 In his seminal article “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (Sellars, [1956] 1997), 
Sellars sets to criticize modern empiricism as represented by sense-data theorists, and 
points that such theorists must choose between two contradictory options: 
a) It is particulars which are sensed. Sensing is not knowing. The 
existence of sense-data does not logically imply the existence of 
knowledge. 
b) Sensing is a form of knowing. It is facts rather than particulars 
which are sensed. (Sellars, 1997: 16)    
Sellars is interested in the difference of knowing something non-inferentially and the 
process of arriving to knowledge by the acquisition of concepts. Empiricism, according 
to Sellars, is commited to the Myth of the Given by trying to admit both alternatives, 
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 The Brains in a Vat experiment, as shown in the previous chapter, is Putnam’s response to the brands of 
solipsism and idealism which believe in “magical” theories of reference and the possibility of a private 
language. 
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namely, by defending the idea that sense-data are particulars (not facts) and that sensing 
such particulars is an instance of knowledge. By taking sense-data to be the foundations 
of knowledge, empiricists “have taken givenness to be a fact which presupposes no 
learning, no forming of associations, no setting up of stimulus-response connections.” 
(Sellars, 1997: 20).  
Thus, for sense-data theorists and empiricists alike, to see a color as red is a non-
inferential instance of knowledge which doesn’t require any process of 
conceptualization. Such is the Myth of the Given: the conflation of the views that 
knowledge is founded upon episodes of sensing which don’t imply inferences, and that 
the awareness of such episodes doesn’t imply concept formation. For Sellars, such 
views are incompatible since only what is conceptually and linguistically structured  
counts as an episode of knowledge. 
That knowledge is justified and structured conceptually is an idea which Sellars 
develops in what he calls the logical space of reasons:  
in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an 
empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical 
space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. (Sellars, 
1997: 76)  
As is the case for the internal realist, Sellars’ “psychological nominalism” (the doctrine 
which holds that all awareness is a linguistic affair), defends the view that justification 
is not possible outside of a linguistic and conceptual framework.  
In his Mind and World (1996), John McDowell develops further the idea of Sellars’ 
logical space of reasons. For McDowell, the Myth of the Given is  
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the idea that the space of reasons, the space of justifications or warrants, 
extends more widely than the conceptual sphere. The extra extent of the space 
of reasons is supposed to allow it to incorporate non-conceptual impacts from 
outside the realm of thought. (McDowell, 1996: 7) 
Such non-conceptual impacts are identified with sense-experience, and belong to a 
realm different from the conceptual one. In his reading of Sellars, McDowell contrasts 
the space of reasons with the logical space of reasons. The space of reasons (or the 
logical space of nature) is the space in which natural science functions. It is in this space 
that sense-impressions belong to, thus, the description for such space is an empirical 
description because it describes transactions in nature.  
On the other hand, talk of knowledge and justification belongs to the logical space of 
reasons, the space which allows for descriptions of how things are interconnected:  
On these principles, the logical space in which talk of impressions belongs is 
not one in which things are connected by relations such as one thing’s being 
warranted or correct in the light of another. (McDowell, 1996: xv)  
Empiricists commit a fallacy by supposing that elements of the logical space of nature 
suffice in themselves to serve as a tribunal for knowledge, thus, extending the space of 
reasons beyond the conceptual space:  
[W]e cannot really understand the relations in virtue of which a judgement is 
warranted except as relations within the space of concepts: relations such as 
implication or probabilification, which hold between potential exercises of 
conceptual capacities. The attempt to extend the scope of justificatory relations 
outside the conceptual sphere cannot do what it is supposed to do. (McDowell, 
1996: 7) 
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Thus, for Sellars and McDowell justification and knowledge are only possible within 
the sphere of the conceptual, the sphere which affords us the intelligibility of warranted 
judgements. In the same way, when the internalist admits that epistemic conditions are 
world-involving, he is not simply admitting a fact about empirical knowledge, namely, 
that episodes of knowledge aren’t merely a fiction created by the mind; what he really is 
aiming at is that what we call reality is a complex web of beliefs which can only be 
warranted and understood in the framework of language and concepts.             
 
3.5. Semantic externalism 
The idea of fitness and rationality concerning truth and justification is best understood 
when compared with the relation between language and reality. Putnam’s theory of 
meaning and reference, known as “semantic externalism,” deserves more than a chapter 
of its own
37
, however, something must be briefly said about meaning and reference 
regarding the notion of “world-involving” epistemic conditions.  
Internal realism is linked to the doctrine of semantic externalism in the sense that the 
verificationism advocated by internal realism is social and not individualistic in nature. 
Putnam’s internal realism rests on an externalist theory of reference which insists on the 
transactional and social character of reference
38
, thus avoiding solipsism and 
approaching pragmatism.   
In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” (1975), Putnam challenges the idea that the two 
following assumptions can be held together: 
                                                 
37
 See “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, in Putnam 1975; and also The Twin Earth Chronicles, ed. by 
Andrew Pessin, 1996, a collection of essays discussing Putnam’s semantic externalism. 
38
 See particularly Putnam 1981, chapters 1 and 2.  
80 
 
1. That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain 
psychological state. 
2. That the meaning of a term (in the sense of “intension”) determines its 
extension. 
To challenge these assumptions, Putnam develops an approach to meaning which came 
to be known as semantic externalism.  This approach rests on the convergent ideas of 
the linguistic division of labor and  the role of the environment to define reference.  
The linguistic division of labor defends the idea that experts in a community have a role 
in defining the reference of terms. As opposed to a traditional and metaphysical theory 
of reference according to which a term is defined a priori in each individual’s mind, this 
doctrine states that in our linguistic practice we defer to the authority of experts to 
define certain concepts, such as natural kind terms. For example, most of us know the 
meaning of the term “gold”; however, when it comes to decide which objects does the 
term apply to –the extension of the term-, most of us defer to the authority of experts. 
Or, to give the most popular example, let’s suppose that there is a planet called Twin 
Earth, which resembles our planet in everything, except that the liquid which they call 
water has the chemical formula XYZ, as opposed to Earthian water, whose chemical 
formula is H2O. When a person in Earth says “this is water” he is in the same 
psychological state as when the Twin Earthian says “this is water”; however, and 
regardless of both being in the same psychological state, the meaning (and the 
extension) of both expressions is not determined by such state. The meaning of such 
natural terms as “water” or “gold” is not a fixed entity which lies in the mind, but rather, 
is the result of a communal effort: 
Language is not a tool like a hammer, that anyone can use by him- or herself. It 
is a tool like a large ship, which it takes many people working together to 
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operate. I can refer to gold, talk about gold, purchase gold, etc. perfectly well 
without being able reliably to distinguish gold from non-gold because there are 
others in the community -experts- upon whom I can rely. In short, there is a 
linguistic division of labor. (Putnam, 1996: xvi)    
On the other hand, semantic externalism states that meanings and references are related 
to the environment due to the rigid indexicality of some words:  
Words like ‘water’ have an unnoticed indexical component: ‘water’ is stuff that 
bears a certain similarity relation to the water around here. Water at another 
time or in another place or even in another possible world has to bear the 
relation sameL to our ‘water’ in order to be water. Thus the theory that 1) 
words have ‘intensions,’ which are something like concepts associated with the 
words by speakers; and that 2) intension determines extension- cannot be true 
of natural kind words like ‘water’39[…]” (Putnam 1975:234)  
Semantic externalism (a doctrine which implicitly supports internal realism) is a 
response against metaphysical realism in the sense that this last doctrine (ever since 
Plato) thought of meanings as transcendent entities which were grasped by the mind. 
The semantic externalism advocated by Putnam argues that the meaning of sentences 
and terms is a complicated process which can only be accomplished when done in a 
linguistic community, in other words, when it’s done in relation with the world.   
The concept of world-involving ideal epistemic conditions far from being a solipsistic 
concept is a concept which conceives the meaning and justification of words in a social 
                                                 
39
 However, by the end of the essay, Putnam admits that “meaning determines extension- by construction, 
so to speak.” (1975:270). This is the case when we construct the meaning of a term by a description 
consisting of four columns of components: syntactic markers, semantic markers, stereotypes, and 
extension: “the representation of the words ‘water’ in Earth dialect and ‘water’ in Twin earth dialect 
would be the same except that in the last column the normal form description of the twin earth Word 
‘water’ would have XYZ and not H2O. This means that we are ascribing the same linguistic competence 
to the typical Earthian/Twin Earthian speaker, but a different extension to the word, nonetheless.” 
(Putnam, 1975:270)    
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context, or as Sellars put it, in the logical space of reasons. Doctrines such as 
Empiricism, Metaphysical realism, and Idealism, reflect two mistaken philosophical 
tendencies:  
[T]he tendency to treat cognition as a purely individual matter and the tendency 
to ignore the world, insofar as it consists of more than the individual’s 
‘observations’. Ignoring the division of linguistic labor is ignoring the social 
dimension of cognition; ignoring what we have called the indexicality of most 
words is ignoring the contribution of the environment. (Putnam, 1975:271) 
The doctrine of internal realism, as based on semantic externalism, acknowledges that 
the sister notions of truth, justification, and meaning depend on the interaction between 
individuals and communities, between mind and world.   
 
3.6. Features of warranted assertibility 
To say that truth is identified with rational acceptability under ideal epistemic 
conditions is not the same as saying that truth depends on communal agreement 
(majority opinion). Warranted assertibility (the term that Putnam uses instead of 
justification and rational acceptability) has certain features which differentiate it from 
the “everything goes” so dear to the relativist. In his “Realism with a Human Face” 
(1990), Putnam identifies five principles concerning warrant which help us understand 
the centrality of this term in relation to the doctrine of internal realism:  
1. There is a fact of the matter as to whether the statements people makes are 
warranted. 
2. Whether a statement is warranted or not is independent of whether the majority 
of one’s cultural peers would say is warranted or unwarranted. 
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3. Our norms and standards of warranted assertibility are historical products; they 
evolve in time. 
4. Our norms and standards always reflect our interests and values. 
5. Our norms and standards are capable of reform.  
       (Putnam, 1990: 21) 
 
The first two principles are a counter to relativism, in the sense that they postulate the 
idea of objective conditions for the assertibility of statements, independently of majority 
opinion. Relativism
40
, on the other hand, is the Protagorean view according to which a 
statement is warranted only if one’s cultural peers say it is. As Putnam rightly points 
out, one cannot defend the independence of warrant from majority opinion as a fact of a 
transcendent reality, but rather, the internal realist should defend warrant’s 
independence from majority opinion as a feature of our idea of warrant. This point was 
emphasized above by pointing that the different conceptions of coherence are 
determined by culture, whereas the very idea of coherence is independent of culture: 
“Our conceptions of coherence are deeply interwoven with our psychology. They 
depend upon our biology and culture; they are by no means ‘value free’. But they are 
our conceptions, and they are conceptions of something real.” (Putnam, 1981: 55) This 
is also supported by principles 3 and 5, namely that our standards of justification are 
historical products capable of reform. 
Even though culture and history determine what is rational and consistent in particular 
cases and traditions, coherence and consistency are keys to the picture of warranted 
assertibility and rationality:  
                                                 
40
 Putnam directs his two first principles to Rorty’s relativism.  
84 
 
[T]he very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality posits a 
Grenzbegriff, a limit-concept of the ideal truth. (Putnam, 1981: 216)  
Rather than viewing the fact that warrant is independent of majority opinion as 
a fact about a transcendent reality, one should recognize that it is nothing but a 
property of the concept of warrant itself. (Putnam, 1990: 22)   
 Finally, principle 4, stating that our norms and standards always reflect our interests 
and values, is a clear example against metaphysical realism and a defense of the idea 
that it doesn’t make sense to speak of facts as independent of language:  
[E]lements of what we call ‘language’ or ‘mind’ penetrate so deeply into what 
we call ‘reality’ that the very project of representing ourselves as being 
‘mappers’ of something ‘language-independent’ is fatally compromised from 
the very start. (Putnam, 1990: 28)   
This interconnectedness between mind and world is an invitation to abandon the 
dichotomies of “convention/fact” and “fact/value”, and embrace the idea that what we 
call “reality” is not, as Quine once put it, a grey fabric, “black with fact and white with 
convention”41, but rather, a reflection of our interests and needs. This is of course not 
relativism revamped in an analytic guise, because Putnam is not saying that “we make 
the world”; rather, internal realism is an effort to show that it is not possible to speak of 
brute facts which are not a reflection of human interests.   
The idea of warranted assertibility is a compromise between objectivity and 
conventionality. As opposed to other doctrines such as Realism, Relativism and 
Idealism, the warranted assertibility afforded by internal realism, insists that we cannot 
dichotomize reality between “pure facts” and “conventions”, because such “purity” and 
objectivity will always be permeated by language and interests, as William James put it, 
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 “Carnap and Logical Truth”, quoted in Putnam 2004: 44. 
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“the trail of the human serpent is all over.” Empiricism (due to the “Myth of the 
Given”), just as Realism, is also the idea that facts can be stripped of language and 
intentionality, and can thus constitute the basis of knowledge. Such assumptions, 
empiricists and realist alike, embrace a conception of truth as correspondence, 
according to which true sentences reflect brute facts. As I have been trying to show in 
this chapter, internal realism conceives truth not as a representation of facts, but as close 
interdependence of beliefs and experiential inputs, to the point that it doesn’t make any 
sense to draw a limit between the two.      
 
3.7. Can truth transcend justification? 
For the internalist, unverifiable or meaningless statements are those which outrun the 
capacity of any rational individual to verify: for example, questions of the type “Are 
there really numbers?”, are meaningless questions which don’t allow us to imagine any 
rational conditions for verification. As Putnam rightly points out, this verificationism 
differs from positivism in the extent that for the internalist there isn’t a restricted way to 
verify statements; whereas for the positivists a statement is verifiable only analitically 
or empirically.    
This internalist conception of truth differs a great deal from the metaphysical conception 
of truth, according to which truth is a property of statements which is not linked with 
justification but rather with correspondence between the statement and reality; thus, for 
the metaphysical realist truth is justification transcendent.  
However, truth, from an internalist perspective cannot be totally identified with 
justification and rational acceptability: “Truth cannot simply be rational acceptability 
for one fundamental reason; truth is supposed to be a property of a statement that 
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cannot be lost, whereas justification can be lost.” (Putnam, 1981: 55) There are 
statements which are rationally acceptable when viewed from the available evidence, 
but which might turn out to be false.  
The relation between truth and verification for the internalist, is one of availability: even 
though internal realism rejects the idea that truth must be identified with justification, it 
nevertheless suggests that the truth of a proposition requires that evidence of its truth be 
available in principle. This, as we have seen, is not to be understood as conclusive 
evidence; instead, internalism admits that evidence of a statement’s truth must be 
available at some time or other and to rational beings whose cognitive powers might 
exceed ours. It is only when justification is in principle available that the internalist can 
claim that truth sometimes outruns justification.     
In his article “Truth as sort of epistemic: Putnam’s peregrinations” (2000), Crispin 
Wright endeavors to find when this sort of justification transcendence stops being 
“benign” and becomes part of the doctrine of metaphysical realism. Wright’s article is 
important for the purposes of this investigation because it claims that Putnam’s 
internalist doctrine of truth can be accommodated also in his reversion to the natural 
realism developed in his Dewey Lectures.  
The “benign” justification transcendence of the internalist doctrine of truth, according to 
Wright, is found in Putnam’s identification of truth with justification under ideal 
circumstances. Wright emphasizes that such identification acknowledges that truth, even 
though is identified with ideal assertibility, can nevertheless outrun justification. Such 
episodes are called by Wright contingencies of epistemic opportunity:  
[I]n all cases where we have a conception of this kind of how the truth value of 
a particular statement could be unverifiable, a developed specific account of 
that conception will consist in detailing limitations of opportunity, or 
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spatiotemporal situation, or perceptual or intellectual capacity, which stops us 
getting at the relevant facts but to which we, or others, might easily not have 
been subject- or at least, to which we can readily conceive that an intelligible 
form of investigating intelligence need not be subject. (Wright, 2000: 360) 
Benign justification transcendence is, according to Wright, favored by the fact that if 
we, or beings with superior cognitive powers, had access to the evidence of a true 
proposition, we would recognize it as such. But it just happens that certain propositions 
are constrained by epistemic contingencies which, for the time being, don’t make that 
evidence available to us.  
On the other hand, as Wright tells us, there is the “malign” evidence-transcendent 
conception of truth which is advocated by metaphysical realism. This type of evidence-
transcendence is not afforded by contingencies of epistemic opportunity, but by the 
metaphysical division between mind and reality, a division which brings forth the 
“interface” picture criticized by internal realism: 
The essence of metaphysical realism, we might say, is thus interface realism. 
And the evidence-transcendent conception of truth which metaphysical realism 
brings in train is of a malignant kind, the kind that goes with an interface 
conception of mind’s interaction with the world. (Wright, 2000: 361)  
A paradigm statement which displays contingencies of epistemic opportunity- and thus 
benign recognition-transcendence-  is of the form (F) Q and no one will ever rationally 
believe that Q
42
. In Putnam’s reply to Wright’s article, “When evidence transcendence 
is not malign: a reply to Crispin Wright” (Putnam, 2000), he emphasizes the fact that 
(F) is not verifiable, but only falsifiable:  
                                                 
42
 This type of statements, referred to by Wright and Putnam as “Fitch propositions” is discussed by F.B. 
Fitch in “A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, xxviii, 1963, quoted 
in Wright 2000.  
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there are only two sorts of circumstances in which it is possible to ‘appraise’ 
the truth value of (F): these are (1) circumstances in which it is possible to 
know that Q is false, and (2) circumstances in which it is possible to know that 
someone rationally believes that Q is true, and in both sorts of circumstances 
(F) is false. (Putnam, 2000: 595-96) 
As Putnam argues, if Wright’s moderate internalist conception of truth accepts some 
recognition-transcendent truths, it must do so not because such propositions display 
contingencies of epistemic opportunity, but because of their logical structure:  
Just as the logical structure of a Fitch example makes it clear that what is 
supposed in such an example […] is something that, if it happens, we cannot 
verify, so the logical structure of [the sentence “there are no intelligent 
extraterrestrials”] makes it clear that what is supposed in this example –say, 
that something improbable (if it is improbable) simply happens- is something 
that, if it happens, we cannot verify. (Putnam, 2000: 598)  
Contrary to Wright, Putnam doesn’t see the proposition “there are no intelligent 
extraterrestrials” as implying the “malign” sign of recognition-transcendence favored by 
metaphysical realism, but sees it, just as (F) above, as another example of falsifiable 
sentences which “spell disaster for any elucidation of truth in terms of rational 
acceptability.” (Putnam, 2000: 599) For the Putnam of the natural realism period which 
starts with the Dewey Lectures, the recognition transcendence of truth is reframed in the 
context of common-sense:  
How, then, do we understand “recognition transcendent” uses of the word true, 
as, for example, when we say that the sentence “Lizzie Borden killed her 
parents with an axe” may well be true even though we may never be able to 
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establish for certain that it is?... If we accept it that understanding the sentence 
“Lizzie Borden killed her parents with an axe” is not simply a matter of being 
able to recognize a verification in our own experience -accept it, that is, that we 
are able to conceive of how things that we cannot verify were- then it will not 
appear as “magical” or “mysterious” that we can understand the claim that that 
sentence is true. What makes it true, if it is, is simply that Lizzie Borden killed 
her parents with an axe. The recognition transcendence of truth comes, in this 
case, to no more than the “recognition transcendence” of some killings. And 
did we ever think that all killers can be recognized as such? Or that the belief 
that there are certain determinate individuals who are or were killers and who 
cannot be detected as such by us is a belief in magical powers of the mind? 
(Putnam, 2000: 65) 
The fact that we can understand statements which we cannot verify is not to be 
explained, as metaphysical realism does, as a fact of a transcendent reality which exists 
independently of concepts and theories; but instead, according to the late natural realism 
of Putnam, such ability is acquired when we learn a language. When we learn the rules 
and the uses of our language we learn too that there are some sentences which we accept 
as true regardless of the fact that we are not directly acquainted with such facts. 
However, it is worthwhile to consider Wright’s concern:  
[M]ust a conception of truth which is tolerant of this commonsensical 
conception be one about which Putnam’s middle period denial ‘that we 
have…a notion of truth that totally outruns the possibility of justification’ is 
simply mistaken? (Wright, 2000: 341) 
Wright’s answer is no: the “benign” recognition-transcendence of some true statements 
which are accepted by the internalist conception of truth approaches this doctrine to 
90 
 
Putnam’s recent reversion to common-sense realism. However, as we have seen from 
Putnam’s answer to Wright’s article, Putnam doesn’t admit that the benign character of 
recognition-transcendence rests on the contingencies of epistemic opportunity displayed 
by statements of the type (F) above, but rather, as the Lizzie Borden example shows, by 
the logical structure of statements. 
Given this scenario, it is worthwhile to ask if the idea of justification being available in 
principle (Wright’s benign case of recognition-transcendence) can be accommodated in 
an account of recognition-transcendence based on the logical structure of statements 
(Putnam’s latest reversion to common-sense realism). In what follows, I will lead my 
argument in a similar direction as does Wright: like him, I will defend the idea that 
Putnam’s later natural realism is not contrary to some tenets of internal realism; more 
specifically, I will defend the idea that verificationism (as embraced by internal realism) 
is not contrary to common-sense realism.  
 
3.8. Warranted assertibility and justification transcendence 
In his article “Corresponding with Reality”, Putnam claimed that his internal realism, 
due to the solipsism of its “verificationist semantics”, “far from being an intelligible 
alternative to a supposedly unintelligible metaphysical realism, can itself possess no 
public intelligibility.” (Putnam 2012a: 80) The reason is that, as Putnam came to see the 
issue after his Dewey Lectures, verificationist semantics restricts the range of truth value 
to those sentences which can be verified, leaving no room for intersubjectivity. As he 
admits, though, in Reason, Truth, and History he was already aware of such danger, and 
thus, in that book he defined “an intersubjective notion of truth in terms of verification 
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(“justification”) thus: S is true if and only if believing S would be justified if epistemic 
conditions were good enough.” (Putnam 2012a: 79)  
However, as Putnam’s later self-criticism goes, according to this sort of verificationism, 
understanding a sentence amounts to understanding a conditional statement that 
confirms it:  
Let us suppose, as seems reasonable, that whatever makes it rational to believe 
that S makes it rational to believe that S would be justified were conditions 
good enough. If my understanding of the counterfactual “S would be justified 
if conditions were good enough” is exhausted by my capacity to tell to what 
degree it is justified to assert it, as my “verificationist semantics” claimed, and 
that is always the same as the degree to which it is justified to assert S itself, 
then I might as well have simply said that my understanding of S is just my 
capacity to tell what confirms S. (Putnam 2012a: 79)  
By equating the understanding of a sentence to the “internal” capacity to decide on its 
confirmation, verificationst semantics, the core of internal realism, becomes a solipsistic 
option. Thus, as Putnam came to see it, internal realism is a solipsistic doctrine because 
it accepts that what makes a statement true is also supposed to be what the statement 
means, in other words, my understanding of S is just my capacity to tell what confirms 
S to what degree. It is in this way that, according to Putnam, internal realism (and 
verificationism) conflates meaning and justification: if the meaning of a statement is 
exhausted by my capacity to tell what justifies it, then, by restricting the meaning of 
sentences to individual means of justification, one falls into solipsism.  
Both, in the above cited article, as well as in his article “Between Scylla and Charybdis: 
Does Dummett Have a Way Through?” (2007) published in the volume The Philosophy 
of Michael Dummett, Putnam conflates the meaning of the conditional statement (1) “S 
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would be justified if epistemic conditions were good enough” with the meaning of S, 
which is obviously not the case. To see how he comes to this conclusion, let’s inquire 
what does it mean that the verificationist, according to Putnam, is trapped by solipsism 
by accepting that his understanding of S is the same as his capacity to tell what confirms 
S.  
For Putnam it is reasonable to suppose “that whatever makes it rational to believe that S 
makes it rational to believe that S would be justified were conditions good enough.” 
(Putnam 2007: 162) But, he continues, this apparently “reasonable” claim leads the 
verificationist straight into solipsism:  
If my understanding of the counterfactual “S would be justified if conditions 
were good enough” is exhausted by my capacity to tell to what degree it is 
justified to assert it, and that is always the same as the degree to which it is 
justified to assert S itself, why did I bother to mention the counterfactual at all? 
Why did I not just say that my understanding of S is just my capacity to tell 
what confirms S to what degree, full stop? (Putnam 2007: 162)  
According to this, the conditional statement (1) “S would be justified if conditions were 
good enough”, is equated to S itself, which is a very long stretch. What Putnam fails to 
see is that (1) is a condition for S, not the other way around: let us suppose that S stands 
for the belief in the existence of saber-toothed tigers 30.000 years ago (an example of 
Putnam’s). Then, according to verificationist semantics, S would be true if it is justified 
by epistemic conditions such as the acceptance of archeological evidence, the fossil 
record and all the scientific knowledge which surrounds such evidence. However, at the 
same time, S is indirectly justified by the understanding and acceptance of (1) as an 
epistemic principle, not the other way around: the capacity to tell to which degree it is 
justified to assert (1) is not the same as the degree to which it is justified to assert S. 
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That (1) is a condition of S, and not the other way around, is clear because one cannot 
meaningfully say that “The belief in the existence of saber-toothed tigers 30.000 years 
ago would be justified if epistemic conditions were good enough” is true if and only if 
the belief in the existence of saber-toothed tigers 30.000 years ago is true.  
What makes the belief in the existence of saber-toothed tigers 30.000 years ago true –
according to the verificationist– is the understanding that such belief would be true if 
and only if epistemic conditions were good enough.  
Then, as was shown, the capacity to tell to which degree it is justified to assert (1) is not 
exhausted by the capacity to tell to which degree it is justified to assert S. The 
verificationist expects that all true beliefs are justified; but what justifies my belief in a 
fact S is not the same as that which justifies my belief in conditional (1). Ultimately, of 
course, both are justified linguistically, but that is not what is at stake here. What is at 
stake is the charge that verificationism is solipsistic because it equates the meaning of 
sentences with their internal justification, which, as we have seen, amounts to the 
conflating of the capacity to tell to which degree it is justified to assert S with the 
capacity to tell to which degree it is justified to assert (1).  
Now, however, we must face the question whether verificationist semantics is itself 
justified according to its own standards
43
. In other words, since what renders true and 
justifies the belief in every sentence S is the acceptance of the conditional statement (1), 
which asserts that S is justified if conditions are good enough; then, what justifies the 
belief in conditional (1)? It seems rather strange to justify the statement “a sentence is 
justified if epistemic conditions are good enough” by saying that what justifies it is that 
                                                 
43
   Putnam has enquired in a similar fashion the question whether the positivist’s principle of verification 
is itself verifiable according to positivist standards. See “Philosophers and human understanding”, in 
Putnam 1983; and Putnam 1992. 
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a statement is justified if epistemic conditions are good enough! Thus, trying to justify 
(1) by appealing to (1) itself leads us to a circular argumentation. 
In Reason, Truth, and History, Putnam says that “a non-realist or ‘internal’ realist 
regards conditional statements as statements which we understand (like all other 
statements) in large part by grasping their justification conditions.” (1981: 122) 
Therefore, like all other statements which are justified by their epistemic conditions, we 
accept (1) for its epistemic conditions. The problem is that (1) is itself the very 
“principle” which says that a statement is justified due to its epistemic conditions. We 
are facing here something similar to a Convention-T sort of sentence: “S is justified if 
conditions are good enough” is true if and only if S is justified if conditions are good 
enough. It is this sort of coherentism –criticized by Putnam in his Model Theoretic 
Argument (Putnam, 1983) – which convinced him that his former doctrine of internal 
realism is solipsistic. Thus, in his latest writings, Putnam has found that for the 
verificationist there is no way out of this coherentism, and therefore verificationism 
amounts to solipsism. In what follows, I will argue that statements such as (1) are not to 
be understood as principles in need of verification, but rather as conditions for our 
linguistic practices; then, the only possible option that the verificationist has for her 
belief in (1) is a non-verificationist way.  
 
3.9. Conditional statements and common-sense 
As we have just seen, the conditional statement “S would be justified if conditions were 
good enough” is not to be understood as the meaning of S itself, as the later Putnam 
pretends, but rather, as a condition for the meaning of S. Such move, as was explained 
above, avoids the charges of solipsism which Putnam levels against his former doctrine 
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of internal realism. However, as was just pointed out, such conditional cannot be itself 
understood in a verificationist way, since it would lead to a circular argumentation.  
Both, in his 2007 and his 2012a, Putnam reminds us that by the time he wrote Reason, 
Truth, and History, and defined truth as idealized justification, he wasn’t aware of the 
solipsist “dilemma” of conflating the meaning of a sentence with its assertibility 
conditions. Nevertheless, in that book, not only he mentions that the “‘internal’ realist 
regards conditional statements as statements which we understand (like all other 
statements) in large part by grasping their justification conditions” (Putnam, 1981: 
122), but also emphasizes that such justification conditions are objective: as opposed to 
the “methodological solipsist” and relativist, the internalist position  
assumes an objective notion of rational acceptability. The non-realist rejects 
the notion that truth is correspondence to a ‘ready-made world’. That is what 
makes him a non –(metaphysical)– realist. But rejecting the metaphysical 
‘correspondence’ theory of truth is not at all the same as regarding truth or 
rational acceptability as subjective … The whole purpose of relativism, its very 
defining characteristic, is, however, to deny the existence of any intelligible 
notion of objective ‘fit’. Thus the relativist cannot understand talk about truth 
in terms of objective justification-conditions. (Putnam, 1981: 123)  
The internalist understanding of conditionals depends on an objective notion of rational 
acceptability, which, of course, is different from a correspondence theory of truth. 
However, we may ask, if the internalist is not assuming a metaphysical correspondence 
between language and reality, then, what is this notion of “objective fit” which he 
assumes and the solipsist and relativist deny?  
Unfortunately, in Reason, Truth, and History, Putnam doesn’t give a clear and 
satisfactory answer to this question. The closest he gets is by emphasizing that truth, 
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rather than correspondence to facts, is idealized assertibility. But, since the notion of 
idealized assertibility implies the very notions of verificationist semantics and 
conditionals which we are trying to understand, it seems that such an answer won’t take 
us very far. However, in his Pragmatism: An Open Question (1995), Putnam rehearses 
an answer which might be on the right track. In the chapter called “Was Wittgenstein a 
Pragmatist?”, Putnam criticizes philosophers like Richard Rorty, Michael Williams, and 
Paul Horwich, who, according to him, read Wittgenstein as supporting the idea that 
language use is based on definite criteria. Thus, “the heart of Rorty’s reading of 
[Wittgensteinian language games] is his comparison of criteria with programs… Rorty 
sees language games as virtually automatic performances.” (Putnam, 1995: 33-4) 
Although not very far from Rorty’s approach to language games, 
[o]n Horwich’s view, a language game is to be understood as consisting of 
sentences for which (if we confine attention to assertoric language) there are 
‘assertability conditions’. These conditions specify that under certain 
observable conditions a sentence counts as true or at least as ‘confirmed’… 
Note that this account differs from Rorty’s only in that the ‘criteria’ which 
govern our use of words provide (in some cases) for degrees of assertability 
less than certainty. Still, speakers who understand their language in the same 
way and who have the same evidence should all agree on the degree of 
assertability of their sentences, in this model, just as in Rorty’s. (Putnam, 1995: 
45-6)  
This paragraph makes us wonder if, due to the emphasis on the degree of assertibility of 
sentences, such positivistic interpretation of Wittgenstein (as Putnam calls it) parallels 
the internalist account. The main difference between this positivistic reading of 
Wittgenstein and Putnam’s own reading is that the first account takes sentences as 
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marks and noises, for which assertibility is separated from truth: under certain 
observable conditions a sentence counts as true. As opposed to this, Putnam’s reading of 
Wittgenstein insists on the idea that “the use of the words in a language game cannot be 
described without using concepts which are related to the concepts employed in the 
game.” (Putnam, 1995: 46) This means that language games are not ruled by a definite 
set of criteria, a set which, if one pays attention enough, one would learn how to use; 
but rather, that language games are self-contained forms of life:  
Someone who doesn’t see the ‘point’ of the language game, and who cannot 
imaginatively put himself in the position of an engaged player, cannot judge 
whether the ‘criteria’ are applied reasonably or unreasonably… Understanding 
a language game is sharing a form of life. And forms of life cannot be 
described in a fixed positivistic meta-language. (Putnam, 1995: 47-8) 
Whereas the positivistic reading of Wittgenstein takes criteria to be exterior to the 
language game, as some external aid we use when it comes to understand language 
games, Putnam’s reading of Wittgenstein sees language games as forms of life which 
cannot be described without using the same concepts which are internal to the game 
itself. That is why someone who cannot imaginatively put himself in the position of an 
engaged player cannot judge whether the ‘criteria’ are applied reasonably or 
unreasonably. Under this interpretation, the idea that assertibility conditions are external 
to the truth of statements is ruled out. For Putnam, assertibility and truth are internally 
related notions: 
To know under what conditions a statement (not a ‘sentence’) is assertable is to 
know under what conditions it is true or liable to be true. The idea that 
assertability conditions are conditions for making a noise is a total distortion of 
Wittgenstein’s meaning. ‘Assertability’ and ‘truth’ are internally related 
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notions: one comes to understand both by standing inside a language game, 
seeing its ‘point’, and judging assertability and truth. (Putnam, 1995: 48-9) 
If the assertibility conditions of a statement are not separated from its truth, then, it 
doesn’t make sense trying to apply separate criteria to statements in general, which 
would be an unnecessary and artificial move. In order to understand the statements of 
every language game one must stand inside it and know that the truth of one’s words is 
related to their assertibility conditions, to the effect that both are to be judged uniformly. 
Of course, as verificationist semantics shows, every language game has internal rules 
which one must follow, and one such internal rule of our language game is that we 
accept that a statement is justified if conditions are good enough. This rule of our 
language game, together with all our other cognitive ideals, “only makes sense 
considered as part of our idea of human flourishing” (Putnam, 1995: 43) 
 
3.10. Partial conclusions of this chapter 
Now we are in a better position to understand Putnam’s internalist conditional that “S is 
justified if epistemic conditions are good enough”. I remarked above that such 
conditional couldn’t be understood in a verificationist fashion, since it would imply a 
circular argumentation. In the same way, the positivistic reading of Wittgenstein which 
Putnam criticizes doesn’t help in understanding sentences like “S is justified if 
epistemic conditions are good enough” because the meaning of the sentence itself 
makes reference to a principle of justification conditions for sentences. As was pointed 
above, establishing assertibility conditions or criteria for such statement leads us into a 
circular argumentation; thus the need to understand such sentence non-criterially: one 
can only understand the conditional that a statement is justified if conditions are good 
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enough if one shares a certain language game. Strangely enough, in “Corresponding 
With Reality” (Putnam, 2012a), the very article in which Putnam charges internal 
realism of being solipsist, he himself, towards the end, reminds us the importance of 
Wittgensteinian “imponderable evidence” (as he did in his Pragmatism: An Open 
Question) when it comes to justification. As Putnam sees it, “[not] only what is shaped 
like a proposition can justify a proposition.” (Putnam, 2012a: 89) Thus, the verification 
criteria for the internal realist are not limited only to propositions, but open to other 
means of verification. By asking to criterially justify the convention of our language 
game, which asserts that a statement is justified if conditions are good enough, Putnam 
seems to ignore his own reading of Wittgenstein. This interpretation seems to be also in 
line with Putnam’s approval44 of what Stanley Cavell (in a very pragmatist tone, 
reminiscent of Peirce) has said about skepticism and justification, namely that in order 
to understand language games and avoid skepticism, one must be attuned to them.
45
 
This is actually not very far from Michael Dummett’s account of justification through 
language learning: “when we acquire the practice of using language, what we learn is 
what is taken to justify assertions of different types.” (Dummett, 2004: 114) However, 
in spite of the acknowledged influence of Dummett’s work, Putnam’s internal realism 
doesn’t accept the idea of necessarily identifying truth and justification, for the reason 
that, according to Putnam, Dummett believes in the possibility of specifying the 
justification conditions for all sentences in a natural language. Truth, for the internal 
realist is idealized warranted assertibility (idealized justification as opposed to 
justification-on-present-evidence: the difference resides in the knowledge of the 
language game, knowing what would ideally be like to assert a certain sentence as 
                                                 
44 “I follow Stanley Cavell that for most of our beliefs about the quotidian objects and goings-on around us, the 
question ‘Is that justified?’ does not arise.” (Putnam 2012a: 61)  
45 For a fuller development of this idea, see Putnam, 2012a “Philosophy as the Education of Grownups: Cavell and 
Skepticism”. 
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opposed to an standardized formalization of assertibility). So the difference between 
Putnam and Dummett is Putnam’s rejection of the idea that one can formalize the 
assertibility conditions of all sentences in a natural language. The notion of idealized 
warranted assertibility is a notion which is not formalizable and which takes into 
account every sentence piece-meal.        
Internal realism, far from being the solipsist doctrine which the Putnam post-Dewey 
Lectures claims it to be, gives us a clue to our justificatory practices by pointing out to 
one of our more accepted rules of justification, namely, the condition that a statement is 
justified if the conditions for stating it are good enough. This, indeed, is an indicator of 
the proximity (or at least the “tolerance”) between internal realism and Putnam’s later 
common-sense realism: some basic statements of our language game are not to be 
understood in a verificationist fashion because some such statements form the logical 
structure of the language game itself. In the Dewey Lectures, Putnam himself seems to 
agree with this interpretation:   
The right alternative to thinking of truth as a “substantive property” á la the 
metaphysical realist is not to think of our statements as mere marks and noises 
that our community has taught us to associate with conditions for being 
conclusively verified (as in the account of Dummett’s “global antirealist”) or to 
associate with “betting behavior” in a way that is “a function of observable 
circumstances” (as in Horwich’s account). The right alternative is to recognize 
that empirical statements already make claims about the world -many different 
sorts of claims about the world- whether or not they contain the words is true. 
(Putnam, 1999: 55)  
Thus, the understanding of conditional statement (1) is not metaphysical bedrock, a 
condition for understanding language in general; but rather, it makes part of what it is to 
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share a form of life. It would indeed be natural for a skeptic who didn’t share our 
language game to doubt this conditional. Such a skeptic would probably not be satisfied 
until one provides him an argument similar to Descartes’s cogito argument, an argument 
where, only apparently, the metaphysical bedrock of certainty was reached. Such a 
skeptic, naturally, would not be satisfied with the argument that I am associating 
Putnam with (as he himself associated it with Wittgenstein) either; which shows that, 
after all, Putnam’s interpretation of Wittgenstein still seems to the point when he says 
that “the possibilities of ‘external’ understanding of a deeply different form of life are 
extremely limited.” (Putnam, 1995: 50) 
Putnam’s latest choice of trying to understand the conditional “S is justified if 
conditions are good enough” by applying criteria, (as his 2007 and 2012a show), seems 
to be a recoil to the metaphysical realism which he has so much criticized. The idea that 
such conditional statement stands for justification as any other statement of our 
language game does is a recoil to metaphysical realism because it asks us to justify 
certain cognitive norms of our form of life which only a skeptic or an alien to such form 
of life would bring into question.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Conceptual relativity is Putnam’s internalist doctrine which aims to show the 
unintelligibility of Metaphysical Realism. Since for the metaphysical realist “the world 
consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects”, and “there is exactly one 
true and complete description of ‘the way the world is’” (Putnam, 1981: 49), internal 
realism retorts that the question “what objects does the world consist of? is a question 
that it only makes sense to ask within a theory or description.” (1981: 49) Thus, 
“internal realism is, at bottom, just the insistence that realism is not incompatible with 
conceptual relativity.” (Putnam, 1987: 17) As we have seen in the previous chapters, 
internal realism claims that all talk about reality cannot be done from a view from 
nowhere; that one cannot step out of theories and languages to describe reality, as 
Metaphysical Realism hopes to do. 
The doctrine of conceptual relativity has been ubiquitous in Putnam’s writings, and it 
can be found not only in those writings representative of his internalist period, but also 
in some post-Dewey Lectures writings such as Ethics without Ontology (2004), and his 
“Reply to Jennifer Case” (2001). Thus, as Putnam acknowledged in his “Reply to 
Simon Blackburn” (1994b) this claim of internal realism is “one I have not at all given 
up; the one I have increasingly emphasized in my writings.” (Putnam, 1994b: 243) As it 
will be argued, this is a sign that elements of internal realism are not contrary to -and 
are compatible with- Putnam’s latest natural realism. 
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In this chapter I analyze Putnam’s doctrine of conceptual relativity taking into account 
his interpretation of conceptual schemes as optional languages. As was pointed in the 
Introduction to this thesis, Putnam’s rejection of internal realism was in part due to the 
fact that he came to consider conceptual schemes as an interface which puts us in touch 
with reality, thus retaining the dualist Cartesian picture. However, if we interpret 
conceptual schemes as optional languages we could make more sense of Putnam’s 
internalist metaphor that the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the 
world, since optional languages are means by which “reality” is expressed and natural 
language extended.  
 
4.2. Defining conceptual relativity 
In The Many Faces of Realism (1987), Putnam defines internal realism as “the 
insistence that realism is not incompatible with conceptual relativity.” (Putnam, 1987: 
17) As opposed to Metaphysical Realism, internal realism doesn’t view the world as 
consisting of a unique and restrictive ontology, describable in the privileged language of 
science. The internalist doctrine of conceptual relativity is illustrated by the non-
classical phenomenon of there being “ways of describing what are (in some way) the 
‘same facts’ which are (in some way) ‘equivalent’ but also (in some way) 
incompatible.” (Putnam, 1987: 29)  
Elsewhere, in “Equivalence” (1983), Putnam argues that such phenomenon is the 
scientific realist’s46 alternative to avoid skepticism and transcendental metaphysics 
because, by accepting equivalent descriptions of the same phenomena, one avoids the 
question of how do we know with certainty (and on extra-scientific evidence) which 
version of the world is true (whether it be treating space-time points as real or as logical 
                                                 
46
 Apparently by the time this article was written Putnam hadn’t come up with the term internal realism. 
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constructions). In that article, Putnam insists that the importance of equivalent but 
incompatible descriptions of the same phenomena comes from the philosophy of 
science, focusing on examples by Hans Reichenbach and the special theory of relativity. 
For the metaphysical realist theories are copies of the world, and a true description of 
the world doesn’t accept equivalent descriptions of it. Therefore, the importance of 
cognitive equivalence of theories is not a matter of just semantic conventionality, but 
it’s a phenomenon with consequences for metaphysics and the philosophy of science.  
The phenomenon of there being incompatible and yet equivalent true descriptions of the 
same facts yields the doctrine of conceptual relativity, which holds that “the notions of 
object and existence, have a multitude of different uses rather than one absolute 
‘meaning’.” (Putnam, 1987: 19) However, in the Preface of Realism with a Human 
Face (1990), Putnam also defines conceptual relativity as holding that  
[W]hile there is an aspect of conventionality and an aspect of fact in everything 
we say that is true, we fall into hopeless philosophical error if we commit a 
“fallacy of division” and conclude that there must be a part of the truth that is 
the “conventional part” and a part that is the “factual part.” (Putnam, 1990: x)  
Thus, we have a doctrine which holds the twin theses of:   
(1) the diversity of uses for such terms as “object” and “existence”, and  
(2) the interpenetration of fact and convention.  
Both theses, I hold, are central to internal realism, since they stand as an alternative to 
the metaphysical realist theses that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-
independent objects”, and that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 
‘the way the world is.’” (Putnam, 1981: 49) 
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However, we must ask if this definition of the doctrine of conceptual relativity is 
consistent. To give an answer we must look to the relation between theses (1) and (2).  
In her article “The Heart of Putnam’s Pluralistic Realism” (2001), Jennifer Case points 
that the doctrine of conceptual relativity holds only thesis (2) above, the interpenetration 
of fact and convention, and that the plurality of uses of the word object (thesis (1) 
above), is part of the phenomenon of conceptual relativity, namely, the fact that there 
can be true but in some sense incompatible descriptions of the same state of affairs such 
that they cannot be conjoined into a more complete description.  
According to Case, the fact that the notion of “object” is extendible elucidates the 
doctrine of the interpenetration of fact and convention because what counts as an object 
is not restricted to facts, but it’s also enrichened by conventions:  
To say that there are distinct senses of “object” is not to say that the syntactic 
string “object” is ambiguous, expressing different words with different 
meanings. Rather, it is to say that the concept of an object is extendible. The 
concept of an object is an “open-textured” one whose uses diverge as we find 
and create new contexts for our linguistic commerce with the word “object.” 
(Case, 2001: 428)    
As opposed to this, for the metaphysical realist there is a fact of the matter as to whether 
theories “describe” or “correspond” to theory independent objects; therefore, the realist 
notion of “object” cannot accept the fact that under one description, for example, points 
be treated as real objects, and under another description as logical constructions:  
Any sentence that changes truth value on passing from one correct theory to 
another correct theory –an equivalent description- will express only a theory-
relative property of the WORLD. And the more such sentences there are, the 
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more properties of THE WORLD would turn out to be theory relative. For 
example, if we concede that [treating points as real objects or as logical 
constructions] are equivalent descriptions, then the property being an object (as 
opposed to a class or a set of things) will be theory relative. (Putnam, 1977: 
491)  
 From this early statement of the first thesis of the doctrine of conceptual relativity ((1) 
above), the theory-relativity of objects and their existence, Putnam’s conception of an 
object has been committed to the idea that what counts as an object is directly linked to 
a theory and a description: 
[A]ll situations have many different correct descriptions, and even descriptions 
that, taken holistically, convey the same information may differ in what they 
take to be “objects”; this was part of my case against the idea of a Totality of 
All Objects. If there isn’t one single privileged sense of the word “object” and 
one privileged totality of “intrinsic properties,” but there is only an inherently 
extendable notion of “object” and various properties that may be seen as 
“intrinsic” in different enquiries, then the very notion of a totality of all objects 
and of the one description that captures the intrinsic properties of those objects 
should be seen to be nonsense from the start.” (Putnam, 1994: 304-5)    
This open-ended conception of objects as “inheritably extendible” was even embraced 
in the Dewey Lectures, where Putnam officially gave up on his internal realism:  
[Q]uantum mechanics is a wonderful example of how with the development of 
knowledge our idea of what counts as even a possible knowledge claim, our 
idea of what counts as even a possible object, and our idea of what counts as 
even a possible property are all subject to change. (Putnam, 1999: 8) 
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Such acceptance of the diversity of uses for words such as “object” and “exists” is 
illustrated by Putnam’s favorite example of mereology47. This example involves a 
hypothetical Polish Logician and a Carnapian. The Polish Logician defends the idea of 
mereological sums, i.e., the idea that the sum of any two things is itself an object, 
whereas the Carnapian denies the existence of such objects. If asked to count the 
number of objects when presented with what Putnam calls three “individuals,” x1, x2, 
x3, the Carnapian says, “There are three objects,” and the Polish Logician, ignoring the 
null object, says, “There are seven objects.” That is, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd objects are 
each of the three individuals, the 4th the sum of x1 and x2, the 5th the sum of x1 and x3, 
the 6th the sum of x2 and x3, and the 7th object is the sum of x1, x2, and x3.  
Mereology, the study of parts and wholes, is “a very simple, elegant and surprisingly 
powerful theory” (Koslicki, 2008: 15), first formulated by polish logician Stanislaw 
Lesniewski and further developed by Nelson Goodman, among many others. In its 
standard formulation, mereology consists of three main axioms, from which all the 
other principles follow: 
Axiom 1 (Unrestricted Composition): Whenever there are some things, then 
there exists a fusion of those things. 
Axiom 2 (Uniqueness of Composition): It never happens that the same things 
have two different fusions. 
Axiom 3 (Transitivity): If x is part of some part of y, then x is part of y. 
(Koslicki, 2008: 17) 
                                                 
47
 The same point, though, has been shown by other examples, such as the ones given in “Realism and 
Reason” and “Equivalence” (Putnam, 1983) which deal with special relativity and space-time points. 
However, the example of mereology is repeatedly used by Putnam from The Many Faces of Realism 
(1987) until Ethics without Ontology (2004). 
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Being conceived with nominalistic motivations, mereology quantifies the lowest logical 
type, namely individuals. However, mereology rests neutral as to what is taken to be an 
individual: 
[The Calculus of Individuals] performs the important service of divorcing the 
logical concept of an individual from metaphysical and practical prejudices, 
thus revealing that the distinction and interrelation of classes and wholes is 
capable of a purely formal definition, and that both concepts, and indeed all the 
concepts of logic, are available as neutral tools for the constructional analysis 
of the world. Then, for example, it becomes clear that the practice of supposing 
that things are what the x’s and y’s of Principa Mathematica denominate and 
that qualities are necessarily to be interpreted as logical predicates thereof, 
rather than vice versa, is purely a matter of habit. The dispute between 
nominalist and realist as to what actual entities are individuals and what are 
classes is recognized as devolving upon matters of interpretative convenience 
rather than upon metaphysical necessity. (H. Leonard and N. Goodman, “The 
Calculus of Individuals and Its Uses” quoted in Koslicki, 2008: 16)         
Similarly to the uses of the word “object,” the uses of the concept of “exists”, as Putnam 
claims, depend on conventions:  
What logicians call the “existential quantifier”, the symbol “(Ǝx)”, and its 
ordinary language counterparts, the expressions “there are,” “there exists” and 
“there exists a,” “some,” etc., do not have a single absolutely precise use but a 
whole family of uses [...] [T]here is nothing in the logic of existential and 
universal quantification to tell us whether we should say that mereological 
sums exist or don’t exist; nor is there some other science that answers that 
question. I suggest that we can decide to say either. We can, in short, create 
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divergent uses of the existential quantifier, and, to some extent […], we have 
always invented new, and in some cases divergent uses of existential 
quantification. (Putnam, 2004: 37)  
To suppose that points “are really individuals” has an unknowable truth value 
would be to suppose that “individual” has its meaning somehow fixed apart 
from its use, counting all the causal facts there are about the contexts in which 
we use it as a part of its “use.” But there is nothing that dictates a sublime 
“right sense” upon words like “individual,” “object,” “exist” in that way… 
[W]e should, as we did in the mereological sums case, see the choice between 
these optional languages as a matter of convention. (Putnam, 2004: 47)       
In other words, the meaning of logical terms such as “(Ǝx)” is not to be found by asking 
whether it’s an analytic truth –as pre-Quinian philosophers would say- or a necessary 
truth which refers to an intangible and transcendent object. The meaning of such 
expression is given by the way we use it. However, such uses are not simply a façon de 
parler or a convenient fiction, but they reflect the phenomenon of conceptual relativity, 
the possibility to extend natural languages via optional languages. 
The “open texture” of the definition of terms like “object” and “exists” allows us to 
conceive the existence of objects which (besides mereological sums), would not be 
considered in more traditional ontologies. The doctrine of metaphysical realism, in its 
Platonist guise, defends the idea that every true statement must correspond with an 
object, be it a natural or non-natural entity. Putnam’s doctrine of conceptual relativity 
defends the idea that one can have objectivity and truth without postulating platonic 
entities. 
 One way to talk about objectivity without objects is by recognizing that truth and 
objectivity in logic are not to be understood as descriptions of intangible entities but as 
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inferential relations between statements that must meet, in order to be called “true”, the 
standards proper to logic: “Logic is neither a description of non-natural relations 
between transcendent ‘objects’ nor a description of ordinary empirical properties of 
empirical objects.” (Putnam, 2004: 59) The truth and objectivity for logical statements, 
more than a matter of analyticity or necessity, is a matter of interpretation, which, as 
opposed to those more transcendental and metaphysical concepts, accepts the ideas of 
relevance and corrigibility:   
What makes a truth a conceptual truth is that it is impossible to make (relevant) 
sense of the assertion of its negation… The conception of conceptual truth that 
I defend recognizes the interpenetration of conceptual relations and facts, and it 
grants that there is an important sense in which knowledge of conceptual truth 
is corrigible. (Putnam, 2004: 62)  
As Putnam recognizes, conceptual relativity doesn’t suppose –as Metaphysical realism 
does- that conceptual truths are incorrigible foundations of our knowledge or simple 
“ways of speaking” –as Quine would have it-, but rather, they are holistically 
intertwined in our whole linguistic and justificatory practices: “I have arrived at the 
rock bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation walls 
are carried by the whole house.” (Wittgenstein, 1968: §248, quoted in Putnam 2004).   
The phenomenon of objectivity without objects is not only elucidated by the case of 
conceptual truths in logic, but also complemented by the case of mathematical truth and 
the fact that “we learn what mathematical truth is by learning the practices and 
standards of mathematics itself.” (Putnam, 2004: 66) Such practices and standards show 
us that the notion of “existence” in mathematics doesn’t make reference to intangible 
objects, but rather, it is related to the idea of possibility:  
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Every statement about the “existence” of any mathematical entities is 
equivalent (equivalent mathematically, and equivalent from the point of view 
of application as well) with a statement that doesn’t assert the actual existence 
of any mathematical objects at all, but only asserts the mathematical possibility 
of certain structures. (Putnam, 2004: 67)  
Therefore, nothing is gained in mathematics, or philosophy, by postulating intangible 
entities which serve as truth makers of statements.    
Therefore, the metaphysical doctrine that if a statement is true then it must be a 
description of some part of reality is, according to Putnam, a pseudo-explanation 
because: 
(i) It posits something we have found no other need to posit (and which is 
not, of course, observable by the senses –otherwise it wouldn’t be a 
posit); 
(ii) It does no work for us, because we derive nothing from it but the very 
phenomenon we posited it to explain (it lacks “surplus meaning”) –this 
also makes it unfalsifiable, of course; and 
(iii) Those who defend it do not suggest any way of extending it so that it 
will have surplus meaning –in short, it lacks fruitfulness ab initio. 
(Putnam, 2004: 60) 
 
4.3. Conceptual schemes as optional languages 
In her article “On the Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1997), Jennifer Case 
interprets Putnam’s doctrine of conceptual relativity as claiming that conceptual 
schemes are to be understood not as natural but as optional languages. The advantage 
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of such interpretation, as Case claims, is that it allows us to keep the idea of a 
conceptual scheme while honoring what Simon Blackburn called the “imperative 
towards unity”, “according to which the conjunction of any two true descriptions of 
reality must itself be true.”48 (Case, 1997: 1) 
According to Case, in the examples of conceptual relativity given by Putnam, one is not 
expressing the same meaning of words in an strict linguistic sense –a criterion of 
sameness of meaning as translation practice,- nor expressing different meanings with 
the same syntactic forms –whereby one would follow the same Davidsonian criterion of 
meaning. What conceptual relativity, by adopting the idea of conceptual schemes as 
optional languages, do give speakers is,  
to use Putnam’s words, different “ways of describing what are (in some way) 
the “same facts” which are in (some way) “equivalent” but also (in some way) 
“incompatible.”” What distinguishes optional languages (and conceptual 
schemes) from one another is, according to Putnam, different uses of the same 
words. (Case, 1997: 14)    
Case proposes a criterion of consistency which allows conceptual relativity to honor 
Blackburn’s imperative towards unity: 
Two apparently inconsistent statements expressed by, respectively, sentence p 
and sentence q are consistent if and only if (1) p is formulated in an optional 
language L1 and q is formulated in a different optional language L2, and (2) 
either (a) p and an acceptable relative interpretation of q in L1 do not express 
apparently inconsistent  statements, or (b) an acceptable relative interpretation 
                                                 
48
 “If we learn that there is a true description of reality from one point of view, and another true 
description from another, then we must in principle be able to conjoin them, and enjoy the fact that 
reality can truly be described in way A, and truly be described in way B. There is no problem, provided, 
of course, that A and B are consistent.” (Simon Blackburn “Enchanting views”, in Hale, B. and Clark, P. 
(eds.)(1994) p. 16) 
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of p in L2 and q do not express apparently inconsistent statements. (Case, 1997: 
14)     
 As Putnam later admitted (2001, 2004), conceptual schemes must be understood as 
optional languages because they are extensions of natural languages. Therefore, as he 
makes it clear, conceptual schemes are not to be understood as any type of talk which 
has an equivalent alternative which is incompatible with it. Again, conceptual schemes 
are not natural languages –which leave the speakers no choice but to speak them-, but 
optional languages which present an incompatible alternative:   
There is no interesting sense in which the truth of “There is a computer on this 
desk” is “relative to the conceptual scheme”, as opposed to depending 
(trivially) on what content those words are being used to express — which of 
course depends on the language the words are in and the context of their use. It 
was never part of my doctrine of conceptual relativity that every statement is an 
example of it, and while the relativity of the content of our utterances to the 
context of their use is indeed something that interests me very much the 
importance of the context-sensitivity of utterance-content...), it is not an 
example of what I called conceptual relativity. (Putnam, 2001: 432)  
 
4.4. Fact and Convention 
In “Convention: a theme in philosophy” (1983), Putnam says that Quine’s idea of 
describing knowledge as a grey fabric in which one cannot quite discern the white 
elements of convention from black factual ones
49
, lands us in metaphysical realism 
because, by accepting that knowledge is formed by two transcendent elements (fact and 
                                                 
49
 WV Quine, “Carnap and Logical Truth”, in The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap, p. 405. 
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convention), one also postulates a world-in itself, a fact stripped of all conventions. A 
similar stand is the one taken by John Searle in The Construction of Social Reality 
(1995), the book which was discussed in the first chapter. According to Searle, 
conceptual relativity “presupposes a language-independent reality that can be carved 
up or divided up in different ways by different vocabularies.” (Searle, 1995: 165). This 
way of conceiving the phenomenon of conceptual relativity is what Putnam calls the 
“cookie cutter metaphor”, a metaphor that, nevertheless, “is of no real assistance in 
understanding the phenomenon of conceptual relativity. Take it seriously and you are at 
once forced to answer the question, ‘What are the various parts of the dough?’” 
(Putnam, 1987: 33)  
As opposed to this way of conceiving reality, Putnam proposes that what is seen as a 
gap between facts and conventions should rather be seen as a continuum, to the point 
that “elements of what we call ‘language’ or ‘mind’ penetrate so deeply into what we 
call ‘reality’ that the very project of representing ourselves as being ‘mappers’ of 
something ‘language-independent’ is fatally compromised from the very start.” 
(Putnam, 1990: 28)  
In her article “The heart of Putnam’s pluralistic realism” (2001), Jennifer Case 
continues the discussion of conceptual relativity that she had started with her 1997 
article - which was very influential on Putnam’s conception of this matter (Putnam 
2001, 2004)-, and elucidates Putnam’s conception of the interdependence of fact and 
convention in different conceptual schemes:   
There is an element of conventionality in what counts as fact within a scheme, 
both because what counts as fact within a scheme counts as fact within a 
scheme and because to adopt a scheme of concepts is not thereby to settle every 
question about how those concepts are to be used. (Case, 2001: 421) 
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In her article, Case cites several examples of the interpenetration of fact and convention 
in Putnam’s writings and shows how such examples point to the idea of continuity 
between both elements of reality:  
[E]ven when we see such a “reality” as a tree, the possibility of that perception 
is dependent on a whole conceptual scheme, on a language in place (one which 
may or may not legislate an answer to such questions as “Is the tree identical 
with the space time region that contains it?” and “Is the tree identical with the 
mereological sum of the time-slices of elementary particles that make it up?”). 
What is factual and what is conventional is a matter of degree. We cannot say, 
“These and these elements of the world are the raw facts, the rest is the result 
of convention.” (Putnam, 1988: 113, quoted in Case 2001) 
[W]e didn't make Sirius a star. Not only didn't we make Sirius a star in the 
sense in which a carpenter makes a table, we didn’t make it a star. Our 
ancestors and our contemporaries (including astrophysicists), in shaping and 
creating our language, created the concept star, with its partly conventional 
boundaries, with its partly indeterminate boundaries, and so on. And that 
concept applies to Sirius. The fact that the concept star has conventional 
elements doesn’t mean that we make it the case that that concept applies to any 
particular thing, in the way in which we made it the case that the concept “Big 
Dipper” applies to a particular group of stars. The concept bachelor is far more 
strongly conventional than the concept star, and that concept applies to Joseph 
Ullian, but our linguistic practices didn’t make Joe a bachelor. (They did make 
him “Joe Ullian”.) General names like “star” and “bachelor” are very different 
from proper names like “the Big Dipper” and “Joe Ullian” (Putnam, 1992: 114-
115, quoted in Case 2001) 
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The first passage, as Case points out, illustrates the doctrine of conceptual relativity, the 
interpenetration of fact and convention. However, in the second passage such 
interpenetration is illustrated from a different perspective: the factuality of general 
names shows that “within a conceptual scheme, the conditions that govern the 
applicability of a concept are by no means absolutely conventional: they are more or 
less conventional.” (Case, 2001: 421) The factuality of conventions is, in a sense, the 
“realist” answer to the supposed relativism of the conventionality of facts. Thus, the 
doctrine of conceptual relativity might be criticized as advocating the relativist idea that 
there are no facts but only interpretations. However, as the passage just quoted shows, 
the doctrine of conceptual relativity also advocates the idea that there is a factual and 
objective side in conventions. Once a convention is established (like a general name is) 
the use of such convention becomes objective. This point is also elucidated by the 
example of mereology:  
Given a version, the question, “How many objects are there?” has an answer, 
namely “three” in the case of the first version (“Carnap’s World”) and “seven” 
(or “eight”) in the case of the second version (“The Polish Logician’s World”). 
Once we make clear how we are using “object” (or “exist”), the question “How 
many objects exist?” has an answer that is not at all a matter of “convention”. 
(Putnam, 1987: 20)        
The interpenetration of fact and convention must be understood, as was already said, as 
a continuum. In such a continuum it is difficult and problematic to trace a dividing line 
between fact and convention. Given the fact that “the idea of a ‘point at which’ 
subjectivity ceases and Objectivity–with-a-capital-O begins has proved chimerical” 
(Putnam, 1987: 28), Putnam’s suggestion is that we classify statements either closer to 
the factual end of the continuum or nearer to its conventional end. Such suggestion not 
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only eliminates the dichotomy between fact and convention, but also other traditional 
dichotomies –such as the dichotomy between properties of things and projections, and 
the dichotomy between truth and justification- which have marked the history of 
philosophy.   
 
4.5. Partial conclusions of this chapter 
As this chapter has shown, the doctrine of conceptual relativity proves to be an essential 
part of internal realism, and it’s not a minor detail that in various places Putnam 
acknowledges such doctrine as the “heart” of his internal realism (Putnam, 1991: 404). 
For example, in The Many Faces of Realism he claims that “Internal realism is, at 
bottom, just the insistence that realism is not incompatible with conceptual relativity.” 
(Putnam, 1987: 17) In fact, the very doctrine of conceptual relativity, the 
interpenetration of fact and convention, which dissolves the traditional dichotomies 
which have plagued the history of philosophy, is considered by Putnam as the “essence” 
of his internal realism (1987: 28). In the Preface to Realism with a Human Face (1990) 
he admits that the doctrine of conceptual relativity has been pervasive in his writings 
since the publication of The Many Faces of Realism. In fact, after his full embrace of 
conceptual relativity Putnam’s approach has experienced “a shift from emphasizing 
model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism to emphasizing conceptual 
relativity.” (Putnam, 1990: xi) However, this claim must be nuanced: as was shown in 
this chapter, as early as “Realism and Reason” (1978) –considered as the article that sets 
the course of internal realism,- we already found the doctrine of conceptual relativity 
under the guise of the theory-relativity of the concept of “object”: “[I]f we concede that 
[treating points as real objects or as logical constructions] are equivalent descriptions, 
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then the property being an object (as opposed to a class or a set of things) will be theory 
relative.” (Putnam, 1978: 491)  
As the different examples of Putnam’s writings quoted in this chapter show, the 
doctrine of conceptual relativity is not a change of emphasis starting after The Many 
Faces of Realism (1987), but rather, it’s been a continuous approach to the 
understanding of reality that Putnam has embraced in his internalist period as well as in 
his natural realist latest period. 
In analyzing the doctrine of conceptual relativity, in this chapter I have pointed that it is 
a doctrine formed by two theses, namely, (1) the diversity of uses for such terms as 
“object” and “existence”, and (2) the interpenetration of fact and convention. For 
Jennifer Case (1997, 2001), however, the doctrine is formed only by thesis (2), the 
interpenetration of fact and convention, and thesis (1) would be a consequence of it. 
This need not be controversial; the reason why I chose to include the diversity of uses 
for such terms as “object” and “existence” in the definition of the doctrine of conceptual 
relativity is because Putnam himself defines it as such (1987: 19). On the other hand, as 
Jennifer Case shows, thesis (1) would be more like a consequence of conceptual 
relativity, especially when it comes to understand conceptual schemes as optional 
languages. As she argues in her articles, there is a relation between the “inheritably 
extendible” notion of objects, on one side, and the diversity of uses of the notion of 
“existence,” on the other, with the idea of conceptual schemes as optional languages: 
since optional languages extend natural languages, therefore they also extend what we 
normally conceive as an object and its existence. 
Whether a consequence of conceptual relativity or a central thesis of it, the “open 
texture” of objects is in close relation with the interpenetration of fact and convention, 
as was shown in this chapter. It would be impossible to conceive facts and conventions 
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as a continuum (as Putnam suggests we should do) if the notion of “object” is closed 
and transcendental. It is, in part, due to the “open texture” of terms like “object” and 
“exists” that we can think of facts and conventions as permeating each other. On the 
other hand, it is, in part, due to such interpenetration of fact and convention that we can 
think of objects as having an “open texture.” The case of mereology –Putnam’s favorite 
example of the phenomenon of conceptual relativity- is a good example of the 
interdependence of the twin theses of the doctrine of conceptual relativity. On a 
superficial perspective, it might seem that someone who accepts mereology (a doctrine 
which advocates the “open texture” of objects) might not necessarily embrace the idea 
that fact and convention interpenetrate; after all, counting the Eiffel Tower and 
Putnam’s nose as one object only requires to quantify “openly” and tolerantly over 
different objects. However, in order for such quantification to be possible one shouldn’t 
conceive of facts and conventions as a dichotomy, because such way of conceiving 
reality wouldn’t allow for a tolerant quantification over objects.    
Putnam has warned that a criticism against conceptual relativity is that when one is 
quantifying over objects in the case of mereology one is giving a different meaning to 
words in this optional language; thus the incompatibility between conceptual schemes 
would be caused by giving different meaning to words. According to Davidson, the 
criterion as to whether two expressions have the same meaning is translation practice. 
But the doctrine of conceptual relativity, as was pointed, is linked to the Wittgensteinian 
conception of meaning as use, according to which the elucidation of the meaning of 
words comes from the uses such words have in a language game. The meanings of 
“exists” and “object” in mereology are not translations of Carnapian language, but they 
reflect a certain way to use these words. Therefore, according to this view, we leave it 
open as to whether “there really are” mereological sums. 
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As was pointed out in this chapter, the different conceptual schemes of mereology and 
traditional set theory are not necessarily conceptual schemes in the guise of natural 
languages, but rather, are to be interpreted as optional languages which extend the 
possibilities of natural language:  
Conceptual relativity holds that the question as to which of these ways of using 
“exist” (and “individual,” “object,” etc.) is right is one that the meanings of the 
words in the natural language, that is, the language that we speak and cannot 
avoid speaking every day, simply leaves open… The optional language of set 
theory and the optional language of mereology represent possible extensions of 
our ordinary ways of speaking.  (Putnam, 2004: 43)   
In finishing, something must be said of the related phenomenon of conceptual 
pluralism. In Representation and Reality (1988), Putnam gives as an example of the 
doctrine of conceptual relativity the fact that one can describe the contents of a room by 
using either everyday object language (chairs, tables, lamps) or the language of particle 
physics. However, as Putnam later
50
 admits -thanks to Jennifer Case’s article “On the 
Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1997)-, this is an example of the doctrine of 
conceptual pluralism, the doctrine which, as opposed to the similar doctrine of 
conceptual relativity, affords compatible but inequivalent descriptions of the same 
phenomenon. As Putnam admits (2004), conceptual relativity implies conceptual 
pluralism, but not the other way around: conceptual relativity involves the denial of a 
single fundamental ontology and thus implies conceptual pluralism. But the denial of a 
single fundamental ontology does not require conceptual relativity, the truth of 
incompatible descriptions of the same state of affairs. Conceptual pluralism, as opposed 
to conceptual relativity, is linked to natural languages as opposed to optional languages: 
                                                 
50
 In “Reply to Jeniffer Case” (Putnam, 2001), and in Ethics Without Ontology (Putnam, 2004). 
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common talk of chairs and tables not necessarily has an equivalent alternative to it, 
therefore, such talk is part of a natural language which we have no choice but to use. 
However, the phenomenon of conceptual pluralism is connected to conceptual relativity 
in the sense that sometimes natural languages are enriched by other natural languages, 
extending their own ontology:  
While the “ontology” of a given natural language, ignoring the optional 
sublanguages that we sometimes add to it, is for the most part obligatory for 
speakers of that language, and while virtually all natural languages have terms 
for tables and chairs, etc., certain natural languages do sometimes quantify over 
“objects” which are unique to those languages. In this way, they illustrate the 
possibility which we have seen to be demonstrated by conceptual relativity, the 
possibility of different extensions of our ordinary notions of object and 
existence. (Putnam, 2004: 49)    
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CHAPTER 5 
NATURAL AND INTERNAL REALISM 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Since the publication of Realism with a Human Face (1990) Putnam started to pay 
attention to William James’s writings, particularly his doctrine of radical empiricism. 
What Putnam finds interesting in those late essays is that they serve as a propaedeutic to 
pragmatism, and not the other way around as is commonly assumed:  
We cannot suppose that all of James’s grand remarks about life, morality and 
religious belief are a mere propaedeutic to a discussion of the really interesting 
question of whether two different people see the same Memorial Hall. 
(Putnam, 1990: 233) 
In the essays collected posthumously as Essays in Radical Empiricism (James, 1910), 
James presents what is called a natural or direct realism, the realism of the common 
man. This doctrine hopes to save material objects and direct perception of them from 
the entanglement between reality and appearance produced by traditional epistemology 
(both rationalist and empiricist). For James, the traditional epistemic approach, by 
advocating the perception of sense-data, falls itself prey of the problem it is supposed to 
solve, namely, the sense-data epistemologist, by following its own demands, is not able 
to discriminate between a real perception and a hallucination. 
Radical empiricism is relevant to the doctrine of internal realism also in the sense that, 
by abandoning talk of transcendent reality and clear-cut ontology, James provides a 
common-sense answer to skepticism. This answer is linked to James’s experimentalism, 
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because he doesn’t look for foundations of knowledge, but descriptions of experiences 
which help us to cope with reality.  
It was particularly in the Dewey Lectures (1999) that Putnam fully embraced this 
doctrine of natural realism and abandoned internal realism. Putnam referred to his new 
approach as a “conceptual reorientation” which attacks the view that holds that 
“whenever we perceive anything what is really ‘present to the mind’ is a little picture, 
and that whenever our perceptions are ‘the same’, the ‘numerically identical’ little 
picture is present to the mind.” (Putnam, 2002b: 125) For Putnam, this “disastrous” 
view is committed to the existence of sense-data and their identification to neural events 
(the so-called “identity theory”). As will be discussed below, this approach to 
perception dates back to the early-modern conception of the mind as a thing, which 
strictly confined cognitive processes to the brain. 
Nevertheless, as it will be argued in this final chapter, there are striking similarities 
between the two doctrines of internal and natural realism (especially with the shared 
interest for conceptual relativity, not to mention the shared disdain for metaphysical 
realism). Such similarities are not only expressed under the guise of technical arguments 
and doctrines, but also under the guise of the whole purpose of philosophy advocated by 
both doctrines.       
 
5.2. James’s theory of perception 
A striking similarity between Putnam’s doctrine of conceptual relativity and James’s 
theory of perception is expressed by the latter’s conception of reality, which holds that 
what we call “reality” is not “all there is, that there is also unreality, or rather, that 
there are, ‘intentionally, at any rate’, unreal entities.” (Putnam, 1990: 236) 
124 
 
James includes in his ontology the term “pluriverse,” in addition to the term “universe,” 
because he wants to include elements which traditionally one wouldn’t count as real; 
more specifically, he differentiates between “intentional” and “adjectival” properties o 
objects. When one imagines or hallucinates a fire, for example, one can say that this fire 
has certain “intentional” properties of being “hot”, but such properties are different from 
the “adjectival” properties of the physical real fire, the one that one would see in a 
normal situation. This is a similar approach to the one used by Putnam in the doctrine of 
conceptual relativity, particularly the first thesis of it –the “open texture” of the term 
“object”- which was discussed in the previous chapter. Similarly to conceptual 
relativity, James’s radical empiricism admits that “there are a lot of things in the 
pluriverse which aren’t ‘real’ but which are still in some sense there.” (Putnam, 1990: 
239) Just like the doctrine and the phenomenon of conceptual relativity (exemplified by 
mereological sums), the radical empiricism of James admits objects and “realities” 
which are not recognized by the traditional epistemology which divides mind and 
matter in a clear-cut fashion.  
A very important part of James’s theory of perception is the thesis that we perceive 
directly the material world, but as opposed to Descartes and traditional epistemology - 
who conceives the knowledge of the world as incorrigible subjective information-, for 
James the immediacy of perception doesn’t imply incorrigibility. In other words, James 
defends the idea that we do perceive material objects directly, but there is always the 
possibility of error in such knowledge. The reason that the tradition which spans since 
Descartes believes that we don’t perceive immediately the material world is because 
there’s error and deception in immediate perception (we don’t perceive incorrigibly), 
and this tradition insists that if we could perceive immediately there wouldn’t be 
corrigibility. In the same way, according to Berkeley and the epistemic tradition which 
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followed after him, “if there is something you immediately perceive, it must have all 
and only the properties it seems to have.” (Putnam, 1990: 242) For the metaphysician –
someone who believes in a dichotomy between mind and matter- then, immediacy is 
incorrigibility. As opposed to this view, James wants to maintain the idea that we do 
perceive immediately (without the help of sense-data) but not incorrigibly. 
Putnam stresses the fact that, to argue his point, James gives an answer to the problem 
of sense-data: “I immediately perceive something subjective –the sense-data- even when 
I see a real fire; and I might perceive qualitatively identical subjective objects if I were 
to hallucinate a fire.” (Putnam, 1990: 243) The point that Putnam wants to stress in 
James’s theory of perception is that according to the sense-data epistemologist one 
wouldn’t be able to discriminate between the subjective perception (hallucination or 
optical illusion) of an object and the “real” perception of it:  
This is why the traditional view is correctly described as a mind-body dualism. 
The sense data I have in the case of veridical perception as well as in the case 
of hallucination are mental, and the physical chair is material. So the traditional 
cut is not between real objects and unreal objects that have some kind of 
existence […] rather, the cut is between mind and matter. In sharp contrast to 
all this, James’s picture is that when I see a veridical perception of a fire I don’t 
see a private sense datum of a fire and infer the fire; I just see the fire. When I 
have a hallucination, in James’s picture, what I see is a fire that isn’t really 
there. (Putnam, 1990: 242)   
Thus, when one has the hallucination of a fire one thinks that such perception has 
“adjectively” the properties of being hot, for example, but one can confuse a private 
experience with a real one simply because both look alike. However, James insists that 
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in the case of a hallucination one thinks that such perception has “general validity,” that 
it conforms to shared standards of validity and justification.  
For James, “the word ‘reality” is correlative to the word truth,” (Putnam, 1990: 241), 
in the sense that he advocates the idea that, in order to be real, “pure experiences” must 
fit descriptions: if I have a hallucination of a fire and I describe such experience as 
“real”, such experience is false and not real, it doesn’t belong to reality. However,  
if you describe what is in a sense the same “pure experience” as a psychiatrist 
would describe it, as John Smith’s hallucination, then under that description the 
same pure experience is a piece of reality –albeit a member of the class 
“hallucinatory experience” and not a member of the class “fire.” So basically 
the word “reality” is correlative to the word “truth.”  (Putnam, 1990: 241)  
What is striking in James’s radical empiricism for our present interests is the idea that 
“every pure experience is a part of reality under some description.” (Putnam, 1990: 
241) Just as Putnam’s doctrine of conceptual relativity, James’s radical empiricism is 
tolerant and inclusive of a diversity of objects and descriptions. Now we have a good 
perspective to appreciate how far this doctrine is from the doctrine of metaphysical 
realism that we discussed in the first chapter: for the metaphysical realist there is a 
unique ontology and a unique description of it expressed in scientific language; James’s 
pluriverse is much richer than this, and in a sense, it is more appropriate to account for 
the different phenomena of human experience.    
This plurality in the conception of objects of perception shows that, for James, the 
divide in perception is not due to real or unreal things, or material or inmaterial things, 
but is due to the properties things have (not in themselves, but as they come to be 
perceived). As Putnam puts it, “What looked initially like ‘Meinongian objects’ turn out 
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to be real (albeit ‘subjective’) objects that possess properties ‘intentionally’ which they 
do not possess adjectively.” (Putnam, 1990: 241)  
Such natural realism, as Putnam signals, is an alternative to traditional empiricist and 
Cartesian epistemology: 
So James was saying, “Here is an alternative hypothesis: sometimes we see 
real chairs and real fires, and I don’t mean that we directly see something 
mental and do some inferring. Sometimes we see objects which are -under 
some description- private. And a private object can resemble a public object.” 
(Putnam, 1990: 245) 
Summing up, then, James’s theory of perception is attractive to the internal realist, 
among other things, because it opposes–just as internal realism does- the metaphysical 
idea that reality is composed of a clear-cut ontology describable in only one way. It is 
also attractive for the internalist because it rehearses an answer to solipsism –just as 
Putnam did with his Brains in a Vat argument:  
[For the Berkeleyan school]…our lives are a congeries of solipsisms out of 
which in strict logic only a God could compose a universe even of discourse… 
If the body that you actuate is not the very body that I see there, but some 
duplicate body of your own with which that has nothing to do, we belong to 
different universes, you and I, and for me to speak of you is folly. (James, 
Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 37, quoted in Putnam, 1990: 246)   
 
5.3. Natural realism 
Before abandoning his doctrine of internal realism, Putnam defined it in The Many 
Faces of Realism (1987) as a way to save commonsense from metaphysical realism: 
128 
 
“the key to working out the program of preserving commonsense realism while 
avoiding the absurdities and antinomies of metaphysical realism in all its familiar 
varieties is something I have called internal realism.” (Putnam, 1987: 17) It is, 
nevertheless, striking that both, internal realism and the natural realism advocated in the 
Dewey Lectures, are doctrines meant to preserve commonsense realism. 
In those lectures, Putnam denounced a tendency of recoil in the history of philosophy: 
Philosophers who recoil from the excesses of various versions of metaphysical 
realism have recoiled to a variety of very peculiar positions -deconstruction 
being currently the most famous, but one could also mention Nelson 
Goodman’s “irrealism” or Michael Dummett’s “antirealism” as examples of a 
similar recoil on the part of some analytic philosophers. (Putnam, 1999: 4) 
As an alternative to this, Putnam believes in  
a way to do justice to our sense that knowledge claims are responsible to reality 
without recoiling into metaphysical fantasy… […] the search for a middle way 
between reactionary metaphysics and irresponsible relativism. (Putnam: 1999: 
4,5) 
This middle way, as was pointed in the previous section, finds its inspiration, among 
other approaches, in James’s radical empiricism. Putnam insists on the fact that James 
rejects the metaphysical yearning of neutral descriptions, descriptions which do not 
reflect a particular interest: 
James insists that there is no such thing as a description that reflects no 
particular interest at all. And he further insists that the descriptions we give 
when our interests are not theoretical or explanatory can be just as true as the 
ones we give when our interests are “intellectual.” (Putnam: 1999: 5) 
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As was discussed in the previous section, the criterion for truth according to James is 
not the metaphysical correspondence of words to “reality.” Though James believed in 
some sort of correspondence, his idea of “reality” was much wider than the traditional 
conception of it. As we saw, James included in his ontology the concept of “pluriverse”, 
a concept which allows for the possibility of an object having both “adjectival” and 
“intentional” properties. Such properties, allows us to speak in an inclusive way for 
conceiving the existence of objects which one would normally not include in a 
traditional ontology. Putnam defends this idea against the “metaphysical fantasy” of 
believing that there exists a fixed totality of properties which determines thoughts. This 
ontological pluralism is also advocated in his internalist writings, where he opposes the 
idea that the world consists of a fixed totality of objects and that it doesn’t make sense 
to pretend to be “mappers” of a theory-independent reality (Putnam 1981, 1990). Just as 
internal realism did, Putnam’s later direct/natural51 realism defends the idea that instead 
of conceiving reality as a fixed totality one should look “at the ways in which we 
endlessly renegotiate and are forced to renegotiate our notion of reality as our 
language and our life develop.” (Putnam, 1999: 9) 
The natural realism that Putnam advocates in the Dewey Lectures, besides James’s 
inspiration, is also inspired by John McDowell’s Mind and World (1994). What appeals 
to Putnam in McDowell’s approach to perception is his rejection of the “interface” 
picture of perception, namely, the idea that “our cognitive powers cannot reach all the 
way to the objects themselves.” (Putnam, 1999: 10) As opposed to traditional 
epistemology, a natural realist believes that in successful perception one is directly 
affected by aspects of external reality, and not simply that one has a subjective 
                                                 
51
 Putnam admits that this doctrine is usually known as “direct” realism, but, since such name involves 
some problems pointed by Austin, and since Putnam wishes to do justice to James’s terminology, he 
defines his new approach to realism as “natural” instead of “direct”. See Putnam, 1999:10. 
130 
 
experience caused by such aspects (Putnam, 1999: 10). In this way, James’s and 
McDowell’s conception of perception as a direct sensing of reality affords Putnam’s 
base for his natural realism. Such brand of realism, following James, insists that the idea 
of conceiving sensory experiences as intermediaries of experience “has no sound 
arguments to support it and, worse, makes it impossible to see how persons can be in 
genuine cognitive contact with a world at all.” (Putnam, 1999: 11)   
The issue of perception as Putnam sees it in the Dewey Lectures is not an isolated 
problem; instead, it is an issue linked with philosophy of mind and language. Putnam 
admits that he came to think of problems of perception via the antinomies of realism 
with which he had been interested since the middle of the 1970s, in writings such as 
“Realism and Reason” and “Models and Reality”. In these articles Putnam was not 
directly concerned with problems about perception, but rather, with problems about 
meaning: meaning is use. However, this idea of meaning as use was not the 
Wittgensteinian notion which Putnam later adopted, but a “cognitive scientific” notion 
in which “use was to be described largely in terms of computer programs in the brain.” 
(1999: 11) According to this functionalist approach, internal programs in the brain 
arrange external causal information which affords knowledge and perception.  
However, with his rejection of functionalism also came the adoption of a 
Wittgensteinian approach of meaning as use. According to such approach,    
[T]he use of words in a language game cannot, in most cases, be described 
without employing the vocabulary of that game or a vocabulary internally 
related to the vocabulary of that game. If one wants to describe the use of the 
sentence “There is a coffee table in front of me,” one has to take for granted its 
internal relations to, among others, facts such as that one perceives coffee 
tables. By speaking of perceiving coffee tables, what I have in mind is not the 
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minimal sense of “see” or “feel” (the sense in which one might be said to “see” 
or “feel” a coffee table even if one hadn't the faintest idea what a coffee table 
is), I mean the full achievement sense, the sense in which to see a coffee table 
is to see that it is a coffee table that is in front of one. (Putnam, 1999: 14) 
In this quote we find a very complete exposition of Putnam’s approach to natural 
realism: it is a second naïveté (as Putnam calls it in the Dewey Lectures) according to 
which one accepts that what causes knowledge of tables and chairs are actual tables and 
chairs out there, and not their sense-data or hallucinations of them. Such perceptions are 
perfectly expressed in language, and the relation of language and reality (the timeless 
metaphysical question “how does language hooks on to the world?”) is not one of 
correspondence, but one of complementarity between language and facts. A statement 
about the perception of a chair makes only sense if it is used in a context in which one 
takes for granted that we actually see chairs, and where most of our perceptions are not 
thought to be produced by hallucinations. This approach tries to make genuine sense of 
the contact of persons with the world, as Putnam described it, it see us as “open to the 
world, as interacting with the world in ways that permit aspects of it to reveal to us.” 
(Putnam, 2012a: 61-62) 
However, Christopher Norris (2002) insists that Putnam’s second naïveté –understood 
as a “physicalist appeal to those sensory stimuli that impact on our nerve-ends from one 
moment to the next” (Norris, 2002: 25)-, must satisfy certain realist conditions which 
counter skepticism. Such conditions should: 
1) Avoid any recourse to “sense data” or other such redundant intermediary 
terms; 2) put us back in “unmediated contact with our environment” and 
thereby restore our “natural cognitive relations to the world”; 3) nonetheless 
reject any version of the Sellarsian “myth of the given”, or the idea of a world 
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that offers itself up for some privileged range of correct descriptions; 4) 
provide something more substantive (epistemologically speaking) than the 
bare-bones physicalist “realism” proposed by Rorty52; and 5) move somewhat 
in a Kantian direction in order to achieve these aims while renouncing Kant’s 
entire metaphysical apparatus and all the problems that go along with it. 
(Norris 2002: 26)   
As Norris assesses Putnam’s natural realist project, he concludes that neither he nor 
McDowell “have made-out a fully convincing case for this scaled-down (de-
transcendentalised) version of Kant as a means of overcoming the “interface” myth or 
of bridging the illusory gulf between mind and world.” (Norris, 2002: 26) On top of 
that, Norris thinks that Kant is a rather odd choice for inspiring such de-
transcendentalised naturalism. Kant’s project is charged with metaphysical assumptions 
without which the entire project would seem empty. Among such assumptions one finds 
the appeal to things in themselves, an appeal rejected by the realism of the common 
man. Also, the notions of “receptivity” and “spontaneity” are linked to a transcendental 
argument which affords a general concept and limits for experience, something which is 
not accepted by Putnam or McDowell’s commonsense realism.  
 
5.4. Varieties of sense-data theories: Identity Theory and second qualities 
Besides James and McDowell, Putnam’s natural realism is highly influenced by John 
Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia, where the British philosopher advocated a return to 
commonsense realism and attacked the idea that perception is afforded by sense-data.  
                                                 
52
 Rorty’s “physicalism”, as Norris understands it, consists of “severing the link between a causal account 
of knowledge-acquisition through direct exposure to sensori stimuli and those kinds of normative 
justification which we standardly provide in accordance with this or that language-game, social practice 
or cultural form.” (Norris, 2002: 16) 
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One of the features of Austin’s argument which Putnam uses for his own approach is 
Austin’s insistence that the inference from “perception is fallible” to “direct perception 
is impossible” is a very far-fetched and problematic one. However, ever since 
Descartes, such inference has been used as an answer to the typical examples of 
fallibility in perception (the stick in the water that looks bent but is straight, the mirror 
image that is mistaken for the object itself, etc.). Such examples have led sense-data 
epistemologists to advocate the idea that at least sometimes (in the case of dreams and 
hallucinations) what we perceive is something mental. However, given the fact that 
sometimes what we perceive is something mental, such epistemologists jump from that 
thesis to the generalization that what we perceive is always something mental, namely, 
sense-data.  
As Putnam argues in the Dewey Lectures, sense-data epistemologists do not provide an 
argument to the effect that even if one grants that the experience of a dream and a real 
object are qualitatively the same, such an experience cannot be produced by the real 
object
53
: 
[B]oth James and Austin argue that even if cases of dreaming, illusion, etc., 
were perceptions of something nonphysical, and the experience of someone 
who dreams were more or less exactly like a “veridical experience” of, say, 
Harvard’s Memorial Hall (one of James’s favorite examples), there is simply 
no argument that the object of the veridical experience cannot be Memorial 
Hall itself. (Putnam, 1999: 27-28) 
The sense-data epistemologist’s rejoinder is based on the facts of immediacy of 
perception and similarity of experiences: it might well be the case that one couldn’t find 
                                                 
53
 It should be noted the inconsistency of the argument here: the sense-data theorist admits the possibility 
of the existence of material objects, thus admits there being some kind of evidence for them. Therefore, 
why insist that such objects aren’t what we directly perceive? 
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an argument that contradicts the claim that the object of a veridical experience is a 
material object (Austin and James’s point above), however, the hypothesis that in both 
cases the same (or at least similar) sense data are immediately perceived explains why 
the experiences are similar (Putnam, 1999: 29). Therefore, in his opinion, as opposed to 
the commonsense philosopher, the sense-data epistemologist is actually providing an 
argument for similarity of experiences, namely, the immediacy of perception. 
Nevertheless, the point of the Natural Realist still holds: from the fact that experiences 
are similar, one cannot jump to the conclusion that perception is mentally caused and 
that experiences are not caused by material objects.  
Sense-data theories in their modern guise are related to the “identity theory”, which 
holds that sensations and thoughts are brain processes. This theory defends the 
assumption 
that there is a self-standing realm of experiences or mental phenomena; that 
these phenomena take place in the mind/brain; that the locus of this drama is 
the human head; and, finally, that perception involves a special cognitive 
relation to certain of these “inner” experiences as well as the existence of 
“causal chains of the appropriate type” connecting them to “external” objects. 
(Putnam, 1999: 30) 
However, one must ask, does the identity theory avoid the traditional objections to the 
sense-data theory? Concerning this question, Putnam points that talk of sense-data and 
its “immediate perception” is an unexplained process which still survives in the 
materialist version of the theory. In the 1950’s, as Putnam reminds us, the “grain 
argument” against the identity theory was put forward, and it held that  
sense data (the typical example was a visual sense datum of a homogeneous 
kind, say, the appearance of a large area of blue sky) and neural processes have 
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a very different “grain”- neural processes are discontinuous, have many 
different parts of many different sorts, and the blue sky sense datum is utterly 
uniform and undifferentiated. It makes no sense, it was claimed, to say that 
things so different are “identical.” (Putnam, 1999: 31) 
Even though this argument by itself wasn’t enough to eradicate talk of sense-data from 
philosophy, it helped to question the supposed identity between sense-data and brain 
states. However, the identity theory is not the only modern guise of sense-data 
approaches to perception; as Putnam reminds us,  
[t]here is another strategy employed by traditional epistemologists from the 
seventeenth century to Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy and after; the 
strategy of denying that most of the properties of external things we ordinarily 
think of ourselves as perceiving (in particular the so-called secondary qualities 
of color, texture, warmth, and coldness, etc.) are really “out there” to be 
perceived. From the (alleged) fact that these qualities are not “properties of the 
things as they are in themselves,” it was traditionally concluded that they are 
“in the mind.” (Putnam, 1999: 38)  
One can easily recognize in this strategy some of the main claims of Metaphysical 
Realism: the objective existence of things in themselves with defined and transcendent 
properties. Anything which is not describable in a mathematical fashion is said to be the 
mind’s projection. This early modern strategy survived well into the 20th century, and as 
opposed to the strategy of the identity theory –which works from “inside out”-, this 
strategy        
works from “outside in”; it argues against natural realism as an account of what 
is “out there.” Both strategies, of course, flow from the background 
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assumptions bequeathed to us by the metaphysical pictures of early modern 
realism (and its materialist and “neutral monist” variants.) (Putnam, 1999: 38) 
According to Putnam, Natural Realists such as James, Dewey, Husserl, Wittgenstein, 
and Austin, have responded differently to the varieties of sense-data theories. For 
example,  
[W]hen Husserl denies that the primary qualities are properties, he does not 
mean to deny that physical objects really have, say, mass and charge, but does 
mean to deny that the notion of a “perfectly precise mass” and a “perfectly 
precise charge” (or position, etc.) is more than a useful idealization. (Putnam, 
1999: 38) 
Another answer of Natural Realism to sense-data theories is to be found in “a proper 
understanding” of Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument as a predicament against 
the famous “inverted spectrum” puzzle”. The puzzle, as Putnam tells us,     
is traditionally supposed to be that someone with normal eyesight, brain, optic 
nerve, etc., might have different “visual qualia”-and this supposed possibility 
depends entirely on the conception of the mental as a self-standing realm 
(sealed off within the head), a conception encouraged by the questionable 
assumptions drawn from the philosophy of perception that it has been my 
concern to combat here. If we adopt the natural realist account and reject the 
traditional modern realist account, then the supposed sceptical possibility 
seemingly forced on us by this puzzle does not arise. (This is, I think, a 
consequence of a proper understanding of the Private Language Argument. If 
this is right, it is an unnoticed way in which Austinian concerns about 
perception are relevant to Wittgensteinian ones about the nature of mental 
states.) (Putnam, 1999: 41) 
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As this example shows, the strategy of sense-data theories is directly linked to the main 
presuppositions of Metaphysical Realism, in the sense that the mental is conceived of as 
self-standing realm separated from the outside world. A dichotomist thought which 
finds its highest expression in the Cartesian res cogitans and res extensa. Against this 
metaphysical picture, the natural realism that Putnam advocates defends the idea of 
conceiving the mind in a social environment:    
[S]ensory experiences are not passive affectations of an object called a “mind” 
but (for the most part) experiences of aspects of the world by a living being. 
Mind talk is not talk about an immaterial part of us but rather a way of 
describing the exercise of certain abilities we possess, abilities that supervene 
upon the activities of our brains and upon all our various transactions with the 
environment but that do not have to be reductively explained using the 
vocabulary of physics and biology, or even the vocabulary of computer 
science. The metaphysical realignment I propose involves acquiescence in a 
plurality of conceptual resources, of different and not mutually reducible 
vocabularies (an acquiescence that is inevitable in practice, whatever our 
monist fantasies) coupled with a return not to dualism but to the “natural 
realism of the common man.” (Putnam, 1999: 38-39) 
Putnam’s contribution to the answers to sense-data theories is related to the perception 
of colors. According to Russell, the different shades of colors we see when we look at a 
table cannot be properties of the table in itself, but can only be dispositions of the 
material object to produce certain sense data “under normal conditions”: “On the 
traditional view the ‘subjective’ table, the phenomenal table, has color properties, while 
the ‘objective’ table has only dispositions to produce color sensations.” (Putnam, 1990: 
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243) It is because of this that Putnam says that metaphysical realism stripped science of 
its data and leaves common objects devoid of any objective properties.         
Putnam’s answer is that “colors are more abstract than traditional writers on 
perception-including Russell-generally acknowledge.” (Putnam, 1999: 39) One cannot 
trace a line to divide conditions of seeing and describe an objectively ideal condition for 
them. As Putnam, points out, colors look different when seen in broad daylight and 
when seen under artificial light, and we cannot refer to any of these conditions as 
abnormal. From this Putnam concludes that “every color has a number of different 
‘looks.’” (Putnam, 1999: 40) Such property of colors is describable in public language, 
as opposed to the solipsism afforded by the sense-data theories, which renders natural 
realism, at least epistemologically, a more advantageous alternative:  
Is the situation, then, a “standoff” in the sense that it is equally metaphysically 
advantageous (1) to think of the looks of things as irreducible (though 
relational) aspects of reality that depend upon the way those things reflect light, 
the conditions under which they are viewed, etc., or (2) to think of the looks of 
things as dispositions to produce certain sense data, and to think of sense data 
as irreducible aspects of reality correlated to brain states? No, because colors 
and the looks of colors, thought of in the first way, are perfectly describable 
(public), and so are the empirical dependencies in question, while if they are 
thought of in the second way, all of the skeptical problems described in my 
first lecture inevitably arise. Epistemologically, we have every reason to prefer 
an account under which our experiences are ab initio encounters with a public 
world. (Putnam, 1999: 40) 
Sense-data theories lack scientific weight, since they postulate entities whose behavior 
is unexplained and inexplicable. Such theories, in the end, 
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provide us with no more than an alternative jargon in which we can restate 
such garden variety facts as the fact that on certain occasions it seems to one 
that one is seeing (hearing, feeling, smelling, etc.) something that is not there, 
and the fact that the look of something is not a property it has independently of 
the conditions under which it is perceived. (Putnam, 1999: 41) 
  
5.5. Internal vs natural realism 
In the Dewey Lectures Putnam sees his former doctrine of internal realism as an 
approach which ultimately falls in the same dichotomies as the traditional epistemology 
it was meant to counter: “My picture still retained the basic premise of an interface 
between the knower and everything ‘outside.’” (Putnam, 1999: 18) The reason for this 
is that by postulating “ideal epistemic conditions” the internalist retains the traditional 
“interface” approach to epistemology. According to the Putnam of the Dewey Lectures, 
internal realism, conceived as a third way between realism and relativism, doesn’t 
undercut the dichotomist approach between language and reality:   
[W]hile the need for a “third way” besides early modem realism and 
Dummettian idealism is something I feel as strongly as ever, such a third way 
must, as McDowell has repeatedly urged, undercut the idea that there is an 
antinomy and not simply paste together elements of early modern realism and 
elements of the idealist picture. No conception that retains anything like the 
traditional notion of sense data can provide a way out; such a conception must 
always, in the end, leave us confronted by what looks like an insoluble 
problem. (Putnam, 1999: 18) 
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Putnam’s internal realism, while inspired by Dummett’s “global antirealism,” tried to 
avoid the idealist consequences of Dummett’s strong anti-realism by postulating the 
notion that, as opposed to Dummett’s notion of being able to unalterably verify or 
falsify empirical propositions, a speaker has rational abilities to decide whether a 
statement is true or false under ideal epistemic conditions. As we have already seen in 
previous chapters, against the criticism that such position implies idealism, Putnam 
replied that the notion of sufficiently good epistemic conditions is a “world involving” 
notion. However, in the Dewey Lectures, where Putnam officially abandoned his former 
internal realism, he charges this doctrine as reflecting the same antinomy of 
metaphysical realism, namely, the dividing line between mind and world:   
If, on the picture we have inherited from early modern philosophy, there is a 
problem about how, without postulating some form of magic, we can have 
referential access to external things, there is an equal problem as to how we can 
have referential or other access to “sufficiently good epistemic situations.” On 
my alternative picture (as opposed to Dummett’s) the world was allowed to 
determine whether I actually am in a sufficiently good epistemic situation or 
whether I only seem to myself to be in one -thus retaining an important idea 
from commonsense realism- but the conception of an epistemic situation was, 
at bottom, just the traditional epistemological one. My picture still retained the 
basic premise of an interface between the knower and everything “outside.” 
(Putnam, 1999: 18)   
Throughout this thesis, and particularly in the previous chapter, I have questioned this 
criticism against internal realism. I insisted on the social character of the doctrine of 
truth as warranted assertibility, according to which to recognize the truth of a statement 
one must share a public language and master the abilities that this implies (cf. previous 
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chapter). However, one must seriously consider Putnam’s warning against internal 
realism, to the effect that “[n]o conception that retains anything like the traditional 
notion of sense data can provide a way out; such a conception must always, in the end, 
leave us confronted by what looks like an insoluble problem.” (Putnam, 1999: 18) We 
have already seen the vast array of problems that bring sense-data theories, however, we 
must see to what extent internal realism depends on such theories.  
In Reason, Truth, and History (1981), while characterizing his former approach to 
functionalism as an identification of mental properties with computational properties of 
the brain, Putnam also stated that in his view “sensations have a ‘qualitative’ aspect 
that cannot be characterized functionally, and that aspect was to be identified with 
some physically characterized aspect of our brain functioning” (Putnam, 1999: 19) 
Thus, in the Dewey Lectures, Putnam characterizes internal realism as Cartesianism 
cum materialism. In the same vein, in his article “Corresponding with reality” (2012a), 
when assessing the problems of functionalism and defending his new approach of 
Liberal Naturalism, Putnam insists on the reductionist aspect of his former doctrine: “an 
up-to-date liberal functionalist should not think that she has to reduce all the notions 
she uses to nonintentional notions.” (Putnam, 2012a: 82) Thus, the latter Putnam (post 
Dewey Lectures) came to see the functionalism of internal realism as a reductionist 
doctrine which hoped to give a physicalist account of intentionality and rely only on 
sense-data as the vessels of perception. In what follows, I will assess the relationship of 
internal realism to functionalism and assess whether such criticisms are to the point.    
To begin with, one must stress the point that according to functionalism, psychological 
properties are functional properties: different organisms may exhibit the same 
functional properties regardless of their material composition. In Reason, Truth, and 
History, Putnam acknowledged that functionalism is the right naturalistic description of 
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the mind/body relation and that he was “attracted to the idea that one right version 
[among the many right versions of reality] is a naturalistic version; in which thought-
forms, images, sensations, etc., are functionally characterized physical occurrences.” 
(Putnam, 1981: 79) Even though the functionalism advocated in Reason, Truth, and 
History identified mental states to physical occurrences, it also emphasized the fact that 
psychological properties are functional properties. One must remember that the doctrine 
of functionalism was put forward as an alternative to materialism and reductionism, and 
that it advocated the notion that what matters in understanding mental states is the 
function they satisfy, not their physical composition; in other words, mental states are 
compositionally plastic.     
In Reason, Truth, and History, Putnam already had serious doubts about the plausibility 
of functionalism’s accounting for the qualitative character of sensations. Making 
reference to the famous “Inverted Spectrum” hypothesis, Putnam wanted to show in his 
early book the impossibility to account for qualitative character of sensations in a 
reductionist fashion; thus, according to the functionalist approach:  
‘[A] sensation is a sensation of blue (i.e. has the qualitative character that I 
now describe in that way) just in case the sensation (or the corresponding 
physical event in the brain) has the role of signaling the presence of objective 
blue in the environment’. This theory captures one sense of the phrase 
‘sensation of blue’, but not the desired ‘qualitative’ sense. If this functional role 
were identical with the qualitative character, then one couldn’t say that the 
quality of the sensation [for the person with inverted spectrum] has changed. 
(Putnam, 1981: 80-81) 
For someone with inverted spectrum the quality of the sensation of colors has changed, 
and this quality doesn’t seem to be a functional state. The problem with functionalism 
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that Putnam already identified in Reason, Truth, and History is that, regardless of its 
insistence on the compositional plasticity of mental states, it identifies “qualitative 
character” with “physical realization.” Here we recognize the aforementioned identity 
theory, which leads us once again to the question whether the sensation-state is identical 
with the brain-state. The argument that Putnam deploys in Reason, Truth, and History 
against the identity theory is to question the possibility of correlation between brain 
events and sensations. Instead of defining a priori the correlation between events, 
“Functionalist Putnam” admitted that the relation between mental and computational 
properties is a “kind of synthetic identity.” Such a notion, allows the functionalist  
to be able to say that not only is light passing through an aperture the same 
event as electromagnetic radiation passing through the aperture, but that the 
property of being light is the very same property as the property of being 
electromagnetic radiation of such and such wavelengths. (Putnam, 2012a: 610) 
This synthetic identification of properties, of course, rejects the idea that properties can 
be said to be identical a priori, and such identification “enables us to explain 
phenomena we would not otherwise be able to explain.” (Putnam, 2012a: 610) Thus, 
the failure of the identity and correlation theories to specify their results yields the 
conclusion that one cannot know objectively (as the metaphysical realist requires) if two 
thinking organisms share the same qualia. This is a feature of functionalism that Putnam 
clearly opposed during his internalist period, namely, because during this period he 
came to believe that “mental states are not only compositionally plastic, but also 
computationally plastic.” (Putnam, 1988: 15) The compositional plasticity of mental 
states advocated by functionalism refers to the idea that feelings and emotions are not 
identical with brain states. The computational plasticity of mental states –which is not a 
feature of functionalism-, refers to the hypothesis that thinking creatures may have an 
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indefinite number of different programs, as opposed to the functionalist idea that our 
functional organization is limited to the program of a Turing machine. In other words, 
the fact that thinking organisms are computationally plastic has as a consequence that it 
is not possible for two organisms to share the same physical computation of a belief, 
which, amounts to a denial of the identity theory (that emotional and feeling episodes 
would have a brain physical correlative.) Thus, the criticisms put forward in the Dewey 
Lectures and after are not wholly to the point, since it is very clear in two of Putnam’s 
main internalist writings (1981, 1987) that the functionalist aspects embraced by 
internal realism are not reductionist: “The ‘intentional level’ is simply not reducible to 
the ‘computational level’ any more that it is to the ‘physical level.’” (Putnam, 1987: 15)  
This same anti-reductionism concerning intentionality is found in another of Putnam’s 
internalists books, Representation and Reality (1988). There, the reductionist character 
of functionalism is contrasted with the social character of the externalism adopted since 
“The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, a character which has been present in the doctrines of 
internal realism as well as natural realism and liberal naturalism: 
Speaking at the level of spontaneous phenomenology, it is undeniable that we 
perceive one another as “thinking that the weather is muggy,” “believing that 
she will miss her train,” and so on. These are phenomenologically real 
conditions. But as soon as we ask whether a Thai speaker who believes that a 
“meew” is on a mat is in the same “psychological state” as an English speaker 
who believes a “cat” is on a mat, we run out of spontaneous phenomenology 
and begin to babble our favorite “theory.” The reason, I think, is that we look 
in the wrong place. Rather than thinking of the propositional attitudes as 
having a phenomenological reality which springs from the possibility of asking 
oneself if one really got the other person or the text right, one looks for a 
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reduction of the propositional attitudes to something that counts as more 
“basic” in one’s system of scientific metaphysics. One looks for something 
definable in nonintentional terms, something isolable by scientific procedures, 
something one can build a model of, something which will explain 
intentionality. And this - the “mental process” - is just what does not exist. 
(Putnam, 1988: 73) 
It is noteworthy to notice that in this quote Putnam is not rejecting phenomenology (as 
the natural realist seems to do). Nevertheless, he is adopting a version of a 
phenomenological approach which is not necessarily at home with the idea that 
perception is reduced to sense-data, or with the idea that intentionality is reducible to 
non-intentional terms. A similar point against the desire of formalization of 
intentionality inherent in functionalism is expressed by the aid of the same formal 
Godelian argument which was used in “Models and Reality,” (cf. chapter 2 above):  
It is part of our notion of justification in general (not just of our notion of 
mathematical justification) that reason can go beyond whatever reason can 
formalize. If we look at the arguments deployed against functionalism (and 
various other “isms”) […], we quickly see that they rest (or the 
“epistemological” arguments rest) on the same fact, though in a less formal 
way. The connection between the epistemological issues just mentioned and 
questions of reference and meaning is secured by the truth of meaning holism. 
[…] [R]eference is not just a matter of “causal connections”; it is a matter of 
interpretation. […] And interpretation is an essentially holistic matter. (Putnam, 
1988: 118-19) 
As this paragraph makes clear, the issue of perception is not independent of the problem 
of truth: for the internal realist truth as justification is not reducible to formal equation, 
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as the different metaphysical doctrines would expect. To understand beliefs expressed in 
propositions, the internalist insists, one cannot simply think of causal connections of 
reference and expect to find their formalization –as functionalism expects-. Instead, 
internal realism places the burden of the argument on our conceptions of justification 
(cf. chapter 3) and on interpretation. Thus, the internalism of Representation and Reality 
insists that a coherent picture of the mind and intentionality must account for the 
phenomena of division of linguistic labor, contribution of the environment, meaning 
holism, objectivity and conceptual relativity:  
[T]o say that intentional phenomena are “objective” is not to say that they are 
independent of what human beings know or could find out (it is not to say that 
they are Objective with a capital “O,” so to speak). If we take “truth” as our 
representative intentional notion, then to say that truth is objective (with a 
small “O”) is just to say that it is a property of truth that whether a sentence is 
true is logically independent of whether a majority of the members of the 
culture believe it to be true. And this is not a solution to the grand metaphysical 
question of Realism or Idealism, but simply a feature of our notion of truth. 
(Putnam, 1988: 109)  
Looking back to The Many Faces of Realism (1987), a book in which internal realism is 
advocated and proposed as an alternative to metaphysical realism, one also finds a 
defense of a commonsensical approach very close to natural realism. In a strikingly 
similar fashion to the natural realism of the Dewey Lectures, Putnam defends the 
commonsensical fact that “[T]here are tables and chairs and ice cubes. There are also 
electrons and space-time regions and prime numbers and people who are a menace to 
world peace and moments of beauty and transcendence.” (Putnam, 1987: 16) This book 
serves as a warning against giving up commonsense realism and “supposing that the 
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seventeenth-century talk of ‘external world’ and ‘sense impressions’, ‘intrinsic 
properties’, ‘projections’, etc. was in any way a rescuer of our commonsense realism.” 
(Putnam, 1987: 16-17) In this warning one finds a staunch opposition to the 
metaphysical “interface” approach to perception and the advocacy of a commonsensical 
approach. As the doctrine is expressed in this internalist writing, commonsense realism 
doesn’t need the empiricist gambit of “sense impressions” to account for perception. 
Instead, that book defends an approach which takes some features of functionalism (that 
mental states are compositionally plastic) and some features of commonsense realism 
(we perceive directly material objects, not their sense impressions.) 
To finish, it must be remarked that another striking similarity between internal and 
natural realism is to be found in the philosophers who are admitted as influencing both 
doctrines. In The Many Faces of Realism, Putnam acknowledges the insights of the 
philosophers who will later figure in the Dewey Lectures as the inspirers of natural 
realism. Thus, in The Many Faces of Realism we find an acknowledgment of the 
commonsensical realism of James, Husserl, Wittgenstein, and Austin:  
[I]f we allow that William James might have had something ‘new’ to say –
something new to us, not just something new to his own time- or, at least, 
might have had a program for philosophy that is, in part, the right program, 
even if it has not been properly worked out yet (and may never be completely 
‘worked out’); if we allow that Husserl and Wittgenstein and Austin may have 
shared something of the same program, even if they too, in their different ways, 
failed to state it properly; the there is still something new, something 
unfinished and important to say about reality and truth. (Putnam, 1987: 17) 
Internal and natural realism take important insights of this group of philosophers 
concerning the relationship between mind and world. Even though Putnam is very 
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reticent to include himself into any doctrine or school of thought, he takes from this 
group of philosophers a host of insights which have modelled his doctrines of internal 
and natural realism. As has been already said, these philosophers share with Putnam a 
certain mistrust towards systematization and reduction in philosophy and a preference 
for pluralism and commonsense. Both, the mistrust and the preference, as has been 
shown, find their expression in the doctrine of conceptual relativity, a doctrine shared 
by internal and natural realism.    
 
5.6. Partial conclusions of this chapter 
Both, internal realism and natural realism are alternatives to metaphysical realism and 
its different brands (particularly, Reductionism and Materialism). As we have seen in 
this chapter, the relationship between thought and reality is a mutual concern of the 
aforementioned doctrines. In the case of Materialism, it looked for a reductive 
explanation of the nature of mind and consciousness. However, this reductionist 
program seems very utopian, particularly considering that similar programs in physics –
such as reducing color or solidity to fundamental physics- have proved impossible. 
Putnam’s functionalism was proposed as an alternative to such Materialism, insisting 
that thinking beings are “compositionally plastic.” Such alternative allows us to 
“recognize that all sorts of logically possible ‘systems’ or beings could be conscious, 
exhibit mentality and affect, etc., in exactly the same sense without having the same 
matter.” (Putnam, 1987: 14) Taking into account that at least this aspect of 
functionalism is embraced by internal realism, the criticisms from the Dewey Lectures 
and beyond (particularly Putnam 2012a) don’t seem to be taking internal realism at face 
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value, or at least, they seem to build a straw man argument which depicts internal 
realism as unquestioningly embracing functionalism and its reductionist consequences.     
In this chapter I have tried to point to the similarities between internal realism and 
natural realism, not with the intention of saying that both doctrines are identical, but just 
with the goal of showing that Putnam’s criticisms from the Dewey Lectures and beyond, 
against his former doctrine of internal realism are, to say the least, ungrounded. As I 
tried to show, internal realism, just as natural realism, is concerned with rescuing 
commonsense from the stranglehold of metaphysical realism:      
The key to working out the program of preserving commonsense realism while 
avoiding the absurdities and antinomies of metaphysical realism in all its 
familiar varieties (Brand X: Materialism; Brand Y: Subjective Idealism; Brand 
Z: Dualism…) is something I have called internal realism. Internal realism is, 
at bottom, just the insistence that realism is not incompatible with conceptual 
relativity. (Putnam, 1987: 17) 
Internal and natural realism, though two different doctrines, are similar in their mutual 
acceptance of the doctrine of conceptual relativity. If there is something which Putnam 
hasn’t given up since his internalist period is the idea of the “open texture” of an object, 
which allowed him to counter the metaphysical claim that the world consists of a closed 
and well-defined ontology, describable in the language of physics.  
However, the problem of perception is not brought to bear directly on the issue of 
conceptual relativity, and maybe that is for the best. As we have seen in this chapter, 
Putnam has tried many different alternatives concerning perception. These constant 
changes of mind on the same issue, though reflecting a very open and honest spirit, also 
betray a bit of confusion and muddiness in Putnam. After reading this chapter, one 
cannot escape the thought that Putnam wasn’t completely sure where he stood 
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concerning this difficult issue. For this reason, I propose a “methodological truce” 
concerning perception: given the muddiness of the issue, and given the fact that 
arguments from conceptual relativity can be used without having necessarily to rely on 
sense-data or a specific theory of perception, I propose that Putnam’s stand concerning 
qualia and sameness of quality of sensations
54
 be bracketed for the purposes of this 
chapter. Once we accept this charitable truce, the road seems less muddy for reaching 
the purposes of finding common ground between internal and natural realism.       
A striking similarity between the two doctrines is their common mistrust on a full-
blooded acceptance of sense-data (or qualia). Already in Reason, Truth, and History 
Putnam acknowledged that “qualia are not well defined entities.”  (Putnam, 1981: 100) 
Thus, “for someone with an ‘internalist’ perspective on truth, it doesn’t follow that 
there is a fact of the matter in every case as to whether two sensations are qualitatively 
similar or dissimilar.” (Putnam, 1981: 101) This same disbelief towards qualia and the 
qualitative similarity of sensations is found in The Many Faces of Realism, where 
Putnam admits that the right picture of the mind accepts the idea of computational 
plasticity of mental states (again, an element which doesn’t figure in the doctrine of 
functionalism.)  
As opposed to sense-data theories, the natural realism advocated by Putnam, and 
inspired by such figures as James, Wittgenstein, and Austin, insists on the 
“needlessness and the unintelligibility of a picture that imposes an interface between 
ourselves and the world.” (Putnam, 1999: 41) In this chapter, I suggested that Putnam’s 
criticisms against his former internal realism attack a straw man version of this doctrine, 
since they emphasize a supposed predilection for the “interface” approach; while in fact, 
if we read carefully Putnam’s internalist writings (particularly his 1981, 1987, and 
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 Concerning these two topics, Putnam has shown a rather confusing approach, from ambivalence 
towards qualia (1981), to its abhorrence (1999), to its embrace (2012b). 
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1988), one would see that in such writings the approach to sense-data is ambivalent, 
and, what is more important, they defend a picture based on holism and meaning 
externalism which is very far from solipsism and reductionism.   
Even in Reason, Truth, and History, Putnam already had serious doubts about the value 
of functionalism when it came to account for the qualitative character of sensations. 
What is striking is that the same doubts are expressed by Putnam in his Liberal 
Naturalist last period, in which he also doubts whether functionalism can account for 
the qualitative character of sensations. Therefore, the criticism made by Putnam in the 
Dewey Lectures against his former self concerning the “interface” approach is not fair, 
since, as was just mentioned, for internal realism, as well as for natural realism (and 
liberal naturalism), the status of qualia remain a rather diffuse issue. It is worth noticing, 
though, that in his commonsense realist period, Putnam accepts a version of Aristotelian 
functionalism according to which “our psyches can best be viewed not as material or 
immaterial organs or things, but as capacities and functions and ways we are organized 
to function.” (Putnam, 2012a: 608) In this late period, it would seem that Putnam comes 
closer to his former doctrine of internal realism in the sense that such doctrine also 
emphasized the functional character of psychological states.  
Therefore, it seems unfair to accuse internal realism with the charge that it naively 
embraces functionalism and sense-data, since in fact, just as natural realism, it seeks to 
preserve commonsense realism. In The Many Faces of Realism (an internalist book) one 
finds a very clear advocacy of the commonsensical approach where the emphasis is put 
on the direct perception of things, as opposed to the “interface” approach. In that book, 
internal realism is described as the “key to working out the program of preserving 
commonsense realism while avoiding the absurdities and antinomies of metaphysical 
realism.” (Putnam, 1987: 18) Therefore, a commonsensical approach to perception 
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seems to be the common thread that unites internal and natural realism. The difference 
would be that internal realism still accepted the functionalist idea of compositional 
plasticity of mental states (while remaining ambivalent towards sense-data), whereas 
natural realism insists on the immediacy of perception -without necessarily explaining 
further how is this possible
55
.   
In his study of Putnam’s philosophy, Hilary Putnam: realism, reason, and the uses of 
uncertainty (2002), Christopher Norris reaches a more or less similar conclusion to the 
one advocated here, namely that internal and natural realism have some important 
similarities. However, his argument is a negative one which states that Putnam’s natural 
realism doesn’t answer skeptical or realist claims, to the point that, 
[His] new theory is so thickly hedged about with qualifying clauses and 
disclaimers that [the Putnam of the Dewey Lectures] often sounds very much 
like [his internal realist counterpart], despite his avowed aim of putting a 
clearly marked distance between them. (Norris, 2002: 25) 
According to Norris, the doctrines of internal realism and natural realism concur in their 
disdain for their metaphysical counterpart. Such shared disdain dictates  
the very terms of his argument by debarring any appeal to the kind of 
‘metaphysical’ realism that would locate the conditions for our truth-apt 
statements in the way things actually stand with the world, rather than the way 
they happen to figure according to our current-best evidential warrant. (Norris, 
2002: 31) 
This shared rejection of metaphysical realism is also expressed in the rejection of a limit 
concerning the definition of objects and the possibility to know them. This is the mutual 
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 However, it is noteworthy that Putnam insists that his natural realism relies on the Wittgensteinian 
doctrine of meaning as use, which would suffice to account for the relationship between perception and 
understanding.  
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acceptance of conceptual relativity which was mentioned above. The internalist as well 
as the natural realist agree that “there is just no way of assigning such limits to the 
totality of existing objects, properties, structures, etc., nor again (by the same token) to 
the totality of genuine referring expressions and veridical statements concerning them.” 
(Norris, 2002: 32) Therefore, both doctrines converge on the importance of conceptual 
relativity and conceptual pluralism. These approaches allow the internal and natural 
realist to avoid affirming, as the metaphysical realist does, that there is a fact of the 
matter as to whether sense-data exist or not. For the internal realist, at least, the question 
of the existence of sense-data is to be decided according to human interests and 
pragmatic procedures; in other words, such question just makes sense if assertibility of 
sense-data is warranted.  
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CONCLUSIONES GENERALES  
 
En esta tesis he tratado de reconocer los méritos del realismo interno de Hilary Putnam, 
y, de cierta forma, salvar dicha doctrina de las críticas que su propio autor 
eventualmente le hiciera. Como se ha argumentado, el realismo interno no solo se 
enfrenta al realismo metafísico y el relativismo, sino que también responde a las críticas 
del realismo natural, críticas que culpan al realismo interno de ser una doctrina 
metafísica, materialista y solipsista. Espero haber mostrado por medio de esta tesis que 
dichas críticas son injustificadas, y que la doctrina del realismo interno es de hecho una 
alternativa atractiva y eficaz para la filosofía contemporánea. 
Como se argumentó en el primer capítulo, las versiones de realismo metafísico allí 
presentadas tienen pretensiones ontológicas más no epistemológicas. Por lo tanto, lo 
que está en juego para tales enfoques es la afirmación de la totalidad de los objetos 
existentes y la forma en que éstos pueden ser descritos científicamente, y no la forma en 
que llegamos a conocerlos. De manera que, en el primer capítulo, se mostró que para los 
realistas el problema de la realidad no está ligado a modos de verificación o a la 
semántica, algo que Putnam contradice con su realismo interno.       
Putnam identificó el realismo metafísico con la tesis que existe una totalidad fija de 
objetos que puede ser descrita en términos científicos. Su realismo interno es una 
respuesta efectiva a tal tesis por dos razones principales: en primer lugar, como se 
mostró en el capítulo 2 de ésta tesis, el argumento de la teoría de modelos presentado en 
“Models and Reality” (Putnam, 1983) –en el cual se presenta algo así como un proto-
realismo interno- nos muestra que ni la formalización ni el reduccionismo del realista 
metafísico logran determinar una única relación de referencia entre las teorías y los 
objetos. En segundo lugar, la doctrina de la relatividad conceptual, presentada en el 
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capítulo 4, se opone efectivamente a la noción realista de objetos fijos, y en su lugar 
argumenta que la definición del término “objeto” no se determina a priori, sino por 
medio de los intereses y las convenciones humanas. Es así que el hecho que el realismo 
metafísico se encuentre expuesto a varias antinomias, como por ejemplo, el hecho que 
algunas versiones de dicho realismo defiendan la idea que ni siquiera las mejores teorías 
puedan acceder al mundo real, y la imposibilidad de establecer una única relación 
referencial de acuerdo a las exigencias realistas, nos obliga a buscar una mejor 
alternativa para interpretar la realidad. Para Putnam, el realismo interno fue brevemente 
tal alternativa.  
El realismo interno es una alternativa filosófica que vale la pena considerar, entre otras 
razones, porque rechaza las dicotomías tradicionales que muchas veces han llevado a la 
filosofía a un callejón sin salida. Entre estas dicotomías encontramos la división entre 
mente y mundo, entre los conceptos y las experiencias. En el tercer capítulo vimos la 
forma en que el realismo interno rechaza las acusaciones que se le hacen en relación al 
solipsismo y el idealismo por el hecho de aceptar que la noción de la verdad requiere 
una cierta coherencia entre las experiencias y las creencias, y que dichas experiencias 
se encuentran, de cierta forma, mediadas por los conceptos que usamos. Por lo tanto, si 
bien la noción de percepción propia del realismo interno es ambivalente con respecto al 
estatus de los sense-data, ésta admite una estrecha interacción entre experiencias y 
conceptos. Contrario a las críticas hechas por Putnam en las Conferencias Dewey 
(1999), el realismo interno no adopta los enfoques empiristas o racionalistas de la 
percepción, según los cuales habría una división clara entre la mente y el mundo; en su 
lugar, el realismo interno insiste que la mente y el mundo son expresiones de la realidad 
y que la una no puede existir sin el otro. Tal como lo expresa Putnam en Razón, Verdad, 
e Historia (1981), la mente y el mundo producen a la mente y el mundo.    
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Espero haber mostrado en esta tesis coherencia en el realismo interno de Putnam. Dicha 
coherencia encuentra su expresión, entre otras características, en el enfoque de Putnam 
hacia la verdad como justificación, su interés por el externalismo semántico, y la 
relatividad conceptual: la idea Putnamiana de la verdad como justificación dependiente 
del lenguaje está ligada a la idea que los hechos son incomprensibles si se expresan en 
un lenguaje ajeno a su contexto.  Por lo tanto, para el realista interno, en oposición al 
realista metafísico, no habría tales cosas como hechos independientes del lenguaje, sino 
más bien hechos contextualizados en lenguajes opcionales, tal como lo mostró el 
ejemplo de las sumas mereológicas.  El hecho que podamos utilizar tales lenguajes 
opcionales es otra forma de atacar la doctrina metafísica según la cual existe una 
totalidad fija de objetos que puede ser únicamente descrita en el lenguaje científico. 
Como lo muestra el externalismo semántico, el significado de las palabras no debe 
buscarse en los estados mentales (como lo defiende el solipsismo), sino más bien es 
algo construido colectivamente que se advierte mediante su uso.   
Por lo tanto, contrario a la idea que Putnam presenta en las Conferencias Dewey (y 
escritos posteriores) según la cual el realismo interno defiende el modelo de la  
“interface” en la percepción, en esta tesis espero haber mostrado que el realismo interno 
es un enfoque en el cual las dicotomías tradicionales de la filosofía son superadas en 
favor de un enfoque más holístico y coherente.  Dicho enfoque propone una interacción 
entre conceptos y experiencias que se aleja por completo del dualismo Cartesiano, y en 
su lugar defiende la idea de que no tiene sentido, de un lado, hablar de hechos puros, 
libres de toda conceptualización, y de conceptos desligados de la realidad, del otro lado.  
Esto se expresó claramente en el tercer capítulo, donde se enfatizó que cuando el 
realista interno dice que la mente y el mundo son producto de la mente y el mundo, lo 
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que hace es contrastar la mente con un mundo de experiencias y creencias, y no sólo 
con experiencias sensitivas.  
Otro de los objetivos de esta tesis fue el de hacer notar una cierta semejanza entre el 
realismo interno y el realismo natural. Un punto de encuentro entre ambos enfoques es 
su mutuo interés por el sentido común, el cual también se expresa en sus respectivas 
concepciones de la verdad. La concepción de la verdad adoptada por el realismo natural 
defiende la idea -propia del sentido común- según la cual, cuando aprendemos las reglas 
de un juego de lenguaje también aprendemos que existen ciertas frases que podemos 
comprender mas no verificar, y que este hecho no se explica recurriendo a razones 
metafísicas y transcendentales, sino que se explica en razón de las reglas mismas del 
juego de lenguaje. Por su lado, el verificacionismo semántico fue una de las razones que 
llevó a Putnam a abandonar el realismo interno, pues, a diferencia del realismo natural, 
el realismo interno sostiene que la verdad se relaciona con la aseverabilidad bajo 
condiciones epistemológicas “ideales,” y, según la crítica de Putnam, dichas 
condiciones serían expresiones del cartesianismo y el materialismo. En esta tesis traté 
de argumentar que las nociones que sobre la verdad sostienen el realismo natural y el 
realismo interno no son incompatibles, pues ambas enfatizan el sentido común y la 
normatividad social de los juegos de lenguaje. Sin embargo, como se mostró en el 
último capítulo, el realismo interno no deja de ser ambivalente con respecto a los sense-
data, lo cual es un error que da fácilmente lugar a críticas, tal como lo hace Putnam en 
sus Conferencias Dewey.  En los últimos capítulos de la tesis se defiende la idea que 
este error –aunque grave y problemático-, debe hacerse a un lado y minimizar su 
importancia con respecto a la totalidad de la doctrina del realismo interno para así 
enfatizar sus aspectos sociales y holísticos. El verificacionismo del realismo interno 
(una vez desprovisto de los aspectos más problemáticos sobre la percepción) debe 
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entenderse como un enfoque del sentido común basado en los intereses y las 
convenciones humanas. Tal como se dijo al final del tercer capítulo, éste 
verificacionismo va de la mano de los juegos de lenguaje, en el sentido que el criterio 
para comprender y verificar la verdad de un enunciado no debe buscarse por fuera del 
juego de lenguaje (desde una vista privilegiada), sino que tal criterio hace parte del 
juego de lenguaje mismo. Por lo tanto, en vez de reconocer el mutuo interés de ambas 
doctrinas por el sentido común, el Putnam de las Conferencias Dewey se acerca al 
realismo metafísico al exigirle al realismo interno criterios objetivos con respecto a la 
verificación.       
De manera que, al contrario de lo que Putnam sostiene en las Conferencias Dewey, lejos 
de ser una doctrina solipsista, el realismo interno es un enfoque social que, en oposición 
al funcionalismo, admite el externalismo semántico. Es por esto que Putnam sostiene 
que    
no es posible individualizar conceptos o creencias sin referencia al ambiente 
que las rodea; los significados no se encuentran “en la cabeza”. El resultado de 
esta discusión para la filosofía de la mente es que las actitudes proposicionales, 
como suelen llamarlas los filósofos, es decir, ese tipo de cosas como la 
creencia que la nieve es blanca y la certeza de que hay un gato sobre el tapiz-, 
no son “estados” del cerebro humano y su sistema nervioso considerados por 
fuera del contexto social y no-humano. Por lo tanto, éstos no son “estados 
funcionales”- es decir, estados que se puedan definir en términos de parámetros 
que quepan en la descripción del software del organismo.  El Funcionalismo, 
interpretado como la tesis que las actitudes proposicionales simplemente son 
estados computacionales de la mente no puede ser correcto. (Putnam, 1988: 73)  
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El rechazo de Putnam a sus propias doctrinas (como en el caso del funcionalismo) ha 
llevado a muchos a criticar su filosofía y no tomarla en serio. En contra de tales críticas, 
vale la pena señalar algunos ejemplos, como la relatividad conceptual y el interés por el 
sentido común, los cuales han estado presentes en los escritos de Putnam desde su 
período como realista interno hasta sus últimos escritos sobre el naturalismo liberal. El 
realismo interno se aproxima al realismo natural en cuanto a su rechazo de la tentación 
metafísica de considerar la existencia fija de los objetos como un hecho objetivo. 
Ambos enfoques defienden el realismo del sentido común y adoptan la idea que las 
cuestiones de la existencia dependen también de juicios y convenciones humanas. Por lo 
tanto, en vez de buscar una razón objetiva que de una vez por todas decida si, por 
ejemplo, los “qualia” existen o no (o afirmar que éstos pertenecen a un esquema 
conceptual secundario), tanto el realista interno como el natural toman inspiración del 
pluralismo y afirman que cada sensación tiene un carácter cualitativo diferente y plural. 
El realismo del sentido común, lejos de ser una doctrina basada en conceptos a priori y 
una ontología fija, se aproxima a la idea internalista según la cual   
el nuestro es un mundo humano, de ahí que las cuestiones sobre lo que es 
consciente o no, sobre lo que tiene o no sensaciones, y sobre lo que es o no 
cualitativamente similar, dependan en última instancia de nuestros juicios 
humanos sobre la similitud y la diferencia. (Putnam, 1981: 102)    
El mismo punto se expresa con respecto al problema de la conciencia, pues encontramos 
grandes semejanzas de ambas doctrinas en lo que se refiere a la crítica de la Teoría de la 
Identidad (vista en el último capítulo). De hecho, ambas doctrinas afirman que    
no existe un hecho objetivo con respecto a que ciertas entidades sean o no 
conscientes, ni que las cualidades sean o no objetivamente las mismas o 
diferentes. Solo existen los obvios hechos empíricos: que las rocas y las 
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naciones son bastante diferentes de las personas y los animales; que los robots, 
en toda su variedad, son objetos intermedios; etc. El hecho que ni las rocas ni 
las naciones tengan conciencia es un hecho acerca de nuestra noción de la 
conciencia. (Putnam, 1981: 102)   
Tal como lo muestran los anteriores pasajes, las inescapables preguntas que tanto han 
ocupado a la filosofía, tales como la verdad, la justificación, y la existencia, deben 
decidirse haciendo referencia a los intereses y las convenciones humanas, y no por 
referencia a principios transcendentales. Una doctrina relacionada con el realismo 
interno que expresa muy bien este último punto es el externalismo semántico, doctrina 
la cual –junto con la relatividad conceptual- ha sobrevivido los constantes cambios en la 
filosofía de Putnam.  El externalismo semántico fue uno de los principales argumentos 
que convenció a Putnam para abandonar el funcionalismo. La incompatibilidad entre 
ambas doctrinas llevó a Putnam a buscar un enfoque más social y holístico para su 
filosofía de la mente; tal enfoque encuentra su expresión en el carácter justificativo de la 
verdad y en el aspecto social de la referencia defendido por el realismo interno. En esta 
tesis he defendido la idea que dichos aspectos sociales y holísticos hacen del realismo 
interno una alternativa válida para la filosofía contemporánea. Es una pena que el 
mismo Putnam no supiera reconocer este valor del realismo interno, pues en sus últimos 
escritos se defiende el mismo enfoque:  
Si, tal como lo afirmé en “El Significado de ‘Significado’”, nuestros estados 
mentales intencionales no están en nuestras cabezas, sino más bien, deben 
concebirse como habilidades que implican el mundo, habilidades identificadas 
con las transacciones que éstas permiten con el ambiente, entonces dichos 
estados no se identifican simplemente con el “software” de la mente.  (Putnam, 
2012b: 25)  
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En estos últimos escritos Putnam parece ignorar el hecho que ellos coinciden con sus 
escritos internalistas en el rechazo a las doctrinas metafísicas y solipsistas, tales como el 
funcionalismo. Sin embargo, en dichos escritos posteriores pareciera como si Putnam 
quisiera reconciliar dos doctrinas incompatibles, pues defiende el realismo del sentido 
común al mismo tiempo que acepta la existencia de los qualia como una hipótesis 
metodológica (inspirado por el artículo de 2007 de Ned Block.) De igual manera, en 
uno de sus últimos escritos (en respuesta a la tesis de McDowell que la experiencia es 
conceptual), Putnam acepta que  las cualidades fenomenológicas de las sensaciones 
pueden ser compartidas por varias personas:  
No veo ninguna razón para dudar que un niño de dos o tres años (o incluso un 
neo-nato) experimente el calor y el dolor al igual que yo lo hago; o, para ser 
más precisos, no veo ninguna razón para dudar que la cualidad fenomenológica 
de dicha experiencia sea la misma que cuando el niño crezca. (Putnam, 2012b: 
348) 
Esta afirmación contradice lo dicho en las Conferencias Dewey en lo concerniente a la 
inmediatez de la percepción, donde se afirma que percibimos las propiedades de los 
objetos y no sus cualidades fenoménicas. Esta contradicción, por lo tanto, se suma a la 
evidencia que se ha tratado de mostrar en esta tesis: existen grandes semejanzas entre el 
realismo interno y el realismo natural (ambos rechazan la idea que lo que percibimos 
son qualia), y ambas doctrinas rechazan la afirmación funcionalista que los estados 
mentales no son computacionalmente plásticos. De igual manera, ambas doctrinas 
rechazan también la idea que dos personas puedan tener el mismo estado físico 
computacional. Por estas razones, el giro de Putnam hacia el funcionalismo liberal (en 
sus artículos en 2012a y b) deja sobre la mesa preguntas más difíciles de responder que 
aquellas planteadas por el realismo interno: ¿es que el hecho de aceptar en sus escritos 
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del naturalismo liberal la identidad de la cualidad de las experiencias le lleva por ende a 
aceptar también una tesis similar a la  de la “interface” con respecto de la percepción? 
De igual forma, ¿es posible reconciliar la afirmación naturalista de Putnam que 
percibimos directamente las propiedades de los objetos con la afirmación de la 
existencia de los sense-data? Desafortunadamente Putnam no vivió lo suficiente para 
responder satisfactoriamente a estos interrogantes; sin embargo, la totalidad de sus 
escritos, considerados como un intento para comprender la relación entre la mente y la 
realidad, son una invitación a la reflexión para las futuras generaciones de filósofos. 
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ANEXO 
 
A continuación anexo mi artículo “Is Putnam’s internal realism solipsist?”, publicado en 
la revista Universitas Philosophica, 32 (64), Bogotá Jan./June 2015, disponible en línea: 
http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S012053232015000100018 
La razón por la que este artículo es anexado a la tesis es por que complementa y 
profundiza lo dicho en el capítulo 3 acerca de la verdad y la trascendencia de la 
justificación.  
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ABSTRACT 
In this essay I claim that Hilary Putnam’s recent rejection of his former doctrine of internal realism as 
solipsistic is a misfired claim. Putnam’s rejection of his early doctrine is illustrated by the criticism of his 
own verificationist account of truth and justification, which is based on the counterfactual conditional: “S 
is true if and only if believing S is justified if epistemic conditions are good enough”. By accepting that 
whatever makes it rational to believe that S also makes it rational to believe that S would be justified were 
conditions good enough, Putnam concludes that the verificationist unavoidably steers between solipsism 
and metaphysical realism. As opposed to this, I claim that Putnam’s later criticism of his own internal 
realism fails to acknowledge the pragmatic side of this philosophical approach; namely, the idea that, 
regardless the close relation between truth and justification, not all sentences in a language game are to be 
understood in a verificationist fashion. Thus, the understanding of the counterfactual “S would be 
justified if epistemic conditions were good enough” doesn’t call for a verificationist reading, which, as 
Putnam claims, yields solipsism, but rather, for a pragmatic approach which emphasizes on the non-
formality of language understanding. 
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¿ES SOLIPSISTA EL REALISMO INTERNO DE PUTNAM? 
JAVIER TORO 
 
RESUMEN 
En este ensayo sostengo que el reciente rechazo de Putnam de su primera doctrina del realismo interno 
como solipsista es un argumento fallido. Este rechazo viene ilustrado por la crítica de su propia 
explicación verificacionista de la verdad y la justificación, que se basa en el condicional contrafáctico: “S 
es verdadero si y solo si creer que S se justifica si las condiciones epistémicas son suficientemente 
buenas”. Al aceptar que lo que hace racional creer que S también hace racional creer que S se justifica si 
las condiciones son suficientemente buenas, Putnam concluye que el verificacionista inevitablemente 
oscila entre el solipsismo y el realismo metafísico. En oposición a esto, sostengo que la última crítica de 
Putnam a su propio realismo interno falla en reconocer el lado pragmático de su propuesta filosófica; a 
saber, la idea de que, sin importar la relación tan estrecha entre verdad y justificación, no todas las 
oraciones de un juego de lenguaje se deben entender de un modo verificacionista. En consecuencia, la 
comprensión del contrafáctico “S se justifica si las condiciones epistémicas son suficientemente buenas”, 
no exige una lectura verificacionista, la cual, como Putnam sostiene, conduce al solipsismo sino, más 
bien, da lugar a un acercamiento pragmático que enfatiza la no formalidad en la comprensión del 
lenguaje. 
Palabras clave: Putnam; realismo; pragmatismo; verdad; correspondencia 
 
 
  
IN A RECENTLY PUBLISHED REVIEW OF HILARY PUTNAM’S latest book Philosophy in an Age of 
Science, Jerry Fodor writes: “it would take at least two workaday philosophers to keep up with 
Hilary Putnam” (Fodor 2013: 30). As extreme as that sounds, Fodor is not exaggerating when 
he also says that Putnam is one among the few philosophers who can say important things about 
“the philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy 
of language, the philosophy of mathematics, philosophical ethics (analytic and otherwise), and 
the debate between solipsists, phenomenologists and realists about the epistemological and 
metaphysical status of ‘external’ objects” (Fodor 2013: 30). Without necessarily being one of 
Fodor’s “workaday philosophers” trying to keep up with Putnam’s work in each and every one 
of these areas, I will address in this essay one of the topics to which Putnam has shown a good 
deal of concern in his latest publications, namely, the relation between solipsism and his former 
doctrine of internal realism.  
In his latest book, Philosophy in an Age of Science (2012), as well as in recent 
publications
1
, Putnam has repented from his doctrine of internal realism because, as he came to 
see it, it amounted to a Cartesian epistemological picture that ultimately becomes solipsistic. In 
fact he admits that:  
On a verificationist account of understanding […] the only substantive notion of correctness 
available to a thinker is that of being verified. If that is the only notion of correctness that my 
‘mind/brain’ is supposed to be able to use […] then my talk about other people is only 
intelligible to me as a device for making statements that are or will be verified by my 
experiences. (Putman 2012: 79) 
Since verificationism, as now Putnam sees it, renders internal realism solipsistic, he has 
come to reject the coherence of this doctrine. Such rejection has led him into the adoption of 
natural realism (inspired by William James), namely, the pragmatist idea which insists that 
objects are perceived immediately and corrigibly (as opposed to inferentially through sense 
data)
2
.  
As opposed to Putnam himself, I will argue that his former doctrine of internal realism is an 
anti-skeptical doctrine, which is more in accordance to the main tenets of pragmatism than his 
recent writings are. Thus, under this interpretation, internal realism, by adopting a 
justificationist approach to beliefs and truth, not only becomes an alternative to the 
metaphysical realism opposed both by Putnam and the classical pragmatists, but also becomes a 
relevant account of belief construction. 
Of course, one cannot ignore the many criticisms that have fallen upon internal realism 
(Devitt 1984 Putnam, 1990, 1999, 2012). In this essay I follow Putnam’s criticism of his former 
talk about qualia (Putnam 1999), which was supposed to afford the “ideal epistemic conditions” 
in internal realism. Though now he accepts the possibility of such talk (Putnam 2012), what he 
said about this topic in his Threefold Cord seems very relevant. Therefore, since the topic of 
Putnam’s drifting attitude towards mental qualia is so vast, in this essay I will simply take for 
granted that the criticisms of The Threefold Cord against the meaningfulness of the internal 
realist’s talk about qualia are much to the point. 
Thus, keeping in mind that internal realism is far from being a perfect doctrine –which, by 
the way, more than a doctrine, like pragmatism, would be a philosophical attitude–, in this 
                                                 
1 See especially Putnam 1999, 2007, and the responses in Baghramian 2012. 
2 See “James’s Theory of Perception”, in Putnam 1990. 
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essay I will insist that Putnam’s rejection of his former doctrine and his charges of solipsism are 
misfired.  
1. 
PUTNAM’S “INTERNAL REALISM” DEFENDS THE IDEA THAT “elements of what we call 
‘language’ or ‘mind’ penetrate so deeply into what we call ‘reality’ that the very project of 
representing ourselves as being ‘mappers’ of something ‘language-independent’ is fatally 
compromised from the very start.” (Putnam 1990: 28) This philosophical approach, which 
started with his 1978 article “Realism and Reason”, and finished around the publication of his 
collection of essays in Realism With a Human Face, in 1990, was meant to be a reaction against 
the “strangle hold which a number of dichotomies appear to have on the thinking of both 
philosophers and laymen. Chief among these is the dichotomy between objective and subjective 
views of truth and reason.” (Putnam 1981: ix). The main objective view of truth and reason that 
Putnam opposed with his internal realism was Metaphysical Realism, the doctrine which holds 
that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one 
true and complete description of ‘the way the world is’. Truth involves some sort of 
correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things.” 
(Putnam 1981: 49) As opposed to this, internal realism holds that the question “what objects 
does the world consist of? is a question that it only makes sense to ask within a theory or 
description.” (Ibid.) 
However, internal realism, for Putnam, was a short-lived approach to philosophy. Around 
1990 (in the “Response to Simon Blackburn”, in Putnam 1994), he started to find flaws in this 
doctrine and began to move towards, what he calls, “natural realism”, inspired by William 
James’s radical empiricism. In different places3, Putnam has described internal realism as a 
position which commits itself to the metaphysical doctrines which was supposed to combat. For 
example, the heart of internal realism, as Putnam claims, was verificationist semantics, inspired 
by Michael Dummett; in Putnam’s version of that semantics “truth, was identified with 
verifiability under epistemically ideal conditions.” (Putnam 2012: 25) Thus, according to the 
Dummettian view of verificationist semantics, which Putnam accepted, “to grasp the meaning 
of a statement is to know what would justify asserting it or denying it.” (Dummett 2004: 114) 
The core of the problem is related with the referential access to and justification of such 
epistemically ideal conditions for, under the internalist picture, “the world was allowed to 
determine whether I am in a sufficiently good epistemic situation or only seem to myself to be 
in one.” (Putnam 2012: 25) For Putnam, such situation presupposes the Cartesian dualism –
which he has always rejected– between a passive observer and the World. Putnam eventually 
abandoned this internalist picture because it relied on two epistemic features which he came to 
reject: the idea of conceptual schemes as being the only reality of which we can speak of, and 
the acceptance of sense data or qualia as the main elements of perception:  
On my alternative picture the world was allowed to determine whether I actually am in a 
sufficiently good epistemic situation or whether I only seem to myself to be in one –thus 
retaining an important idea from commonsense realism– but the conception of an epistemic 
situation was, at bottom, just the traditional epistemological one. My picture still retained the 
basic premise of an interface between the knower and everything ‘outside.’ (Putnam 1999: 18)  
                                                 
3 For example, Putnam 1994 “Comments and Replies”; Putnam 1999 “The Threefold Cord”; and Putnam 2012, 
“From Quantum Mechanics to Ethics and Back Again.” 
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The importance of such mental qualia was that, on the internalist picture, it served as the 
basis for the conceptualization of reality:  
On the ‘internal realist’ picture it is not only our experiences (conceived of as ‘sense data’) that 
are an interface between us and the world; our ‘conceptual schemes’ were likewise conceived of 
as an interface. And the two ‘interfaces’ were related: our ways of conceptualizing, our language 
games, were seen by me as controlled by ‘operational constraints’ which ultimately reduce to our 
sense data. (Putnam 2012: 26)  
Thus, in his 1994 Dewey Lectures, Putnam rejected internal realism because, as he then 
saw it, it used conceptual schemes and sense data as an interface between the mind and reality. 
According to him, all we could know under internalist constraints were linguistic constructions 
based on unverifiable mental qualia. For this reason, Putnam has abandoned the internalist 
picture and has adopted instead the Jamesian doctrine of natural realism; a doctrine which sees 
us “as open to the world, as interacting with the world in ways that permit aspects of it to reveal 
themselves to us.” (Putnam 2012: 27) 
Nevertheless, Putnam has recently accepted that talk of mental qualia makes good sense, 
and thus, his rejection of internal realism now centers on charges of solipsism and lack of public 
intelligibility.  
2.  
IN A RECENTLY PUBLISHED ARTICLE CALLED “Corresponding with Reality”, Putnam claims that 
his internal realism, due to the solipsism of its “verificationist semantics”, “far from being an 
intelligible alternative to a supposedly unintelligible metaphysical realism, can itself possess no 
public intelligibility.” (Putnam 2012: 80) The reason is that, as Putnam now sees the issue, 
verificationist semantics restricts the range of justification to those sentences which can be 
verified only by me, leaving no room for intersubjectivity. As he admits, though, in Reason, 
Truth, and History he was already aware of such danger, and thus, in that book he defined “an 
intersubjective notion of truth in terms of verification (“justification”) thus: S is true if and only 
if believing S would be justified if epistemic conditions were good enough.” (Putnam 2012: 79) 
But, as the criticism goes, according to this sort of verificationism, understanding a sentence 
amounts to understanding a counterfactual that confirms it:  
Let us suppose, as seems reasonable, that whatever makes it rational to believe that S makes it 
rational to believe that S would be justified were conditions good enough. If my understanding 
of the counterfactual “S would be justified if conditions were good enough” is exhausted by my 
capacity to tell to what degree it is justified to assert it, as my “verificationist semantics” 
claimed, and that is always the same as the degree to which it is justified to assert S itself, then I 
might as well have simply said that my understanding of S is just my capacity to tell what 
confirms S. (Putnam 2012: 79)  
By equating the understanding of a sentence to the “internal” capacity to decide on its 
confirmation, verificationst semantics, the core of internal realism, becomes a solipsistic option. 
Thus, as Putnam came to see it, internal realism is a solipsistic doctrine because it accepts that 
what makes a statement true is also supposed to be what the statement means, in other words, 
my understanding of S is just my capacity to tell what confirms S to what degree. It is in this 
way that, according to Putnam, internal realism (and verificationism) conflates meaning and 
justification: if the meaning of a statement is exhausted by my capacity to tell what justifies it, 
then, by restricting the meaning of sentences to individual means of justification, one falls into 
solipsism. The problem of solipsism, so present in philosophy since the Cartesian cogito, is an 
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unacceptable position for the pragmatist or the internal realist. It is unacceptable because it 
implies that the meaning of words is determined by internal and individual criteria, and not by 
social criteria. Therefore, such arguments like the Cartesian cogito and the Brains in a Vat 
argument
4
, do not reflect the importance that intersubjectivity has for internal realism.  
In what follows I will argue that such criticism of internal realism is misfired, since Putnam 
wrongly equates the understanding of a fact (S) with the understanding of a counterfactual (1) 
“S would be justified if epistemic conditions were good enough”. More than committing a 
logical blunder –which is almost unthinkable in the case of Putnam–, I will argue that his later 
rejection of his former doctrine of internal realism overlooks the importance of pragmatist 
holism, namely, the idea that the knowledge of certain specific rules of language games is a 
necessary condition for the belief of certain facts.  
Both, in the above cited article, as well as in his article “Between Scylla and Charybdis: 
Does Dummett Have a Way Through?” published in the volume The Philosophy of Michael 
Dummett, Putnam conflates the meaning of counterfactual (1) with the meaning of S, which is 
obviously not the case. To see how he comes to this conclusion, let’s inquire what does it mean 
that the verificationist, according to Putnam, is trapped by solipsism by accepting that his 
understanding of S is the same as his capacity to tell what confirms S.  
For Putnam it is reasonable to suppose “that whatever makes it rational to believe that S 
makes it rational to believe that S would be justified were conditions good enough.” (Putnam 
2007: 162) But, he continues, this apparently “reasonable” claim leads the verificationist 
straight into solipsism:  
If my understanding of the counterfactual “S would be justified if conditions were good enough” 
is exhausted by my capacity to tell to what degree it is justified to assert it, and that is always the 
same as the degree to which it is justified to assert S itself, why did I bother to mention the 
counterfactual at all? Why did I not just say that my understanding of S is just my capacity to tell 
what confirms S to what degree, full stop? (Ibid.)  
According to this, the counterfactual (1) “S would be justified if conditions were good 
enough”, is equated to S itself, which is a very long stretch. What Putnam fails to see is that (1) 
is a condition for S, not the other way around: let us suppose that S stands for the belief in the 
existence of saber-toothed tigers 30.000 years ago (an example of Putnam’s). Then, according to 
verificationist semantics, S would be true if it is justified by epistemic conditions such as the 
acceptance of archeological evidence, the fossil record and all the scientific knowledge which 
surrounds such evidence. However, at the same time, S is indirectly justified by the 
understanding and acceptance of (1) as an epistemic principle, not the other way around: the 
capacity to tell to which degree it is justified to assert (1) is not the same as the degree to which 
it is justified to assert S. That (1) is a condition of S, and not the other way around, is clear 
because one cannot meaningfully say that “The belief in the existence of saber-toothed tigers 
30.000 years ago would be justified if epistemic conditions were good enough” is true if and 
only if the belief in the existence of saber-toothed tigers 30.000 years ago is true.  
What makes the belief in the existence of saber-toothed tigers 30.000 years ago true –
according to the verificationist– is the understanding that such belief would be true if and only if 
epistemic conditions were good enough.  
                                                 
4 See Putnam 1981. 
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Then, as was shown, the capacity to tell to which degree it is justified to assert (1) is not 
exhausted by the capacity to tell to which degree it is justified to assert S. The verificationist 
expects that all true beliefs are justified; but what justifies my belief in a fact S is not the same 
as that which justifies my belief in counterfactual (1). Ultimately, of course, both are justified 
linguistically, but that is not what is at stake here. What is at stake is the charge that 
verificationism is solipsistic because it equates the meaning of sentences with their internal 
justification, which, as we have seen, amounts to the conflating of the capacity to tell to which 
degree it is justified to assert S with the capacity to tell to which degree it is justified to assert 
(1).  
Now, however, we must face the question whether verificationist semantics is itself 
justified according to its own standards
5
. In other words, since what renders true and justifies 
the belief in every sentence S is the acceptance of the counterfactual (1), which asserts that S is 
justified if conditions are good enough; then, what justifies the belief in counterfactual (1)? It 
seems rather strange to justify the statement “a sentence is justified if epistemic conditions are 
good enough” by saying that what justifies it is that a statement is justified if epistemic 
conditions are good enough! Thus, trying to justify (1) by appealing to (1) itself leads us to a 
circular argumentation. 
In Reason, Truth, and History, Putnam says that “a non-realist or ‘internal’ realist regards 
conditional statements as statements which we understand (like all other statements) in large 
part by grasping their justification conditions.” (1981: 122) Therefore, like all other statements 
which are justified by their epistemic conditions, we accept (1) for its epistemic conditions. The 
problem is that (1) is itself the very “principle” which says that a statement is justified due to its 
epistemic conditions. We are facing here something similar to a Convention-T sort of sentence: 
“S is justified if conditions are good enough” is true if and only if S is justified if conditions are 
good enough. It is this sort of coherentism –criticized by Putnam long ago in his Model 
Theoretic Argument (Putnam 1983)– which makes him now believe that his former doctrine of 
internal realism is solipsistic. Thus, in his latest writings, Putnam has found that for the 
verificationist there is no way out of this coherentism, and therefore verificationism amounts to 
solipsism. In what follows, I will argue that statements such as (1) are not to be understood as 
principles in need of verification, but rather as pragmatic conditions for our linguistic practices; 
then, the only possible option that the verificationist has for her belief in (1) is a non 
verificationist way, a pragmatic way.  
3. 
AS WE HAVE JUST SEEN, THE CONDITIONAL “S would be justified if conditions were good 
enough” is not to be understood as the meaning of S itself, as the later Putnam pretends, but 
rather, as a pragmatic condition for the meaning of S. Such move, as was explained above, 
avoids the charges of solipsism which Putnam levels against his former doctrine of internal 
realism. However, as we just pointed out, such conditional cannot be itself understood in a 
verificationist way, since it would end up in a circular argumentation. To see a possible (non-
solipsist and non-circular) way to understand such conditional I propose to approach it 
pragmatically.  
                                                 
5 Putnam has enquired in a similar fashion the question whether the positivist’s principle of verification is itself 
verifiable according to positivist standards. See Putnam 1983 “Philosophers and human understanding”; and Putnam 
1992. 
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Both, in his 2007 and his 2012, Putnam reminds us that by the time he wrote Reason, Truth, 
and History, and defined truth as idealized justification, he wasn’t aware of the solipsist 
“dilemma” of conflating the meaning of a sentence with its assertability conditions. 
Nevertheless, in that book, not only he mentions that the “‘internal’ realist regards conditional 
statements as statements which we understand (like all other statements) in large part by 
grasping their justification conditions” (Putnam 1981: 122), but also emphasizes that such 
justification conditions are objective: as opposed to the “methodological solipsist” and relativist, 
the internalist position  
assumes an objective notion of rational acceptability. The non-realist rejects the notion that truth 
is correspondence to a ‘ready-made world’. That is what makes him a non –(metaphysical)– 
realist. But rejecting the metaphysical ‘correspondence’ theory of truth is not at all the same as 
regarding truth or rational acceptability as subjective … The whole purpose of relativism, its 
very defining characteristic, is, however, to deny the existence of any intelligible notion of 
objective ‘fit’6. Thus the relativist cannot understand talk about truth in terms of objective 
justification-conditions. (Putnam 1981: 123)  
Thus, the internalist understanding of conditionals depends on an objective notion of 
rational acceptability, which, of course, is different from a correspondence theory of truth. 
However, we may ask, if the internalist is not assuming a metaphysical correspondence between 
language and reality, then, what is this notion of “objective fit” which he assumes and the 
solipsist and relativist deny?  
Unfortunately, in Reason, Truth, and History, Putnam doesn’t give a clear and satisfactory 
answer to this question. The closest he gets is by emphasizing that truth, rather than 
correspondence to facts, is idealized assertability. But, since the notion of idealized assertability 
implies the very notions of verificationist semantics and conditionals which we are trying to 
understand, it seems that such an answer won’t take us very far. However, in his Pragmatism: 
An Open Question, Putnam rehearses an answer which I think is on the right track. In the 
chapter called “Was Wittgenstein a Pragmatist?”, Putnam criticizes philosophers like Richard 
Rorty, Michael Williams, and Paul Horwich, who, according to him, read Wittgenstein as 
supporting the idea that language use is based on definite criteria. Thus, “the heart of Rorty’s 
reading of [Wittgensteinian language games] is his comparison of criteria with programs… 
Rorty sees language games as virtually automatic performances.” (Putnam 1995: 33-4) 
Although not very far from Rorty’s approach to language games, 
[o]n Horwich’s view, a language game is to be understood as consisting of sentences for which 
(if we confine attention to assertoric language) there are ‘assertability conditions’. These 
conditions specify that under certain observable conditions a sentence counts as true or at least as 
‘confirmed’… Note that this account differs from Rorty’s only in that the ‘criteria’ which govern 
our use of words provide (in some cases) for degrees of assertability less than certainty. Still, 
speakers who understand their language in the same way and who have the same evidence 
should all agree on the degree of assertability of their sentences, in this model, just as in Rorty’s.  
(Putnam 1995: 45-6)  
This paragraph makes us wonder if, due to the emphasis on the degree of assertability of 
sentences, such positivistic interpretation of Wittgenstein (as Putnam calls it) parallels the 
internalist account. The main difference between this positivistic reading of Wittgenstein and 
Putnam’s own pragmatist reading (which, as I claim, amounts to his internal realism) is that the 
first account takes sentences as marks and noises, for which assertability is separated from truth: 
under certain observable conditions a sentence counts as true. As opposed to this, Putnam’s 
                                                 
6 Here Putnam is making reference to Nelson Goodman’s idea of versions fitting with worlds. See: Goodman, 1978. 
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pragmatist reading of Wittgenstein insists on the idea that “the use of the words in a language 
game cannot be described without using concepts which are related to the concepts employed in 
the game.” (Putnam 1995: 46) This means that language games are not ruled by a definite set of 
criteria, a set which, if one pays attention enough, one would learn how to use; but rather, that 
language games are self-contained forms of life:  
Someone who doesn’t see the ‘point’ of the language game, and who cannot imaginatively put 
himself in the position of an engaged player, cannot judge whether the ‘criteria’ are applied 
reasonably or unreasonably… Understanding a language game is sharing a form of life. And 
forms of life cannot be described in a fixed positivistic meta-language… (Putnam 1995: 47-8) 
Whereas the positivistic reading of Wittgenstein takes criteria to be exterior to the language 
game, as some external aid we use when it comes to understand language games, Putnam’s 
pragmatist reading of Wittgenstein sees language games as forms of life which cannot be 
described without using the same concepts which are internal to the game itself. That is why 
someone who cannot imaginatively put himself in the position of an engaged player cannot 
judge whether the ‘criteria’ are applied reasonably or unreasonably. Under this interpretation, 
the idea that assertability conditions are external to the truth of statements is ruled out. For 
Putnam, assertability and truth are internally related notions: 
To know under what conditions a statement (not a ‘sentence’) is assertable is to know under 
what conditions it is true or liable to be true. The idea that assertability conditions are conditions 
for making a noise is a total distortion of Wittgenstein’s meaning. ‘Assertability’ and ‘truth’ are 
internally related notions: one comes to understand both by standing inside a language game, 
seeing its ‘point’, and judging assertability and truth. (Putnam 1995: 48-9) 
If the assertability conditions of a statement are not separated from its truth, then, it doesn’t 
make sense trying to apply separate criteria to statements in general, which would be an 
unnecessary and artificial move. In order to understand the statements of every language game 
one must stand inside it and know that the truth of one’s words are related to their assertability 
conditions, to the effect that both are to be judged uniformly. Of course, as verificationist 
semantics shows, every language game has internal rules which one must follow, and one such 
internal rule of our language game is that we pragmatically accept that a statement is justified if 
conditions are good enough. This rule of our language game, together with all our other 
cognitive ideals, “only makes sense considered as part of our idea of human flourishing” 
(Putnam 1995: 43) 
4.  
NOW WE ARE IN A BETTER POSITION TO UNDERSTAND PUTNAM’S internalist conditional that “S 
is justified if epistemic conditions are good enough”. We said above that such conditional 
couldn’t be understood in a verificationist fashion, since it would imply a circular 
argumentation. In the same way, the positivistic reading of Wittgenstein which Putnam 
criticizes doesn’t help in understanding sentences like “S is justified if epistemic conditions are 
good enough” because the meaning of the sentence itself makes reference to a principle of 
justification conditions for sentences. As was pointed above, establishing assertability 
conditions or criteria for such a sentence leads us into a circular argumentation; thus the need to 
understand such sentence non-criterially. Putnam’s reading of Wittgenstein affords us with the 
possibility to understand such conditionals in a pragmatist way: one can only understand the 
conditional that a statement is justified if conditions are good enough if one shares a certain 
language game. Strangely enough, in “Corresponding With Reality” (in his 2012), the very 
article in which Putnam charges internal realism of being solipsist, he himself, towards the end, 
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reminds us the importance of Wittgensteinian “imponderable evidence” (as he did in his 
Pragmatism: An Open Question) when it comes to justification. As Putnam sees it, “[not] only 
what is shaped like a proposition can justify a proposition.” (Putnam 2012: 89) Thus, the criteria 
of verification for the internal realist is not limited only to propositions, but it is open to other 
means of verification. By asking to criterially justify the convention of our language game, 
which asserts that a statement is justified if conditions are good enough, Putnam seems to ignore 
his own pragmatist reading of Wittgenstein. This interpretation seems to be also in line with 
Putnam’s approval7 of what Stanley Cavell (in a very pragmatist tone, reminiscent of Peirce) 
has said about skepticism and justification, namely that in order to understand language games 
and avoid skepticism, one must be attuned in them.
8
 
This is actually not very far from Michael Dummett’s account of justification through 
language learning: “when we acquire the practice of using language, what we learn is what is 
taken to justify assertions of different types.” (Dummett 2004: 114) Internal realism, far from 
being the solipsist doctrine which Putnam now claims it to be, gives us a clue to our 
justificatory practices by pointing out to one of our more accepted rules of justification, namely, 
the condition that a statement is justified if the epistemological conditions for stating it are good 
enough.  
The understanding of this conditional is not a metaphysical bedrock, a condition for 
understanding language in general; but rather, it makes part of what it is to share a form of life. 
It would indeed be natural for a skeptic who didn’t share our language game to doubt this 
conditional. Such a skeptic would probably not be satisfied until one provides him an argument 
similar to Descartes’s cogito argument, an argument where, only apparently, the metaphysical 
bedrock of certainty was reached. Such a skeptic, naturally, would not be satisfied with the 
pragmatist argument that I am associating with Putnam (as he himself associated it with 
Wittgenstein) either; which shows that, after all, Putnam’s interpretation of Wittgenstein still 
seems to the point when he says that “the possibilities of ‘external’ understanding of a deeply 
different form of life are extremely limited.” (Putnam 1995: 50) 
Putnam’s latest choice of trying to understand the conditional “S is justified if conditions 
are good enough” by applying criteria, (as his 2007 and 2012 show), seems to be a retreat to the 
metaphysical realism which he has so much criticized. The idea that such conditional statement 
stands for justification as any other statement of our language game does is a retreat to 
metaphysical realism because it asks us to justify certain cognitive norms of our form of life 
which only a skeptic or an alien to such form of life would bring into question.  
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